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Abstract 
 
 
 
Lahore, Anarkali, mid-1950s. A distinguished-looking refugee is standing in 
front of a petition writer in the hope of getting the better of the Pakistani 
bureaucracy and having a property allotted.  A few miles ahead, another refugee, 
camped in a school, is drafting a letter to the editor of the Pakistan Times. He 
will hide his identity through the pseudonym ‘desperate’. Both of them belonged 
to the throng of those muhajirs who, back in 1947, had embarked on a dreadful 
journey towards what they perceived to be their homeland.  
Historiographical trends have tended to overlook the everyday experience of 
the state among those middle-class Partition refugees who resettled in Pakistani 
Punjab. Focusing mainly on their ‘less fortunate’ fellow citizens, these 
explanations have reproduced that historically-unproven popular narrative that 
ascribes pain and sufferings only to the economically-backward sectors of the 
local society. Even more frequently, well-rooted argumentative patterns have 
superimposed historical and present-day socio-geographical mappings of refugee 
families onto both urban and rural Punjab. These somehow echo that government 
rhetoric that, up to the early 1960s, paid lip service to the notion of a ‘biraderi-
friendly’ rehabilitation. 
This thesis challenges standard interpretations of the resettlement of Partition 
refugees in Pakistani Punjab between 1947 and 1962.  It argues the universality 
of the so-called ‘exercise in human misery’, and the heterogeneity of the 
rehabilitation policies. As it sheds light on these latter original contributions to 
the current knowledge, it questions the ability of the local bureaucracy to 
establish its own ‘polity’, the unsuitability of patronage political systems as an 
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autonomous politological category, and the failure of Pakistan as a state. 
Individual chapters pursue questions of emotional belonging to spatial and 
political places, social change, everyday experiences of the state through its 
institutions, electoral politics, and the deployment of integration/accommodation 
practices as nation- and state-building processes.      
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Glossary 
 
adab   proper moral conduct 
alim (pl. ulama) Muslim scholar learned in the Quran 
anjuman  association 
anna   one sixteenth of a Rupee 
atta   flour 
bahir   external world; domain of the material 
biraderi  kinship group 
chak   village 
crore   ten millions 
dharamsala  rest house for Hindu pilgrims 
fitna   sedition; chaos or fragmentation  
ghar   home; inner self 
gharana  lit., those of the house, close relation 
gurdwara  Sikh temple  
holi   Hindu religious spring festival 
imam   supreme leader of the Muslim community; among Shiites,   
   referred to Ali and his descendants  
izzat   honour; prestige; reputation 
jamabandi  revenue records (land) 
katcha   makeshift; temporary 
kafila   caravan; group of persons travelling together 
kafir   miscreant  
kamin   craftsmen and labourers who earn their living by  
supplying landlords with goods and services  
kirpan   sword owned by all Sikhs as a part of their faith 
‘symbols’/rituals 
lakh   one hundred thousand 
lathi    wooden stick 
maghreb  time of the daily fourth ritual prayer 
maulvi   Muslim scholar learned in the Quran; title used by an alim 
mohalla  neighbourhood 
muezzin  person who calls Muslims to prayer from the minaret of a 
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   mosque 
muhajir  hist., someone who, in 622, joined the Prophet as he 
migrated from Mecca to Medina; in Pakistan, usually 
used to refer to all Partition refugees 
muharram  first month of the year in the Islamic calendar 
murid   follower of a pir 
naqshbandi  affiliate pir whose spiritual lineage traces back to the  
   homonym sufi order 
patwari  Revenue Department officer at tehsil level 
pir   Sufi saint 
purdah  practice among women of living in separate rooms;  
fig., seclusion 
qabza derina  long-time possession 
raj   rule; empire  
sajjada nashin lit., one who sits on the carpet, head of a pir family  
salat   ritual prayer performed five times daily, one of the five 
   pillars of Islam  
seh parta  assessment list 
shakra malikana particular type of rent contract  
sharia   Islamic law 
sufi   Muslim mystic  
tabbar   unit of kinship groups, ranging from a mononuclear family 
   up to three-generation lineally-related kinsmen 
taziya   processional miniature tombs 
tehsil   administrative subdivision of a district 
zamindar  landowner; landholder 
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Note on transliterations and translations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Urdu, Hindi and Arabic words have all been italicised and transliterated. This 
dissertation makes use of a simplified mode of transliteration without the use of 
diacritical marks. For place names, transliteration contemporary with the sources 
has been maintained. The English form of the plural is used in preference to the 
foreign one. 
All translations from Hindi, Arabic, Persian and Urdu are my own. Manto’s 
short stories are taken from S. H. Manto, Mottled Dawn: Fifty Sketches and 
Stories of Partition, New Delhi, 1997. The translation of Faiz A. Faiz’s poem is 
by Agha Shahid Ali in Annual of Urdu Studies, 11, 1996, p. 87. ! !
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Introduction 
  
On 5th April 2012, on an otherwise business-as-usual and humdrum political 
evening, the President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari hit the headlines with a 
declaration that caused an almost immediate uproar.  Addressing the Pakistan 
People Party (PPP) Executive Council at the Governor House in Lahore, he 
argued that the Sharif brothers “were living [in Lahore] as migrants”.1 According 
to local press reports, President Zardari further rubbed the salt into the wound by 
polemically dragging in the funeral of their father at Data Darbar.2 The reactions 
of both the family and party members were immediate. Maryam Sharif – Nawaz’ 
daughter – tweeted:  “Guys, do you sees Zardari’s statements on TV channels. 
Wish he had kept this side of him hidden”.3 For his part, the Punjab Law 
Minister Rana Sanaullah voiced the opinions and the mood of affiliates of the 
Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PML(N)). “I cannot even believe” – he 
declared to Express News – “that such shameful remarks were given by the 
president. It seems like he has gone mad”.4  
The unsigned editorial that the PML(N)-leaning newspaper The Nation 
(Lahore) published a couple of days later came as a bit of a surprise. “President 
Asif Ali Zardari” – its opening words were – “has mocked his main political 
rivals, the PML(N), calling the party leaders […] emigrants. Whether he meant 
this just politically, as they were, he said, camping on Lahore, which was 
actually PPP territory, or personally, when he said that they had to take their 
father’s corpse to Data Darbar to raise a funeral congregation, the Sharif brothers 
                                                
1 The Express Tribune (Karachi), 6th April 2012.  
2 Nawa-i-Waqt (Lahore), 7th April 2012, and The Nation (Lahore), 6th April 2012. 
3 http://twitter.com/maryamnsharif (accessed 29th June 2012). 
4 The Express Tribune (Karachi), 6th April 2012.  
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should realise that they have brought it [upon] themselves”. Indeed, Zardari’s 
statement followed on from the harsh campaign that the PML(N) had concocted 
against the PPP central government in the early months of 2012. Nevertheless, 
the columnist failed to tune properly into the mood of a certain section of the 
Punjabi society, whose feelings and emotions were made clear to me by one of 
its members. Sons of an upper-middle class businessman who migrated from 
Amritsar to Lahore as a result of the 1947 communal disturbances, Nawaz and 
Shahbaz Sharif belong to the large ‘family’ of those muhajirs who resettled in 
the Pakistani Punjab. The words of the PPP leader wove private and public 
narratives into a single political plot. Never before – my interlocutor confided in 
me – had this specific element of the refugee community’s identity been brought 
in the public domain in such a rude manner and made so overtly political.5  
Both the personal and community histories of those Partition refugees who 
resettled in West Punjab differ substantially from the experience of the muhajirs 
who eventually ended up in Sindh. There, the Urdu-speaking migrant community 
has been involved in a longstanding and at times violent ethnic clash with the 
Sindhi majority and eventually founded its own political party.6  By contrast, in 
West Punjab, refugees trod a relatively smoother path towards their assimilation 
within the local social fabric. A common language and cultural background 
certainly has helped to prevent them from fomenting harsh contrapositions and 
retreating into potentially stubborn ethnic differences.  All the same, they have 
still developed their own political identity, which, in recent years, has found in 
the PML(N) its standard-bearer. The founding fathers and almost all the upper 
                                                
5 Conversation with the author, 8th April 2012. Due to his/her prominence and the possible 
implications of his/her declaration, the interviewee will remain unnamed.  
6 On this point see O. Verkaaik, Migrants and Militants: Fun and Urban Violence in Pakistan, 
Princeton, 2004.  
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echelons of this party are first- or second-generation Partition refugees whose 
personal stories leave deep footprints on the land on which they daily walk.  
To place this experience in proper perspective, it is necessary to provide an 
overview of the official Pakistani state discourse on refugee rehabilitation, and 
also to identify the main migratory flows as well as the places, both urban and 
rural, where Partition refugees were resettled.  Figures and statistics on the 
number of refugees who fled into West Punjab are widely acknowledged for 
their unreliability, and still represent a bone of contention between India and 
Pakistan. The collapse of the administrative machinery threw into confusion any 
attempt to keep accurate demographic accounts of the comings and goings of 
persons across the region. In early September 1947, the local correspondent from 
The Times (London) registered that “more than 1,000,000, and possibly as many 
as 2,000,000 people” were trekking either eastwards or westwards in search for a 
safer place in which to live.7  “No reliable estimate” – pinpointed the Governor 
of West Punjab Francis Mudie a month later – “can be formed of the numbers 
who have yet to come from East Punjab. It may be 3,000,000. It may be 
4,000,000”.8 Apparently, only 20% of the displaced persons who were 
temporarily hosted in West Punjab reception camps could be properly identified 
and recorded.9 Nevertheless, some kind of a consensus has been reached on the 
idea that the number of refugees who resettled in West Punjab amounted roughly 
to 5,500,000.10  
In spite of this general agreement, however, these figures still demand to be 
handled with extreme caution. They do not take into account, for instance, the 
                                                
7 The Times (London), 5th September 1947. 
8 The Times (London), 17th October 1947. 
9 Uncoordinated Punjab Refugee Tour Notes, n.d., DO 133/60, NAKG. 
10 Appendix A, File No. B50, NAP. 
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thousands of Indian Muslims who crossed clandestinely the Punjabi border from 
India. According to then Minister of the Interior Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, in 
the lapse of time between 1948 and 1953 an overall total of 441,721 persons 
illegally entered Pakistan.11 Officials within the Rehabilitation Department, West 
Punjab, admitted that 1,000 to 1,500 illegal aliens escaped monthly across the 
border with India.12 Things then become even more complicated when the so-
called refugees from non-agreed areas are brought into play. On 19th-20th 
September 1947, an inter-ministerial conference decided that the resettlement of 
those persons who were fleeing from the disturbed areas of East Punjab and the 
local Princely States would take priority over the evacuation of muhajirs from 
any other Indian regions. With India infringing the agreement, it is highly likely 
that the arrival of non-agreed areas refugees further weakens the accuracy of 
calculations. Apart from anything else, it muddles up possible discussion on the 
geographical origins of this refugee community.  
 Understanding where refugees were resettled or where they resettled 
themselves can be even more controversial. As this dissertation contends, the 
current mapping of their presence in Punjabi towns and villages, whose socio-
geographical coordinates are frequently taken as proof of the homogeneity of the 
rehabilitation practices and therefore exploited as both ‘documentary evidence’ 
and research tools in many historiographical analyses, does not reflect their 
original ‘final destination’. According to the West Punjabi Board of Economic 
Inquiry’s statistical review of the distribution of the migrant community and the 
1951 Pakistan Census, the ‘strongholds’ of the refugee resettlement were the 
                                                
11 First Session of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly – Despatch No. 849, 14th March 1953, 
NND 938750, NARA. 
12 Recent Developments in Refugee Rehabilitation and Resettlement in the Punjab, 12th July 1951, 
NND 938750, NARA. 
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districts of Lahore, Lyallpur (present-day Faisalabad), Montgomery (present-day 
Sahiwal) and Multan.13 Therein, refugees exceeded by far the 5-lakh units (see 
Table 1 below) and accounted – especially in the headquarter towns - for an 
overall average of 56,5% of the local population.14 
Lahore 
Division 
 Rawalpindi 
Division 
 Multan 
Division 
 Bahawalpur 
State 
 
Gujranwala   299.145 Campbellpur   38.121 Dera G. Khan     35.740 Bahawalpur 298.140 
Lahore   745.078 Gujrat 135.676 Jhang    138.649 Rahim Yar 
Khan 
  74.726 
Sheikhupura   309.890 Jhelum   52.376 Lyallpur   986.236   
Sialkot   369.467 Mianwali   46.672 Montgomery   713.050   
  Rawalpindi 106.262 Multan   646.151   
  Shahpur 207.256 Muzaffargarh     78.559   
        
Total 1.723.580  586.363  2.598.385  372.866 
Table 1: Refugee population in the Divisions and Districts of West Punjab – Source: Census of Pakistan - 1951, 
1951. 
 
In line with national statistics, around 90% of the refugee community lived in the 
Punjabi countryside.15 The litmus test of this trend lies in the number of muhajir 
workers whose jobs related to the primary sector:  indeed, 64% of the self-
supporting refugee workforce was on duty on the local fertile agricultural lands 
(see Table 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 Board of Economic Inquiry (West Punjab Government), A Statistical Review of the 
Distribution of Refugees in West Punjab, Lahore, n.d., Mudie Papers, Mss EUR F164/147, IOR 
and Census of Pakistan – Table of Economic Characteristics (West Pakistan), Vol. VII, 1951, 
UPL. 
14 Ibidem. The number of refugees in Lahore (Corporation) was of 363,954 (out of a total 
population of 849,333), in Montgomery of 31,633 (out of 50,185), in Lyallpur of 124,343 (out of 
179,127) and in Multan of 93,586 (out of 190,122). 
15 A. G. Raza, Resettlement of Refugees on Land – A Review, 6th June 1948, DO 142/440, NAKG. 
See also Phillips Jr. W. M., “Urbanisation and Social Change in Pakistan”, Phylon, 25, 1, 1964, 
p. 37. 
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Technical/ 
Professional 
A
dm
inistrative/
M
anagerial 
C
lerical/O
ffice 
W
orkers 
Sales W
orkers 
A
gric./Fish 
W
orkers 
Skilled 
O
peratives 
U
nskilled 
Labourers 
Service 
W
orkers 
O
ther 
Cultivation     1,077,334     
Animal husbandry     39,586     
Other agriculture     5,962     
Forestry/fishery     106     
Mining/quarrying 7  6 27 3  143 89 23  
Manufacturing 976 2,007 2,544 574  179,531 9,196 800  
Building 
construction/ 
Utilities 
266 460 326 9  5,829 479 117  
Trade/Commerce 181 12,128 2,274 119,456  1,698 4,745 1,011  
Transport/Shipping/ 
Port Services 
87 186 1,484   9,780 2,862 2,157  
Post/Telecom. 21 20 1,059   131 52 21  
Education 4,002 70 307 6  5 26 112  
Medical Services 3,504 60 143 17  16 54 30  
Municipal Services 895 540 36,557 5  1,081 198 6778  
Domestic/Personal 
Services 
41 99 442 11  899 9,121 73,008  
Religion/Art/ 
Public Information 
4,097 8 182 1  24 257 62  
Other/Not Classified 284 118 1,449 455  1,325 129,684 5,612 20 
Table 2: Economic groups and occupation of self-supporting muhajirs aged over 12 years old (excludes a) Defence 
Service and b) economically inactive persons) – Source: Census of Pakistan – 1951, 1951 
 
But available statistics – lies, damn lies – register neither the places of origin 
nor the number of extended families that eventually found a new home in these 
districts. They merely draw a numerical and, therefore, largely static picture of 
events, and arguably serve little useful purpose to researchers interested in the 
subtleties of ongoing social change processes. A rare exception to this paucity of 
data is a 1954 albeit partial list of Muslim abducted women and children, in 
which each and every refugee’s place of origin is provided (see Table 3).16 
East Punjab  Patiala and East Punjab States  Other  
Ambala 133 Faridkot State 38 Delhi Province 30 
Amritsar 232 Jind State 85 Other States in India 43 
Ferozepore 455 Kapurthala State 57 Other Places in India 18 
Gurdaspur 141 Nabha State 162 Jammu and Kashmir State 401 
Gurgaon 10 Patiala State 1056   
Hissar 74     
Hoshiarpur 92     
Jullundhur 95     
Kangra 20     
Karnal 40     
Ludhiana 165     
Rohtak 30     
Simla 3     
Table 3: Number of abducted women and children per district – Source: Government of West Punjab, Supplement to 
the List of Muslim Abducted Women and Children in India and Jammu & Kashmir State – Part III, Lahore, 1954 
 
                                                
16 Government of West Punjab, Supplement to the List of Muslim Abducted Women and Children 
in India and Jammu & Kashmir State – Part III, Lahore, 1954, MDRR. 
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 Nevertheless, the 1948 West Punjab Refugee Census reveals that, out of the 
total refugee population who poured into the Pakistani Punjab, 4,197,000 persons 
came from the East Punjab Districts; 682,000 from the East Punjab States; 
202,600 from the Jammu and Kashmir; 191,600 from Alwar; 91,200 from the 
Delhi Province; 28,400 the United Provinces; and some other 93,600 from other 
regions of India.17 The combination of these latter figures with those of the 
earlier 1941 Census of India reveals a clearer – albeit still rather cloudy – picture 
of the districts of origin of those 4,197,000 muhajirs who fled the eastern wing of 
the Punjab. Torn apart by the 1947 communal violence, the districts of 
Karpurtala, Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Jullundur and Ferozepore - whose Muslims, by 
the time of the 1941 Census of India, accounted for respectively 56,4%, 50,2%, 
46,5%, 45,6% and 45,1% of the local inhabitants – certainly registered a steady 
decrease of their Muslim population.18 Arguably, a fair number of refugees came 
also from the districts of Ludhiana, Gurgaon, Hoshiarpur, Ambala, Karnal and 
Faridkot, where Muslims comprised an overall average of 32,6%.19  
Once again, any data extrapolated from the 1948 West Punjab Refugee 
Census must be treated with extreme caution. In practice, their calculation 
resulted from an ‘educated guess’ being made of the number of urban refugees  
settled in the province plus the product obtained by multiplying an estimated 5-
member family by the number of claims for an eventual allotment of agricultural 
land that had been submitted to the local provincial Revenue Department.20 The 
                                                
17 Recent Developments in Refugee Rehabilitation and Resettlement in the Punjab, 12th July 1951, 
NND 938750, NARA.  
18 Census of India – 1941, Vol. VI, New Delhi, 1941, IOR.  
19 Ibidem. 
20 Recent Developments in Refugee Rehabilitation and Resettlement in the Punjab, 12th July 1951, 
NND 938750, NARA.  
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thoroughness of the screening of bogus applications and their subsequent 
systematic ‘writing off’ is unclear.  
Indeed, from the very early stages of the post-1947 resettlement process, 
refugees in West Punjab demonstrated a strong penchant for exaggerating their 
claims and submitting multiple forms for multiple allotments.21 The actual 
magnitude of the problem cannot be calculated, though estimates in one case 
suggest that some 80% of the 3,000 submitted applications for refugee 
allowances were either bogus or highly inflated.22 On 16th December 1952 the 
then Minister for Rehabilitation and Colonies Fazal Ilahi Piracha left a list of 
multiple allotments of West Punjabi evacuee urban properties on the table of the 
local provincial Assembly Hall.23 Unfortunately, it has not survived the merciless 
march of time and the troubled history of local archives in Pakistan. The curious 
case of those “wealthy Muslims from India, [who were] uncertain to return their 
Indian citizenship or become Pakistanis” yet nonetheless applied for – and 
eventually were allotted – either an urban or a rural evacuee property lacks in 
factual accuracy.24 The very same problem applies to all those lands, houses, 
businesses and factories that were illegally occupied by both locals and refugees 
during the chaotic early months of Pakistan’s independence.25  
After all, the scramble for bagging as many profitable evacuee properties as 
possible was not restricted to the refugee community alone. Legally entitled to 
apply for the allotment of all kind of evacuee property whenever the restoration 
and maintenance of the economic life of Pakistan made it necessary, local 
                                                
21 UKHC (New Delhi) to UKHC (Karachi) – Ref. P/69, 9th August 1949, DO 35/2994, NAKG. 
22 Rehabilitation Department of West Punjab, Manual of Instruction – Part I and II, Lahore, 
1949, Chapter VIII, p. 1, PCSL. 
23 Punjab Assembly Debates, 16th December 1952, PCSL.  
24 UKHC (New Delhi) to UKHC (Karachi) – Ref P/69, 9th August 1949, DO 35/2994, NAKG.  
25 A-1, 4th January 1949, NND 765024, NARA. 
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inhabitants started themselves to compete for the allocation of local business and 
industrial premises and houses.26 In their own particular battle, they were, 
according to available sources, spurred on by a deep feeling of resentment at “the 
newcomers [who were] obtaining land and lodgings they themselves would 
like”.27 By early March 1954, according to a not-particularly reliable statistical 
survey published in The Dawn (Karachi), the number of allotted evacuee urban 
houses that were in locals’ hands amounted to 22,670 (out of 160,010) and the 
number of evacuee shops to 23,375 (out of 160,010).28 As regards factories, 
government data released in 1948 suggested that non-refugees ran 244 out of the 
2911 evacuee registered and non-registered factories of the West Punjab. 
Numbers in reality could however have been even higher, for, as the West 
Punjabi authorities reported, locals ‘exploited’ and nominated refugees in order 
to secure an evacuee property for themselves.29  
A couple of official documents published in the mid-1950s – namely The 
Manual of Instruction – Part I and II and the Resettlement of Refugees on Land 
in the Punjab – Part XII and XVI  – go a long way towards unlocking the secrets 
of the official Pakistan state discourse on the resettlement of refugees in West 
Punjab.30 In the eyes of the local politico-institutional apparata, the linchpin of 
the humanitarian emergency was primarily the management and the eventual 
allotment of all those urban and rural properties that had been left behind by 
Hindus and Sikhs during the late summer and the autumn of 1947.  The federal 
                                                
26 On locals’ entitlement to claim an evacuee property, see Rehabilitation Department of West 
Punjab, Manual of Instruction – Part I and II, Lahore, 1949, pp. 6-7, PCSL and West Punjab 
Government Letter No. 2300 – Reh. 49/1678, 10th March 1949, PCSL.    
27 A-1, 4th January 1949, NND 765024, NARA. See also I. Talbot, Divided Cities. Partition and 
its Aftermath in Lahore and Amritsar, 1947-1957, Karachi, 2006, pp. 157, 163-4. 
28 The Dawn (Karachi), 3rd May 1948 and Punjab Assembly Debates, 8th March 1954, PCSL.  
29 West Punjab Government Letter No. 2300 – Reh. 49/1678, 10th March 1949, PCSL.  
30 Rehabilitation Department of West Punjab, Manual of Instruction – Part I and II, Lahore, 
1949, PCSL and Government of West Pakistan, Resettlement of Refugees on Land in the Punjab 
– Part XII and XVI, Lahore, 1956 PCSL.  
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Minister for Refugees and Rehabilitation Khwaja Shahabuddin accordingly 
showed his hand during a question and answer session of the Pakistan 
Constituent Assembly in late September 1950. The schemes, he pointed out, that 
the Government had been enforcing up to then were “(1) the temporary allotment 
of land to agricultural refugees; (2) allotment of evacuee houses; (3) allotment of 
evacuee shops;  (4) grant of maintenance allowance to deserving refugees; (5) 
establishment of cottage industries by the Pakistan Refugee Rehabilitation 
Finance Corporation; (6) schemes for establishing satellite towns or colonies for 
absorbing the overflow of the bigger towns”.31 
Appointed immediately after Independence, the Custodian of Evacuee 
Properties was tasked with the preservation of all the aforementioned possessions 
and the safeguard of the original owners’ rights and interests. During the 5th 
Inter-Dominion Conference held in Karachi in January 1949, Indian and 
Pakistani authorities succeeded in reaching an agreement on the transfer, sale and 
exchange of movable evacuee properties, thereby leaving the Custodian with the 
sole responsibility of managing the immovable ones. He was supposed to 
compile and maintain a complete record of abandoned shops, businesses and 
houses, and to liaise with evacuees, his counterpart in Jullundhur and the Indian 
government.32  
The Custodian of Evacuee Properties, however, was only a tiny cog of the 
resettlement machine. Federal and provincial ministers for refugee resettlement 
quickly took over the ‘political reins’ of both rehabilitation policies and 
practices. Friction between the centre and provinces being an everyday routine 
affair, Joint Refugee Councils were established first in Punjab (1947) and then in 
                                                
31 Pakistan Constituent Assembly Debates, 30th September 1950, PCSL. Point 5 of Shahabuddin’s 
‘refugee manifesto’ will be discussed in detail on pp. 212-3. 
32 Sind Observer (Karachi), 15th January 1949.  
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Sindh, East Bengal and the NWFP (1948).33 Usually attended by the Prime 
Minister, the Minister for Finance and for Refugee Resettlement, Pakistan, and 
the concerned provincial Governors, Chief Ministers and Ministers for Refugee 
Rehabilitation, their meetings aimed at harmonising acts and ordinances and 
coordinating policies.   
But if Ministers and Joint Councils were supposed to be the brain behind the 
reintegration of the muhajir community, all the employees of the Rehabilitation 
Department represented the brawn (see Table 4). At the top of the organisational 
structure of the Department, the Head acted even as Resettlement Secretary to 
the West Punjab Government, and was assisted by a Deputy Secretary and an 
Under-Secretary. In the West Punjab districts of Lahore, Sialkot, Multan, 
Rawalpindi, Lyallpur, Montgomery and Gujranwala, a Deputy Rehabilitation 
Commissioner was appointed to polish off resettlement policies in loco. In the 
remaining districts – where the number of refugees was relatively low - Deputy 
Commissioners fulfilled the ex-officio function of Deputy Rehabilitation 
Commissioners as well.34 Entrusted with the task of allotting houses, shops and 
unregistered factories, they also sat on the West Punjab Rehabilitation Board and 
West Punjab Allotment Tribunal. So, for instance, while the West Punjab 
Rehabilitation Board was tasked with the allotment of all registered and 
important unregistered factories, ice factories, the West Punjab Allotment 
Tribunal supervised the allocation of the shops on the Mall, Lahore and the 
houses with a rent of Rs 300/month in Lahore and of Rs 100/month in all other 
districts.35 
                                                
33 Pakistan Constituent Assembly, 20th March 1953, PCSL.  
34 Rehabilitation Department of West Punjab, Manual of Instruction – Part I and II, Lahore, 
1949, Chapter I, p. 1, PCSL.  
35 Ibidem, Chapter III, p. 3. 
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Lahore 2 1 1 11 16 17 17 69 2  5 1 1 292 435 
Sheikhupura   1 1 1 2 2 10  1 2   26 46 
Sialkot 1  1 3 1 4 4 24  1 2   43 84 
Gujranwala 1  1 2 2 1 5 22  1 2   62 99 
Rawalpindi 1 1 1 3 3 3 6 35  1 2   77 133 
Jhelum   1 2 1 2 2 15  1 2   35 61 
Gujrat   1 2 1 1 4 17  1 2   34 63 
Shahpur   1 1 1 4 2 19  1 2   29 60 
Mianwali   1 1 1 2 2 13  1 2   27 50 
Attock   1 2 1 1 3 17  1 2   32 60 
Multan 1 1 1 4 4 8 5 46  1 2   82 155 
Lyallpur 1  1 2 4 2 5 21  1 2   67 106 
Montgomery 1  1 3 4 2 6 20  1 2   75 115 
Dera G. 
Khan 
  1 1 1 3 2 18  1 2   28 57 
Muzaffargarh   1 1 2 2 4 14  1 2   31 58 
Jhang   1 1 1 3 3 16  1 2   24 52 
Total 8 3 16 40 44 57 72 376 2 15 35 1 1 964 1634 
Table 4: Gazetted and Non-Gazetted Field Staff Sanctioned for Rehabilitation –  Source: Rehabilitation Department 
of West Punjab, Manual of Instruction – Part I and II, Lahore, 1949, Appendix II, Statement A and B. (*Others: Assistant 
Accounts Officers, Superintendents, Head Clerks, Steno-cum-Readers, Assistants, Senior and Junior Clerks, Typists, 
Accountants, Accounts Cashiers, Assistant Cashiers, Cashiers, Daftries [sic] and Peons) 
 
Overall, the distinction between urban and rural resettlement was the only 
selected criterion for pigeonholing premises and redistributing them among 
claimants. Soon after Independence, federal authorities became more and more 
paranoid about what they perceived to be the high correlation between the 
survival of Pakistan as a state and the economic recovery of the Punjabi 
countryside.36 According to contemporary estimates, the land on which refugees 
were to be resettled amounted to 3,064,625 acres. By the kharif of 1948, all the 
holdings of those non-Muslim landlords who employed Muslim tenants were 
reduced so as not to exceed to 8 acres/family. This government act extended the 
amount of land that was available for resettlement purposes up to 4,030,274 
acres. A further 113,893 acres of Crown land was added to the final 
                                                
36 Extract from the Pakistan News for the period February 18th to February 24th 1948, n.d., DO 
142/440, NAKG.  
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calculation.37 Finally, in 1949, the development of the so-called Thal Project – a 
revamped pioneering plan that aimed at enhancing the irrigation system of the 
homonym deserted area in South Punjab – increased the available rural land by 
660,000 acres.38  
Re-allotting the fertile lands of the West Punjab was not however only a 
matter of available acreage. It first and foremost involved the physical transfer of 
all self-declared refugee agriculturalists to their plots. As in early 1948 no record 
had yet been exchanged with India, early temporary allotments were made by 
consulting the list of voters of the 1945-6 elections.39 In 1948, The West Punjab 
Refugee (Registration of Land Claims) Ordinance was hailed as the milestone in 
the resettlement of refugee in the Punjabi countryside. Owners of land and those 
tenants who had a right of occupancy under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 and 
section 3 of the Colonisation of Government Land, 1912, were thereby solicited 
to submit their claims for compensation. The Act provided for the appointment 
of Settlement and Assistant Settlement as Registration, and represented the “first 
step towards a large-range policy for the allotment of [land] rights […] as 
opposed to the temporary cultivating possession.40 Following the promulgation 
of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act in 1956, refugees from 
non-agreed-areas were allowed to submit their claims for all those lands that they 
had behind in regions other than the East Punjab. Local authorities would take 
until late 1961 to process their applications.41  
                                                
37 A. G. Raza, Resettlement of Refugees on Land – A Survey, 6th June 1948, DO 142/440, NAKG.  
38 Government of West Punjab, The Thal Development Act, 1949, Lahore, 1949 and Government 
of West Punjab, The Thal Development Act, 1950, Lahore, 1950, MDRR. 
39 Ibidem. 
40 Lahore Despatch No. PHC/43/48 – Pol. 10980/48, 27th September 1948, DO 142/440, NAKG.  
41 Rehabilitation and Works Division 1958-1963 – Five Years of Revolutionary Government, n.d., 
p. 9, PCSL. 
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For their part, urban resettlement practices showed a higher degree of formal 
sophistication. Houses and shops were divided into four classes: class A, for all 
those premises having rents above Rs. 100/month; class B, for all those with 
rents above Rs. 50/month up to Rs. 100/month; class C, for all houses and 
businesses with rents above Rs. 25/month up to Rs. 50/month; and class D for 
properties with rents up to Rs. 25/month.42 Houses and shops were allotted to so-
called bona fide claimants for an initial six-month period that could eventually be 
extended up to 1st January 1952.43 The re-allocation of unregistered factories was 
on 4-year basis, while that of registered factories was “until otherwise ordered by 
the Rehabilitation Commissioner (General), West Punjab”.44  
In their attempt to curb the overcrowding of urban areas, the West Punjab 
authorities initially planned to repair damaged buildings. The lead in the whole 
restoration process was taken by the Lahore Improvement Trust. As soon as early 
February 1949, it sketched out a project for the revalorisation of the damaged 
areas between Shahalmi Gate and the Bawli Sahib within the walled city of 
Lahore under the ‘legal umbrella’ of the just-approved West Punjab Damaged 
Areas Ordinance, 1948. From then onwards, Improvement Trusts cropped up in 
almost every town of the West Punjab, and similar projects implemented.45 The 
urban housing shortage being so acute, the idea of satellite towns was 
immediately developed and taken in hand by these Improvement Trusts 
themselves from the mid-1950s up to the fall of Ayub Khan’s regime in the late 
1960s.  Self-contained units on the edge of the main refugee-saturated Punjabi 
                                                
42 Rehabilitation Department of West Punjab, Manual of Instruction – Part I and II, Lahore, 
1949, Chapter II, p. 2, PCSL.  
43 West Punjab Government Letter No. 2300 – Reh. 49/1976, 10th March 1949, PCSL. 
44 Rehabilitation Department of West Punjab, Manual of Instruction – Part I and II, Lahore, 
1949, Chapter III, pp. 4-5, PSCL.  
45 I. Talbot, Divided Cities, op. cit., pp. 116-23. 
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towns, satellite towns were graded from scale A to D according to their price and 
size. In 1963, local builders were working on 42 building sites of as many 
satellite towns – many of which located in the former province of West Punjab – 
all throughout West Pakistan.46 In one of them, namely the Lahore Township 
Scheme, development works had just started. The total investment in its 28,700 
residential plots and 10,000 one-room quarters was of about Rs. 79,2 millions.47   
In the purple rhetoric of Ayub Khan’s pamphlets, satellite towns were supposed 
to provide “not only accommodation but also employment and other facilities to 
the millions of uprooted men and women, giving them a sense of belonging and 
assimilation in their new homeland”.48 
In April 1954, the Pakistani Government put forward a joint-scheme for cash 
compensation for all those properties that refugees had left behind in India 
during the stormy summer of 1947.  As “the […] period from 1955 to 1958 was 
more or less a period of inaction”, the Displaced Persons (Compensation and 
Rehabilitation) Bill was later amended in 1958 in order to “make […] 
[compensation] workable in a smooth and rational manner”.49 Reportedly, by 
1963, compensation was being paid to all those refugees, orphans, widows and 
aged persons whose claim did not exceed Rs. 5,000.50  
All the aforementioned ordinances, laws and resettlement policies embodied 
the official State discourse in and around the urban and rural rehabilitation of 
refugees in West Punjab.  This dissertation accordingly aims at unveiling what 
actually happened behind the scenes of what with hindsight might appear to have 
                                                
46 Rehabilitation and Works Division 1958-1963 – Five Years of Revolutionary Government, n.d., 
p. 9, PCSL. 
47 Ibidem.  
48 1958-1964: Years of Progress, 1965, p. 16, PCSL.  
49 Rehabilitation and Works Division 1958-1963 – Five Years of Revolutionary Government, n.d., 
p. 7, PCSL. 
50 Ibidem, p. 8. 
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been a well-planned and thought-through process.  It takes as its primary focus 
the city of Lahore, the provincial headquarters of Pakistani Punjab in both 
political and bureaucratic terms.  While the socio-economic and political legacies 
of Partition-related migration where possible do need to be considered at district 
and local levels, there is also room for a study such as this one, which 
concentrates on one, albeit, of Pakistan’s major cities during this important 
transition period, from whose experience we can learn much, of not all, of what 
was happening more widely in the province’s urban centres.  
As I write, rumours are circulating that the Pakistani citizens will be asked to 
go to the polls in late autumn this year. Parties are getting ready to fight. In the 
region of the Punjab, the PML(N) will have to reckon with the PPP in the south 
and for the first time, at the all-Punjab level, with an apparently rising Pakistan 
Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). The actual political weight of Imran Khan’s party is a 
controversial issue among political analysts and commentators. Nonetheless, it 
has the potential to attract a share of votes to the detriment of the PML(N) and, in 
some constituencies, to hold the balance of power.  In spite of a few 
programmatic differences, Imran Khan and the Sharif brothers roughly target the 
same electorate. Some go as far as to fear an unlikely pact between the two. 
Imran Khan and Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif all share a refugee background. 
Understanding how their political minds work and how their own personal 
stories may shape the future of Pakistan is now a political imperative.  
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Bibliographical review 
Under no circumstances am I prepared to be converted to a Sikh. 
I want my razor back. 
 
(S. H. Manto, Determination) 
 
The idea that the Partition of the Indian subcontinent was a watershed in South 
Asia history is a widely accepted truism. Just like all such momentous and 
liminal events, it has lain at heart of intense debates among historians, social 
scientists and anthropologists. Despite the heatedness of the discussion, the 
relevant secondary literature has paradoxically polarised into three main 
competing interpretative narratives. The appearance of provincial studies first 
and then a ‘from-beneath’ analysis of the path towards Independence have 
counterbalanced the study of the so-called ‘high politics’ of Partition. As for this 
latter approach, the manoeuvring of both colonial and local leaders as well as 
that of political parties represents the prism through which the withdrawal of the 
British raj has been analysed. Indeed, Indian nationalist accounts are moulded 
out of an apparent contradiction:  while condemning those Muslim League 
tactics that urged the Congress to opt for the partition, they usually highlight the 
success implied in the achievement of independence.51 In contrast, as suggested 
by the case of Khalid bin Sayyed, Pakistani historians have generally succumbed 
to the temptation to emphasise greatly the role of Islam in shaping the demand 
for Pakistan and the fulfilment of the two-nation theory.52 In 1985, Ayesha Jalal 
burst onto this narrative and argumentative scene by proposing an alternative 
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pattern of interpretation of the events.53 A tool in Jinnah’s hands, Pakistan was 
conceived as a peculiar ‘negotiating bargain’ on which the British authorities and 
Indian political parties came to agree. When, back in the 1970s, official 
documents on Partition and Partition-related events were released, the emergence 
of local studies shed light on the twist and turns of the Muslim League success in 
focal regions of colonial India. This is, for instance, the case of Francis 
Robinson, David Gilmartin and, more recently, of Ian Talbot and Sarah Ansari.54 
As suggested above, alongside these historiographical trends, the so-called 
subaltern studies finally highlighted both the human and subjective dimension of 
the independence of India and Pakistan.55 
 
The rioters brought the train to a stop. Those who belonged to the other religion 
were methodically picked out and slaughtered. After it was all over, those who 
remained were treated to feast of milk, custard pies and fresh fruit. Before the 
train moved off, the leader of the assassins made a small farewell speech: “Dear 
brothers and sisters, since we were not sure about the time of your train’s 
arrival, regretfully we were not able to offer you anything better than this modest 
hospitability. We would like to have done more. 
 
(S. H. Manto, Modesty) 
 
With Independence drawing closer, the appeals that came from the political 
headquarters started to acquire a more violent twist. Even Gandhi - advocate and 
bulwark of non-violence – was reportedly ready to accept the hypothesis of a 
bloodbath, should the Indian subcontinent be divided into two autonomous 
states. Indeed, the daily agenda of local religious and civil associations and the 
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whirl of declaration and press-releases brought about a harsh opposition between 
all the different communities, and stimulated the progressive militarisation of the 
local society.  
Partition violence has been widely portrayed as a turning point in South Asian 
history. Paul Brass, later followed by Ravinder Kaur, Yasmin Khan and Ian 
Talbot, has explained it in terms of an exceptional political mobilisation around 
the demand for an independent India and Pakistan.56  According to this view, 
communal upheavals were predominantly political-led conflicts that lost all the 
religious impetus that had previously featured in former conflicts. Hence the 
heated debate on Khizr Tiwana’s government in the Punjab and the achievement 
of India and Pakistan – rather than Hinduism, Islam or Sikhism per se – then 
pushed people to take up arms and opt for violence. The intensity and the 
brutality of communal riots, the role of women and the invasion of the private 
sphere typified 1947 violence as an unicum in South Asian history. But while 
these interpretations certainly highlight the exceptional dimension of the events, 
they have nevertheless failed to recognise the degree of continuity that survived 
across time and space. Furthermore, they have overlooked what general studies 
on other partition-affected areas had previously revealed. In 2003, Ghislaine 
Glasson Deschaumes and Rada Ivekovic edited a wide number of contributions 
on post-1989 Eastern Europe nation- and state-building historical processes.57 
Driven by the desire to assess whether or not India and Pakistan represented a 
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paradigm in the field of nationalism and partition studies, the editors collected 
articles whose focus ranged from Berlin, Jerusalem, Cyprus to the former 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. As they introduced their collection, 
Deschaumes and Ivekovic recognised that “partition incites ancient hatreds rather 
than settling them. […][It restructures] the sources of conflicts around borders, 
refugees and diasporas”.58 All the social conflicts that result from a political and 
geographical division of a land draw on well-rooted socio-historical dynamics. 
Therefore, the outbreak of harsh upheavals during the early formative phase of 
some states trigger off a process of re-elaborating previous conflicts alongside 
newly-created reasons of contraposition. 
Literature – especially that produced by Ian Talbot – has not depicted 1946-8 
violence as a monolithic historical unicum that shares the same causal 
connections and features all throughout months and events.59 In his work, looting 
and rioting have been classified and divided into a three-phase process. The 
communal conflagrations that broke out in May 1947 followed the calls for 
direct action that led to the withdrawal the Unionist government and anticipated 
the enormous social disruption of the summer of 1947. Above and beyond the 
theoretical ring-fencing of such classification, riots are recognised for their 
ability to impact on both the land and the social mapping of villages, towns and 
districts, and to carve out the geographical spaces of Indian and Pakistan. 
Drawing consistently on Suranjan Das’ research on Bengal, these studies have 
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highlighted the relevance of the privatisation of the traditional state-held 
monopoly on violence.60  The progressive militarisation of the Rashtriya 
Svayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Muslim League National Guards (MLNG) and 
private citizens facilitated, it is argued, the subsequent spread of conflicts 
throughout the whole of the region. Substantial changes in the structural 
approaches of Hindu nationalism, Sikh militancy and Muslim associations, 
together with the appearance of illegal training courses on the use of arms and 
ammunitions, finally paved the way for the subsequent Partition-related clashes 
and the reactions of the different communities involved. 
Attempts to explain the August to November 1947 violence have been even 
more controversial. Its unbearable atrocity, the spread of the upheavals and the 
number of deaths, wounded individuals and refugees veiled the interpretation of 
events for the immediately-subsequent decades. What someone lived through 
and experienced in those months became a non-narratable and non-explainable 
‘taboo’. Arguably, the curtain of pain, mutual distrust and allegations appeared to 
be too difficult to be lifted with the necessary detachment and rationality. 
Alongside the accounts of British and local administrators, memoirs backed and 
compiled by single religious communities or regional governments took their 
place within the available literature.61 The rival community is portrayed here as 
the instigator of violence, and its decisions or acts as direct, pre-meditated and 
well-planned provocations. Local circumstances and an instinctive feeling of 
self-defence or retaliation thereby shocked the offended party into action.  
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In the 1980s and 1990s, the emergence of gender and subaltern studies 
inaugurated a new history-from-beneath approach. As these re-assessed previous 
interpretations of Independence-related violence, they emphasised the relevance 
of common people’s experiences by reframing them into the wider picture of the 
so-called ‘high politics’.62 New shapes, faces, voices and whispers were added to 
the histories and stories of Partition. The body of the abducted becomes, Urvashi 
Butalia argues, the body of the nation.63  Events are depicted in all their physical 
fallouts and aspects, turning themselves into human beings impacting on other 
human beings. 
Was then the Spring to Autumn violence of 1947 a case of genocide? Or 
ethnic cleansing? Or, even, a new form of violence? Historians and political and 
social scientists have divided over the issue and the ensuing search for a 
convincing answer. One of the first systematic attempts to tackle the issue was 
that carried out by Hansen back in 2002,64 in which he provides a vivid account 
of the decade and the months that led up to Independence, upgrading Punjab-
based massacres and clashes to the general debate on genocide studies in the 
process. In fact, the lack of state involvement and the mutuality in the 
perpetration of the atrocities had previously prevented researchers who 
specifically focused on genocide studies from considering the case of 1947 
Punjab as a testing ground for their arguments.65 Thus, at the very same time as 
he pursues his aim, Hansen makes a double point. On one hand, he overcomes 
the traditional boundaries that implied the mainstream image of the genocidal 
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violence:  on the other, he questions the idea of the summer 1947 clashes as a 
simple moment of temporary madness.66 In relation to the same historical events, 
Ishtiaq Ahmed and Ian Copland talk of ‘ethnic cleansing’ by juxtaposing the 
relevance of intentions in both the outbreak and the perpetration of violence.67 
They somehow anticipate Norman Naimark’s remarks on the substantial 
difference between genocide and ethnic cleansing:  in the latter's words, 
“genocide is the intentional killing of part or all of a ethnic, religious group: the 
murder of a people or peoples […] is the objective. The intention of ethnic 
cleansing is to remove a people and often all traces of them from a concrete 
territory”.68  
Whether or not Partition-related communal clashes were a case of genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, deadly ethnic riot, retributive genocide or nationalist fratricide, 
almost all historians and social scientists have overlooked the interplay of the 
local press and public declarations from political leaders.69 Indeed, the reading of 
newspapers filters the understanding and elaboration of an opinion over events. 
A reader of printed dailies, Eugene Shaw suggests, usually goes through a 
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cognitive process of either exclusion or inclusion that relies consistently on what 
the press includes or excludes from its pages.70    
 
Thousands of Muslims families left their homes and hearts in India that August, 
taking only the barest necessities with them. Train after train transported them in 
the unknown. Many did not make it – they were tortured, raped, and killed along 
the way by vengeful Sikhs and Hindus. Many Hindus and Sikhs heading in the 
opposite direction, leaving Pakistan for India, were butchered in turn by 
Muslims. […] All those who made this journey and lived had a tale to tell. 
 
(P. Musharraf, In the Line of Fire. A Memoir, London, 2006, pp. 11-2) 
 
From the very outset, the resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees 
challenged the performance of the administrative and political machineries of 
West Punjab and Pakistan. This was not merely related to their integration into 
the local social fabric but even encompassed what seemed to be lesser 
experiences, needs and claims. Crammed camps, angry refugees, the spread of 
medical diseases, the need to provide millions of people with food and 
assistance, were side troubles that demanded immediate action. British officers, 
such as Richard Symonds, and government institutions have got into print a 
number of first-accounts of the management of the humanitarian emergency at 
both institutional and political levels.71  
The emergence of gender and subaltern studies inspired a new perception and 
treatment of the topic at issue. Their bottom-up approach wove together the high 
politics and the everyday life of millions of refugees. Consequently, historians 
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have more recently shifted their analysis progressively from government and 
party headquarters to private houses, resettlement camps or shops. In her analysis 
of the early condition of muhajirs in post-independence Sindh, Sarah Ansari 
meticulously explores the twists and turns of this new approach.72 The task of 
accommodating millions of refugees and integrating them into the local socio-
economical fabric was not, she argues, a mere administrative headache. Instead, 
it undermined the foundations on which Pakistan was being built and, to a certain 
extent, affected the elaboration of the early idea of national solidarity. The 
superimposition of an artificially bureaucratic notion of citizenship on regions 
and local inhabitants encouraged what Ansari calls an ethnicisation of the public 
sphere. Within this socio-political framework, individuals were then actively 
involved in a process of either re-construction or protection of well-consolidated 
identities. Therefore, whilst the migrant community regarded themselves as the 
embodiment of the new state, Sindhi Muslims retained much of their own 
identity and authority.  
With reference to the Punjab, Talbot has recently advanced a similar 
argumentative and interpretative narrative.73 Despite the common cultural 
background and kinship ties facilitating integration, a fierce competition for 
resources, he maintains, embittered the relationship between local people and 
refugees. While the former believed that government decisions were mainly 
refugee-oriented, migrants charged local residents with illegally seizing local 
evacuee properties. Distrust, allegations and suspicions further tarnished the 
early success of some refugees’ enterprises.  
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Dealing with the resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees entailed the need 
to reckon with the related costs at a moment when both the federal and regional 
exchequers were being asked to fund the economic reconstruction of Pakistan 
and the Punjab. On one hand, there was the spending on the management of the 
humanitarian crisis and the local re-constitution of the politico-bureaucratic steel 
frame. On the other, the duty of avoiding the financial collapse of the state stood 
as a tricky and momentous challenge for the administrative establishment. Much 
has been written on the elaboration and development of the early Pakistani 
political economy.74 Nonetheless, far fewer words have been devoted to 
exploring and analysing the actions undertaken by the West Punjab Assembly 
and local civil society to re-establish agrarian, commercial and industrial 
businesses in the aftermath of August 1947. Nor has there been careful historical 
analysis to explain the anthropological fallouts of such decisions on the refugee 
community and local society. 
Migrants and local residents indeed possessed deeply different experiences of 
interpersonal labour relations. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, David 
Gilmartin, Ian Talbot and Shinder Thandi listed the main features of pre-
independence agricultural Punjab.75  The geography of its west wing and the 
distribution of the natural resources had empowered economic ties that 
transcended kingship and caste connections. With the advent of the canal 
colonies, agriculturalists – mainly Sikh – who settled in southern Punjab turned 
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out to be rational homines oeconomici able to increase productivity and gross 
income. However, land was not merely an economic resource. It was a unit of 
measurement of personal prestige and way to boost its owner’s political power.  
The tarnished rays, the night-smudged light. 
This is not that Dawn which, ravished with freedom,  
we had set out in sheer longing, 
so sure that somewhere in its desert in sky harboured 
a final heaven for the stars and we find it. 
We had no doubt that night’s vagrant wave would tray towards the shore, 
that the heart rocked with sorrow would at least reach its port. 
 
(F. A. Faiz, The Dawn of Freedom – August 1947) 
 
The achievement of independence went hand-in-hand with the emergence of 
the Muslim League as a party of social integration and the sole representative of 
Indian Muslims.76 Mushirul Hasan describes the Punjabi political arena of the 
late 1920s as political space that was structured along ‘have got and ‘have not’ 
lines rather than along communal ones.77 Elaborating a political platform in 
support of the interests of the rural zamindars helped political parties to make 
significant gains in any type of electoral competition. The late 1930s Unionist 
Party thus won the support of the local electorate thanks to its ability to rely upon 
traditional and religious leaders and create an ideological umbrella wherein 
Hindu, Sikh and Muslim zamindars felt their interests to safely and properly 
represented. Elsewhere, Hasan provides a long-term and detailed account of the 
decline and fall of the Unionist Party.78 Beset by the fallouts of the Morley-
Minto and Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and the end of the Khilafat Movement's 
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Hindu-Muslim unity, the party started progressively to lose ground and electoral 
appeal.  
Both Mushirul Hasan and David Gilmartin acknowledge that electoral 
competitions proved to be of great importance in the conceptualisation of the 
political self. For his part, Gilmartin carries out an in-depth religious-focused 
analysis of the impact of democratisation processes on Punjabi Muslims.79  From 
the 1920s onwards, elections called for a reconciliation of at least two 
‘identities’.  Indeed, the Muslim community had to reframe its identity as a group 
both within the South Asian context and within the colonial structure of power. 
The introduction of an electoral representative challenged the traditional 
equipoise, and triggered off fierce debates over the quintessence of local 
Muslim-ness. If compared with previous campaigns, 1945-6 elections underlined 
the relevance of autonomous voters. The political mobilisation of Punjabi 
Muslims was carried out in the name of the re-establishment of Islamic unity and 
a moral order wherein each and every individual was required to fulfil his own 
duty.  
Across the whole of the Punjab, Muslim League mural posters and political 
leaders appealed to voters to “exercise […] [their] free choice”.80 Pirs and 
sajjada nashins called on their followers to stand for Jinnah’s party as a way to 
prevent fitna. Self-realisation, order and unity therefore became the standout 
themes exploited to rally support from among local Muslims. In an article that 
was published back in 1979, Gilmartin points out that traditional religious 
authorities “found in the Muslim League under Jinnah’s leadership a political 
platform which allowed them to maintain their political and religious 
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connections and at the same time to express their religious concern in politics at 
the provincial and national level”.81 Recent trends in historiography attenuate the 
relevance of religion on the 1945-6 elections. Ian Talbot casts light on the 
political implications that resulted in the fall of the Unionist Party and the 
subsequent rise to power of the Muslim League.82  According to his analysis, the 
outbreak of World War II and the British decision to devolve independence to 
the Indian subcontinent rocked the Punjabi political arena. Members and leaders 
of the Unionist Party – whose manifesto had rested on the loyalty to the colonial 
raj – were now running on empty. When it comes to delving into the secrets of 
‘domestic politics’, Talbot highlights the impact of the 1937 Jinnah-Sikander 
Pact. This political agreement is conceived as the turning point in a three-step 
strategy that was concocted by the Muslim League and aimed at winning over 
the rival party. The ‘helping hand’ of the Punjab Muslim Student Federation and 
the alleged mismanagement of the wartime crisis paved the way for the electoral 
success of Jinnah’s party in the province.83 Finally, the decision of zamindars, 
pirs and sajjada nashins to join League’s ranks was, in Talbot’s view, the straws 
that cumulatively broke the camel’s back. 
When Independence came to India and Pakistan, the Muslim League, its staff 
and its political platform themselves turned into peculiar refugees. Existing 
literature tends to focus on the party’s failure to address the challenge of nation-, 
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state- and institution-building processes. Safar Mahmood, for instance, identifies 
in the League’s factionalism, corruption and internal weaknesses the main causes 
of Pakistan’s failure.84  In contrast, Ayesha Jalal stresses the role played by 
Pakistan’s geography and financial constraints in the centralisation of power and 
the emergence of the army and the bureaucracy as dominant political forces. 
Jinnah’s choice to opt for the separation of party careers from ministerial 
appointments proved in the long run to be a great mistake that doubly harmed 
institutions and party life.85 
Recent regional research on the immediate post-Partition years reveals more 
complex and multi-faceted image of the League’s attitude towards nation- and 
state-building strategies. An impasse in the machinery of the representative 
patterns, Talbot maintains, embroiled the early political life of both Pakistan and 
the Punjab.86 The ‘transfer’ of party seats from the pre-Independence regional 
legislature to the newly-established West Punjab Assembly pushed Muslim 
League politicians to grant their loyalty to the centre rather to their electoral 
basis. Personal rivalries imbued the local sphere and progressively widened the 
gap between politics and those who were supposed to be represented by it. 
Hence, refugee integration into the fabric of West Punjabi society and their 
everyday interaction with state authorities provide an excellent thematic and 
analytical framework that allows the mutual interactions of ‘high politics’ and 
the everyday experience of political institutions to be investigated. Post-Partition 
literature on the history of the Pakistan Punjab has consistently portrayed the 
resettlement and the rehabilitation of refugees as a smooth, successful and 
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biraderi-homogenous process.87 But this assertion is generally based on a 
common assumption that has not, as yet, been supported by historical evidence. 
It duplicates government narratives of the time and current socio-geographical 
mapping of Partition refugees and their families on land by taking for granted 
their truthfulness and historical accuracy. What if – as this dissertation's first 
research question poses – these widely-accepted yet unproven arguments are 
challenged? What if, as a cursory glance though available primary sources 
suggests, the resettlement of Partition refugees in West Punjab is acknowledged 
for its still unknown socially and politically-disruptive outcomes?  
The early policies of both the government of Punjab and the provincial branch 
of the Muslim League and their consequences for the everyday life of the 
average local man or woman have equally not found adequate space in studies on 
post-Partition Pakistan. There is, in fact, a paucity of research that focuses 
specifically on those dynamics that led government and party authorities to act as 
viable state actors within a re-drawn political arena and to be accepted as such by 
members of local society. The dawn of 15th August 1947 entailed, for both the 
administrative and political cadres, the need to – albeit partially – ‘start at zero’.  
Ordinary citizens, local parties and authorities had to learn how act as 
respectively citizens and state institutions. As many Pakistanis put it, Pakistan 
itself was a muhajir.88 Consequently, it shared the very same joys and sorrows of 
those millions of refugees who, back in 1947, had found their new home within 
its borders. But to what extent – the second research question of this dissertation 
explores – does the challenging of well-rooted arguments on the resettlement of 
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the migrant community in West Punjab affect our understanding of the early 
years of Pakistan’s political history? 
 
Methodology and sources 
One January afternoon in the year 1941, a German soldier was out walking, 
enjoying an afternoon’s liberty when he found himself wandering alone, through 
the San Lorenzo district of Rome. He knew precisely four words of Italian and of 
the world he knew little or nothing. His first name was Gunther. His surname is 
unknown. 
 
(E. Morante, History: A Novel, London, 2000, p. 11) 
 
As drunk as a lord, Gunther was roaming around the Eternal City in search for 
a brothel. He bumped into Ida Mancuso, a primary school teacher, and raped her. 
Ida would become pregnant and, nine month later, give birth to Useppe. Her life, 
alongside that of Useppe and the son of her first marriage, present a window on 
the poignant events of World War II.  Elsa Morante – the author of The History: 
A Novel – crafts a subtle plot wherein the everyday life of the protagonists 
permeates the major events of history. In turn, the latter constantly shapes Isa, 
Useppe and Antonio’s lives. As William Rivière comments in his introduction to 
the English translation of the book, “History is history and story in many senses, 
from its original title La Storia. […] [It] abounds in human weakness, 
misfortune, superficiality and corruption”.89 
Methodologically-speaking, this dissertation focuses on the hundreds of 
thousands of Punjabi Idas, Useppes and Antonios who, in 1947, took refuge in a 
state that they perceived to be their new homeland. In particular, it casts light on 
the manifold recesses of the everyday experience of the state among Partition 
refugees in Pakistani Punjab. Ida, Useppe and Antonio rubbed their eyes as 
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events and persons swam before them. Likewise, Pakistani Punjab’s migrant 
community has often appeared not to be in control of either its own fate or, 
needless to say, the fate of other individuals. Nevertheless, their lives have left 
their mark in history.  Feelings and emotions shape, argues Leora Auslander by 
extending Ernest Renan’s arguments on nationalism to citizenship, both the sense 
of belonging to a nation and the attachment to a specific form of governance.90 
Indeed, political history stems from an intricate tapestry of such histories and 
stories. The apparently chaotic cluster of ideas, interactions, reactions, personal 
opinions and objects that usually fill the life of each and every individual makes 
an imprint on the so-called ‘major’ history and politics.  In her research on the 
Vichy Government, Shannon L. Fogg fully unveils the impact of the everyday on 
politics and institutions at a momentous juncture of French history.91 Therein, big 
ideas meet with the day-to-day realities of ordinary people in a creative and 
somehow revolutionary state-building (and questioning) process. Lucia 
Michelutti adds a new twist to the wider debate in her recent The 
Vernacularisation of Democracy: Politics, Caste and Religion in India.92  By 
lifting the curtain on the grassroots mechanics of Indian democracy, Michelutti 
spotlights those subtle processes of embedment of the activities that are 
associated with the governance of India in the local socio-cultural practices of 
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ordinary people. Her ethnographic exploration of the low- and middle-ranked 
Yadav caste and its engagement with the political ideas of democracy lays bare 
the mutual dualities of the politics of the everyday state. This latter is not merely 
about the impact of the men of street on abstract political ideologies.  It also 
deals with what happens when those abstract ideologies reach the realms of each 
and every individual.  
Michelutti succeeds in leaving her imprint on the still-in-the-making and 
rather cloudy interpretative picture of the everyday state. Indeed, in spite of them 
claiming it as their own research field, researchers  - especially area studies ones  
– have failed to be as forceful and consistent as Michelutti while outlining their 
own definition of an everyday state and revealing its twofold nature.93 One, 
however, should not blame them. As they interact with it on a daily basis, 
citizens themselves come up against the elusive and fuzzy nature of the state.94 
After all, rulers and ruled are, as Achille Mbembe argues, intimately involved in 
a mutual indeterminate, equivocal, impromptu and mediated relationship,95 The 
state, Akhil Gupta follows hot on Mbembe’s heels, stands as a by-product of 
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specific historical moment and moulds out the interplay between politics and 
governed and governors’ representations of it.96 In a Louis XIV-style bout of 
enthusiasm, it can be then argued that, for all the vagueness of their definitions, 
the state is the everyday and the everyday is the state.  
The argumentative narrative of this dissertation stems from the idea that 
Pakistan has not been a failed (or failing) state. Anatol Lieven convincingly 
argues Pakistan’s stability and resilience in the face of an only apparently 
contradictory weakness of the civil government itself.97 It is, he maintains, a 
“negotiated State”: political power, authority and sovereignty are indeed the 
result of an endless process of mediation. Elsewhere, literature – admittedly 
rather scattered – has labelled such political systems as patronage 
democracies/regimes, but it has never taken account of their potential for 
standing as a distinct politological category.98 An intellectual legacy of a number 
of pieces of research on the so-called Northern American ‘Gilded Age’, 
patronage political systems have traditionally been conceived as a dysfunction of 
either democratic or autocratic regimes.99   Nevertheless, arguing the 
gnoseological autonomy of patronage democracies/regimes (or negotiated states) 
allows researchers to grasp more fully the complexities, subtleties and dynamics 
of Pakistan’s political life. Politics is consequently judged by the standards of 
local stake- and shareholders, actors as well as those taking occasional ‘walk-on’ 
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parts. To a certain extent, ideas of power, authority and institutions become 
tinged with new nuances that challenge the traditionally-applied definitions of 
institutions, bureaucracy, electoral policies and corruption.100  
Source limitations, however, have played an important part in shaping the 
approach undertaken by this dissertation.  Kanwaljit Kaur’s Ph.D. on the 
resettlement of Partition refugees in Indian Punjab makes anyone focusing on the 
mirror phenomenon in the Pakistani wing of the region frankly envious.101 Her 
bibliography details a long list of primary sources that represent a forbidden 
dream for historians who are used to working in Pakistani party, federal and 
provincial archives. In 1958, the banning of all political parties, the 
requisitioning of their records and the freezing of their assets immediately 
followed the imposition of martial law over the whole of Pakistan. Thereafter, 
with the only exception of the so-called Freedom Movement Archives (mainly 
pre-1947 all-India and provincial Muslim League Records), remaining party 
papers and their location appear to lie in the realm of the unknown. Hence, the 
government records that are available in Islamabad and Lahore and which 
specifically deal with the topic under scrutiny can be almost counted on the 
fingers of one hand.  
This apparent paucity of official documents can be attributed in large measure 
to the early difficulties of both the bureaucratic and institutional apparata in 
swiftly handling the humanitarian crisis. To a certain administrative degree, the 
birth of an independent Pakistan meant starting at zero. Doing things took 
priority over rationalising decisions. Authorities frequently scribbled reports on 
                                                
100 On this point, see W. Gould, Bureaucracy, Community, and Influence in India. Society and the 
State, 1930s-1960s, Abingdon (Oxon), 2011.   
101 K. Kaur, Riots, Refugees and Rehabilitation: A Case Study of Punjab 1946-56, Unpublished 
Ph.D. Dissertation, Punjabi University, Patiala, 2012.    
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the edges of newspapers that, it goes without saying, were not kept for records 
purposes.102 Up to the mid-1950s, district and provincial officials did not file 
documents, decisions and receipts.103 Reportedly, patwaris who were supposed 
to serve first the Pakistan Administration Service and then the 1950-onwards 
revamped Civil Service of Pakistan in the rural districts of Punjab, did not turn 
up and deserted their offices.104 All this has resulted in a scarcity or, at times, 
lack of proper detailed documentary evidence of resettlement plans undertaken 
whether at district-, town- and village-level. So while a list of locally-kept and 
focused documents on and around the rehabilitation of refugees in Multan 
District can be found either in a recently-published catalogue or in the 
bibliography of the present dissertation,105 just a cursory glance of them reveals 
that nothing – or nearly nothing – has survived both the early deficiencies of the 
Pakistani institutions and the wearing effect of time. The case of Multan is not, 
however, an isolated one. The Lahore Improvement Trust (the present-day 
Lahore Development Authority) holds no documentary evidence of the period 
under scrutiny. For his part, Ilyas Chattha, working on developments elsewhere 
in the Punjab during the same timeframe, recently came up against similar 
problems, namely that “archival sources in Sialkot and Gujranwala are scattered 
and have been moved continuously”, making, in his words, access to district- and 
tehsil-level sources an “intricate problem”.106 
                                                
102 A. Albinia, Empire of the Indus: The Story of a River, London, 2009, pp. 14-15. 
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active files and other documents that […] [are] currently in use”. See, M. Hull, Government of 
Paper. The Materiality of Bureaucracy in Urban Pakistan, Berkeley-Los Angeles, 2012, p. 28.  
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 Therefore, bearing in mind the problems associated with retrieving district-
level sources, this dissertation brings together official Pakistani documents with 
US and British records and a careful survey of both the judicial records and the 
Urdu or English-language dailies of the time. With respect to local newspapers, it 
draws consistently on the Pakistan Times (Lahore), whose readership – members 
of the well-educated Punjabi urban bourgeoisie – is frequently omitted from the 
existing narrative on refugee resettlement whose rhetoric instead tends to focus 
on less privileged individuals and groups. But relying on the Pakistani English 
and vernacular press of that time entails a certain amount of calculated risk:  
conspiracy theories, conflicting interpretation of events and unchecked 
information dominated local newspapers and magazines alike.  Furthermore, 
their own struggle for survival trapped journalists, editors and government 
authorities in a dangerous vicious circle. As the joint-editor of the Weekly 
Guardian (Lahore) pointed out in a private conversation with a US representative 
in Lahore in early July 1951, “the Government control[led] the entire supply of 
newsprint of Pakistan and […] [could] withdraw all government-sponsored 
advertisements whenever it wishe[d]”.107 Therefore, sticking to institutional 
views, reports and narratives was, in many cases, a life-saving daily routine. 
Censorship, charges of corruption and partisanship notwithstanding, the press 
and local courts constitute an invaluable source of details, stories and (why not?) 
gossip.  
The number of sources used in this dissertation that can be traced back to so-
called oral history, however, is relatively small. This was a deliberate choice. 
The aim was to break down that wall of silence, denials and dissonances up 
                                                
107 Memorandum of Conversation, 9th July 1951, NND 897209, NARA.  
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against which researchers usually come.108 Sometimes less is more. For those 
who went through it as refugees, Partition was unquestionably a distressing 
experience. Re-ordering the jigsaws of sleepless nights hidden under stacks of 
corpses, relatives brutally butchered and women raped on public highways, with 
an unknown foreign researcher can be a source of understandable discomfort.109 
For their part, questionnaires – no matter whether structured or semi-structured – 
trigger off a curious mechanism that pushes interviewees to please their 
interviewer. The idea of meeting the same person several times and finally ‘being 
accepted as one of the family’ may certainly be challenged on the grounds of the 
very necessary detachment that a historian is asked to have. Nevertheless, in a 
trust-based society such as Pakistan, it puts interviewees at ease by engaging 
them in an open and frank debate on the issues at stake.  
 
Chapter outline 
The present research accordingly weaves a chronological and thematic plot into a 
single narrative. Its investigation focuses on the Punjabi refugee middle and 
upper-middle class, thereby challenging the argument that their members were 
by no means overcome by the dreadful events of Partition.110  Los ricos también 
lloran, one may gloss.111 Unless otherwise clearly stated, and as pointed out 
earlier, this dissertation will mainly draw its conclusions from an analysis of the 
Lahori milieu from Independence up to the promulgation of the second 
Constitution of Pakistan in 1962. As they trace the development of the politics of 
the everyday state among the muhajirs of the Pakistani Punjab, individual 
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chapters of this dissertation question the assumed homogeneity of resettlement 
and self-resettlement practices, the ability of the local bureaucracy to act as an 
independent political power, and the so-called ‘leftist syndrome of the marginal 
men’.112 
     Chapter 1 introduces the dissertation by framing the migration of Partition 
refugees within its natural historical context.  It chronicles the communal 
violence of early spring to late summer 1947, and the initial flows of refugees 
that this produced.  Particular attention is paid to the everyday symbolic 
dimension of these events and to popular, grassroots-level understanding and re-
elaboration of the ‘big political ideas’ at stake in those months.  
Chapter 2 then explores the ways in which this refugee community 
elaborated its sense of belonging to a state and a wider nation, while engaging 
with the ideas of modernity, urbanisation and scandal. From reception camps to 
temporarily-allotted houses or self-constructed huts, migrants became involved 
in an intricate hotchpotch of emotions that deeply influenced their process of 
integration into the local social fabric and the development of their own political 
identity. As migration and resettlement practices literally tore apart entire 
biraderis, these latter ones, this chapter contends, went through a process of 
notional and social re-elaboration. 
The disruption of traditional hierarchies and balances of power undoubtedly 
made an impact on the bureaucratic management of the humanitarian crisis. 
Chapter 3 accordingly delves into the weaknesses of the new Pakistani 
bureaucracy as it grappled with the need to re-assert its own authority over local 
society and to resettle millions of people on the land. As a result, it challenges 
                                                
112 Each and every chapter has its own ‘literature review’ where all these points are properly 
addressed.  
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traditionally-accepted definitions of corruption by re-framing patronage practices 
within the kind of institution-building processes that exist in trust-based and 
highly-personalised societies such as that of Pakistan. 
Chapter 4 continues the arguments of the previous chapter and re-frames the 
substantial weakness of the Pakistan bureaucracy within the context of the 1951 
provincial elections and of the early laying of the foundations of local political 
stability. As civil servants and politicians interfered with and exploited each 
other, the local arena lived up to both old and new expectations. The relevance of 
kinship ties, ordinary people’s struggle for securing the (usually) scarce means of 
livelihood, and party dynamics merge here together in an analysis of the early 
shaping of Pakistan’s electoral policies.  
Chapter 5 addresses finally the nature of the Pakistani institutional 
‘(dis)order’. At a moment when debate over the future constitutional shape of the 
Pakistan state stagnated, day-to-day reality supplanted any form of learned 
discussion. A morbid attachment to charismatic figures, censorship and the 
partisanship of the press, and Pakistan’s troubled relationship with India and 
regional rivalries are here depicted as proactive - albeit dysfunctional – 
constituents and constitutional parts of the new state. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Memories of swords, blood and freedom:  
1947 communal disturbances and the early flows of refugees 
 
When my critics object and tell me that I am obsessed by the experience of 
partition, trapped in it, my response is that what happened in 1947 was so 
complex, so devastating that I have yet to understand it fully. How can I get away 
from it? 
(I. Hussain in A. Bhalla, Partition Dialogues. Memories of a Lost Home,  
New Delhi, 2007) 
 
As Jinnah defined it, the Punjab represented the cornerstone of Pakistan. Here 
the Muslim League fought one of its most interesting political battles in order to 
win over the Unionist Party in the key 1945-6 elections. Taken as a proof of the 
Muslim League’s power and its declared aspiration to be the sole representative 
of Indian Muslims, both the electoral campaign and competition shook the local 
political arena by challenging all those traditional affiliations that had 
consolidated over the previous decades. Ideas of religious identity, individuality 
and a lethal overlapping of politics and religion equally provided the raw 
ingredients for the 1945-6 Muslim League victory and for the different bouts of 
violence that rocked the Punjab after the withdrawal of Khizr Tiwana’s ministry 
in February 1947.  
This chapter challenges existing definitions and images of Partition-related 
communal clashes by re-assessing the value of the symbols that social actors 
‘handled’ during the spring and the summer of 1947. It offers a brief yet detailed 
account of the circumstances involved in the early fluxes of migrants and these 
latter ones’ journey towards what they perceived to be safer places or their new 
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home. As a general remark, the chapter argues the need to emphasise the 
relevance of the meanings that local society attached to the political ideas at 
stake and violence. The aim here is to apply the methodology of Marshall 
McLuhan, Quentin Fiore and Jerome Agel, thereby treating attitudes, opinions 
and clashes as both a medium and a message.1 Therefore, the first section of this 
chapter reveals the subtle plot of interactions between past and contemporary 
symbolic cosmogonies in the deployment of the March to June communal 
clashes, and accounts for the early flows of refugees. The second and third 
sections focus on the individual and somehow personal experience of 
communalism, the indeterminateness of the political ideas at stake during the 
early summer of 1947, and the subsequent re-negotiation of both the religious 
and civic identities of the local communities. 
 
 “People will surge from one side of the Square to the other”: the 1947 
March to May communal violence and the early flows of refugees2  
 
The Governor of Punjab Evan Jenkins entrusted the Khan of Mamdot with the 
task of forming a new Cabinet at 11:40 am on 3rd March 1947. A single-party 
Ministry that counted on the miscellaneous support of single individuals within 
the Assembly, would not, Jenkins warned him, last long. Daultana’s only answer 
was to ask the Governor’s blessing in this new Muslim League enterprise.3 
“[You can] count on help from me if […] [you get] into difficulty, but I could do 
very little unless the Muslim League […] [takes] a reasonable line and […] [are] 
                                                
1 M. McLuhan, Q. Fiore and J. Agel, The Medium is the Message. An Inventory of Effects, 
Harmondsworth, 2008. 
2 See K. Golsorki, Poem of the Unknown, n. d.. 
3 Jenkins to Wavell No. 652, 3rd March 1947, MSS.EUR.D 977/16, IOR.  
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prepared to help themselves”, countered the British official.4 As news spread 
across Lahore, Hindus and Sikhs started tearing down Muslim League flags. 
Some of them marched towards local police stations and set them on fire.5 The 
long spring and summer of 1947 had just begun. The wave of violence that swept 
all before it was not, literature has argued thus far, about ‘traditionally’-
understood religious differences.6 But the everyday dimension of those months 
suggests that a certain degree of continuity survived across time and surfaced in 
the popular perception of events. Delving into the vast array of official primary 
sources, this section highlights the interplay of historical correspondences and 
assesses their impact on the course of the history of the Punjab. Highlighting 
continuities between 1947 events and previous communal conflicts, however, 
should not be perceived as a way of downplaying the exceptionability of the 
months leading up to the withdrawal of the British raj. By contrast, it represents 
an attempt to conduct both a diachronic and synchronic analysis that sheds light 
on the complexity of the local scenario and pins down the fluidity in the social 
perception of the value of symbols in twentieth-century Punjab.  
Demonstrations, fires, killings, disrupted communications, assaults on trains 
and deserted streets crammed with corpses were about to become a common 
scenario throughout 1947 Punjab. As colonial administration over the Indian 
subcontinent drew to close, the main local towns and rural areas shared a similar 
experience of violence, pain and terror. Soon after the resignation of Khizr 
Tiwana in early March, rioting broke out in the Amritsar suburbs of Chown 
                                                
4 Ibidem.  
5 Jenkins to Mountbatten – Secraphone Message, 4th March 1947, MSS.EUR.D 977/16, IOR. 
6 P. Gosh, “Partition’s Biharis”, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 
17, 2, 1997, pp. 21-34; I. Talbot and G. Singh, The Partition of India, Cambridge, 2009, p. 66; I. 
Talbot, Divided Cities. Partition and its Aftermath in Lahore and Amritsar, 1947-1957, Karachi, 
2007 , pp. 33-59. 
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Nohli, Holi Bazar and Kitra Jamal. Businesses and commercial were 
systematically looted and burnt, and 40,000 persons were made homeless. The 
total damage was assessed at Rs. 5-8 crores.7 Although only slightly touched by 
the demolition of properties, Lahore, Multan and Rawalpindi experienced similar 
bouts of communal violence. Overtly political, riots combined Hindu and Sikh 
opposition to the establishment of a Muslim League raj over the Punjab with 
some of the elements that had previously featured in conflicts of the 1920s and 
1930s. Local mainstream disturbances and their symbolic religious cosmogony 
were encapsulated in a new form of contraposition. This latter broadened and 
renewed the traditional meaning that social actors attached to communal 
violence.  
The various means through which this violence was deployed seem to have 
been all part of a common repertoire “learned, shared and acted all through a 
relatively deliberate process of choice” that had been taking place since the early 
part of the century.8 Take, for instance, a sudden outbreak of a communal clash 
that had shaken the southern town of Multan in September 1920. A mishap 
occurred during the Shi’a muharram process through a Hindu-majority suburb. 
When the taziya inadvertently damaged a telephone cable, stones were thrown at 
the faithful involved. Muslim retaliation was immediate, and resulted in the 
destruction of Hindu houses and shops, several wounded and the rape of Hindu 
women.9 “On 11th April [1947]” – reported the British Deputy Commissioner – 
“large numbers of Muslims collected at this mosque [the one in the suburb of 
                                                
7 The Times (London), 10th March 1947.  
8 C. Tilly, “Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834”, Social Science History, 17, 2, 
1993, p. 264. See also C. Tilly, “Les origins du répertoire de l’action collective contemporaine en 
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9 D. Abenante, La colonizzazione di Multan. Islam, potere, istituzioni nel Punjab sudoccidentale 
(1948-1922, Trieste, 2004, p. 211.  
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Chowk Prag Das] for Friday prayer. […] After the prayer, the Muslims passed 
through a predominantly non-Muslim area, shouting slogans, and stones and 
bricks were thrown at them from the housetops by Hindus and Sikhs. The 
Muslims retaliated to some purpose”.10 The similarities between the two 
occasions separated by nearly two decades are striking. The ‘technology’ that the 
social actors exploited and to which they appealed relied upon well-established 
set of acts of violent public performances.  
As in the past, religious festivals, processions and symbolisms were again part 
and parcel of the whole picture of events that was being sketched out on the all-
India scenario. In early 1947, a number of Sikh associations were planning to 
take part in almost all Holi procession in Lahore and across the whole Punjab.11 
In April Amritsar, a riot broke out after the ritual Friday prayers.12 Sikh holy 
books were burnt in Muzzaffargarh, and cases of Sikhs having their beards and 
hair forcibly cut were reported in Rawalpindi, Attock and Jhelum Districts.13 
Spaces and symbols need here to be conceived in terms of their fluid and 
dynamic dimensions. As Turner puts it, they are not static cognitive signs.14 
Rather symbolisms should be understood with reference to the general context 
and the significance or interpretations that human beings and groups attach to 
them.  
In the spring of 1947, the overall religious cosmology still retained the 
meaning that previous communal clashes had established, albeit reshaped around 
                                                
10 Jenkins to Mountbatten – Secret No. 666, 30th April 1947, MSS.EUR.F. 200/121, IOR.  
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R/3/1/90, IOR.  
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1974, p. 96.  
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a new political demand and the subsequent reactions of political leaders. From 
1945 onwards, politics and religion had intertwined in an intricate plot. The call 
for an independent India and Pakistan embodied the porosity of the borders 
demarcating the two. Likewise, the ambiguities of Indian and Pakistani 
nationalisms echoed and seeped into local society and the way it stood in the 
public arena. Mosques, Hindu temples and Sikh gurdwaras were both the target 
and the starting point for communal violence. In Multan, for instance, the 
Devpura, Jog Maya and Ram temples as well as the dharamsala of Bawa Sant 
Das and the shrine of Baba Safra revealed the relevance of religion to all the 
persons who were either taking part in or experiencing the events.15 No matter if 
reasserted within a new political context and message, the participation of 
‘enemy’ communities in processions or the desecration of holy books 
unquestionably aimed at provoking religious identities.  
What was even more important was that all the various religious groups and 
leaders read events within this framework and consequently concocted their 
counterattacks along these lines. “It [rioting] was communal in its essential and 
had as its purpose the domination of the Punjab by Muslims”, the Sikh leader 
Master Tara Singh set down in black and white in February 1947.16 As in the 
earlier 1920s and 1930s disturbances, most of the March-May 1947 incidents 
were often perceived as a direct religious provocation according to which the 
religious ‘other’ was always portrayed as the aggressor. While the political 
matrix of events was not denied, retaliations were incited and even premised 
upon this assumption. Muslims along with Muslim League leaders blamed Hindu 
                                                
15  Jenkins to Wavell – Telegram No. 61/G, 19th March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.   
16 Master Tara Singh quoted by Mr. Akhtar Hussain in G. D. Kholsa, Stern Reckoning. A Survey 
of the Events Leading up to and following the Partition of India, New Delhi, 1989, p. 98.  
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and Sikhs as the sole instigators of communal clashes.17 For their part, Sikh 
leaders similarly claimed that communal outbursts and Muslim League agitation 
were orchestrated as a targeted attack against their community.18 Unsurprisingly, 
the defence of their gurdwaras and the attachment to guru Gobind Singh were 
standout issues in all Sikh public campaigns and publications.  “In order to 
establish Pakistan, the atrocities committed on Sikhs in the Punjab since 5th 
March 1947 have not come to light because on censorship on news. […] Oh 
Sikhs! Read this and think yourself. What have you to do under the 
circumstances? In your veins, there is yet the blood of your beloved Guru 
Gobind Singh Singhji. Do your duty”, incited a five-sheet pamphlet that, in early 
April, was passing from Sikh hand to Sikh hand.19 Elsewhere, these feelings 
were further linked to the claims for a territorial sovereignty in the future post-
colonial institutional arrangement.20 The indeterminateness of Indian and 
Pakistani nationalisms crept into the lives of common people by finding its 
embodiment in the deployment of violence. It became itself one of those ordinary 
things that, being the most powerful idea in history, made an impact on persons’ 
choices and acts.21  
Nevertheless, the 1947 March to May communal clashes possessed their own 
peculiar traits that anticipated and, to some extent, even constituted a preparation 
for the summer rioting. A progressive and massive militarisation of the everyday 
was underway across the whole of the Punjab, notably in Lahore and Amritsar 
                                                
12 Jenkins to Mountbatten – Telegram No. 70/G, 24th March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR and Jenkins 
to Mountbatten – Secret No. 662, 31st March 1947, MSS.EUR.F 200/124, IOR.  
18 Jenkins to Wavell No. 654, 9th March 1947, MSS.EUR.D 977/16, IOR and Jenkins to 
Mountbatten – Secret No. 663, 9th April 1947, R/3/1/176, IOR.  
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Districts.22 The smuggling of arms ammunitions – mainly imported from the 
NWFP and the Tribal Areas – grew steadily.23 Paramilitary associations such as 
the RSS and the Muslim League National Guards doubled their efforts alongside 
their membership.24 Together with a militarisation of local society, the region 
also experienced the further privatisation of the traditional state monopoly over 
the legitimate use of violence. Groups of persons as well as single individuals – 
in some cases not attached to any political or religious group – embarked upon 
an extensive production and accumulation of ammunitions, firearms and 
bombs.25 Sometimes the results were comically tragic. Hundreds of persons died 
while squeezing homemade incendiary devices into soda water bottles.26 The 
scramble for arms, however, was part of a targeted activity of paramilitary 
associations and newly-created ‘private armies’ as well as a reaction to the 
growing sense of insecurity and mistrust towards the local police. Indeed, retired 
and employed officers were quite frequently charged with being actively 
involved in the disturbances and eventually arrested.27 Allegedly, both the 
Muslim League and the Congress had inaugurated a widespread under-the-table 
campaign of delegitimisation of the local police forces.28  A do-it-yourself 
arranged self-defence was perceived to be the only viable solution to the 
partiality of those institutions that were deputed to the maintenance of law and 
order, and to the resulting growing climate of uncertainty.  
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Frequent calls for action by political leaders further embittered the months 
that preceded and followed the withdrawal of the Tiwana government. In August 
1946, Gandhi had reportedly accepted the eventual ineluctability of bloodbath.29 
For his part, Jinnah had requested Muslims to “make every effort to prepare and 
organise the community” as a reaction to the dangerous fallouts of the all-India 
level negotiations on the future constitutional arrangement of the subcontinent.30 
At grassroots level, however, the situation had slipped through the fingers of 
party notables and influential individuals. Indeed, those who were blowing on the 
fire of communalism found themselves face to face with the fright of the nasty 
fallouts of their strategies.31 In Campbellpur – Jenkins reported – local “Muslim 
sections […] were extremely sulky and some of […] [their members] are 
beginning to be frightened”.32  
Violence, its organisation and its tools, entered now more than ever into the 
everyday life of the men and women of Punjab. It somehow also acquired new 
and more ‘familiar’ faces. Passers-by, neighbours, fellow citizens and even 
friends all became potential aggressors and started to be treated with suspicion. 
In mid-April Hodal, the intercession of a Muslim mutual acquaintance in a 
quarrel between two Hindu kamins resulted in a communal clash with a roll call 
of 10 death and 32 persons injured. To top it all, a Rs. 1 lakh fine was levied and 
the suspension of certain trading licences imposed on the whole area.33 In many 
other towns, the hoisting of white flags on the roofs of the houses signposted the 
presence of a Muslim family and sent out a clear message for all Muslims 
                                                
29 Inward Telegram No. 1796/s, 27th August 1946, PREM 8/541/5, NAKG.  
30 The Times (London), 31st August 1946. 
31 Jenkins to Wavell – Telegram No. 30/G, 6th March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR. 
32 Jenkins to Wavell – Secret No. 657, 17th March 1947, IOR.  
33 Jenkins to Mountbatten – Telegram No. 657, 17th March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.  
 66 
belonging to the neighbouring villages.34 They identified those buildings that 
should not be attacked, marking new social boundaries within suburbs, villages 
and towns the while. A state of ‘flag war’ existed among all the different local 
communities. Hindu and Sikhs cut Muslim League flags into a thousand pieces 
and ripped up the badges of the members of Jinnah’s party.35  “A class fellow of 
mine” – remembers an interviewee in a recent BBC documentary on the partition 
of the subcontinent – “raised the Congress flag on the school building. Muslims 
were very furious. Why? They also raised the Muslim League flying on the 
school building”.36 
People engaged in unusual and curious competitions. Lahore appeared to be 
“infested by a pack of jackals howling at the moon”.37 Slogans of defiance and 
war cries echoed from within houses and from rooftop to rooftop from dark to 
dawn. It was, Gyanedra Pandey would argue, violence in its more disguised 
forms.38 Perpetrators of brutalities were then the same persons who could act 
selflessly and show solidarity with their neighbours, fellow citizens and friends. 
There was however no contradiction in this overlapping of mutual support and 
violence. The duality of the human behaviour is part and parcel of any group 
activity or performance. Indeed, in spite of their involvement in awful crimes, 
persons still show a considerable degree of disinterestedness and sacrifice.39  
The 1947 spring clashes erupted simultaneously and, for the first time, went 
on to encompass the countryside as well. Communal violence first scourged the 
rural areas in the outskirts of Rawalpindi in mid-March 1947.  Armed with lathi, 
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agricultural implements and homemade arms, the villagers of the Taxila-Gujar 
Khan-Kahuta triangle put their suburbs to fire and sword.40 Gunshots would 
thereafter ricochet across the Attock, Jhelum and Multan districts.41  Life there 
was, needless to say, brought to a standstill. Local officers and the police found it 
difficult to reckon with this widespread situation of terror and violence. As the 
wave of upheavals hammered rural villages and small towns and lasted for 
weeks, all those forces that should have kept the Punjab stable and peaceful were 
found unprepared. Authorities, Jenkins recorded in his correspondence to the 
Viceroy, had “little experience of dealing with such disturbances”.42 The almost 
complete disruption of the communication networks further hampering the 
appeasement of the region, supplementary efforts were needed.43 A subsequent 
inquiry into the conduct of local Post and Telegraphs offices during the rioting 
later revealed that their staff made no effort to maintain the service.44 Those 
persons who could afford a telephone appeared to be quite reluctant to use it. 
Rumour – later confirmed – had it that calls were being intercepted and then 
passed on to political leaders.45  
Unsurprisingly, the early refugees poured into the streets and the hastily-
prepared temporary reception structures. Violence, fear and houses reduced to 
smouldering wrecks persuaded individuals that it was too dangerous to live as a 
minority in rival religious majority areas.46 About 40,000 displaced persons were 
hosted in a large army-run camp in the Rawalpindi Cantonment area.47 In the 
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comparatively smaller Jhelum District, local authorities had to accommodate 
around 6,000 refugees who had been made homeless by communal 
disturbances.48 Numbers, it seems, were even higher. All those who had been 
given a temporary bed in charitable institutions or relatives’ homes were missing 
from the official roll call.49 Furthermore, March to May migrations were 
primarily an urban phenomenon. Indeed, towns were not badly hit by communal 
bouts, but, in a curious twist of fate, were also seen as the first port of call for the 
many displaced persons involved.50  Partition was both at the threshold and 
already there. 
 
 “And these passersby, decent and suffering,/these passersby do not know 
your name”: translating the ‘big political ideas’ at stake into practice 
 
I am glad to inform the House that the plan contained in the 
announcement which I am about to make, including the offer of 
Dominion status to one or two successor authorities, has been 
favourably received by all three parties represented at the conference 
held by the Viceroy with the Indian leaders during the past two days.51 
 
On 3rd June 1947 Prime Minister Atlee entered a House of Commons where a 
sense of sharp expectancy mingled with frenzy excitement. The rooms of 
Westminster were hosting a debate that would sanction the end of the colonial 
era and affect the course of world history.  The austere and attenuated calm of 
the Lords Chamber clashed with the hasty political manoeuvring and the images 
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of a subcontinent literally being torn apart by the flame of communalism.52 The 
announcement of the partitioning of the Indian subcontinent marked the point of 
no return in the local political and communal history. The involvement of 
political parties and both religious and civil associations in the deployment of 
violence that followed has pushed many historians to portray conflicts as 
concocted and perpetrated by large and organised groups of persons.53 The need 
to assert power and authority over local spaces has been acknowledged for its 
ability to force Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs equally to coordinate their attacks in 
order to win over their ‘rivals’ more quickly.54 These very same features have led 
to communal upheavals being considered as a massive mobilisation around an 
independent India and Pakistan.55 This section, however, challenges such 
interpretations by arguing the perceived indeterminateness over the political 
ideas at stake and introducing the idea that it was individuals and small groups 
rather than large mobs who comprised the building blocks of the 1947 summer 
violence. 
An odd feeling of ‘making the best of a bad job’ crept over both the local 
arena and civil society. Caution soon left room for mutual claims, reclaims and 
allegations. One could not please everybody. In the Punjab, the so-called 3rd June 
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Plan was then greeted by the anger of the Sikh community, the approval of 
Muslims and Hindus who were resident in their respective religion-majority 
districts, and the serious concerns of those who lived as minorities within all the 
different administrative units. This announcement notwithstanding, the social 
climate remained mainly unchanged. However, as the Governor of Punjab put it, 
“the plan had no discernible effect on communal relations”.56 The atmosphere – 
especially in Lahore – continued to remain very tense: communal clashes 
persisted without showing any sign of either worsening or improving.  
On a different level, an almost lethal combination of enthusiasm, indifference, 
nervousness and excitement poisoned the late Punjabi spring of 1947. These 
contrasting feelings created the soil in which the first reactions were being 
developed.57 The future possible manoeuvrings of local political leaders 
catalyzed the attention of the local public sphere. A sense of anxious waiting 
spread through party seats, militants and ordinary people. On the 23rd of that 
month, the partition of the Punjab would be held in the provincial assembly, and 
the reactions of social and political exponents were much awaited. After all, the 
Partition Plan had raised many more questions than it really answered. Its 
vagueness on the geographical and ‘factual’ identity of an independent India and 
Pakistan increased the climate of uncertainty, and left local leaders with an 
important gap to plug.  
Not even the history of the Pakistan movement weighed in favour of local 
politicians and government representatives. Indeed, a curious dysphasia marked 
the Punjabi narratives on Partition. In high circles meetings, the ‘P-word’ and 
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idea had always been a hot potato that passed from hand to hand without anyone 
being either able or willing to handle it. Back in late August 1942, Chhotu Ram 
and Sardar Singh had urged the Governor of the Punjab not to release any 
declaration as regards Pakistan.58 Sikander had hoped for long that first the war 
and then discussions on the future constitutional shape of the subcontinent would 
discourage Jinnah from pursuing his political aim.59 Grassroots politics and 
militancy, however, had modulated on a quite different pitch. “Amongst the 
Muslims of the province, your name [Jinnah’s one] is magic. The League must 
take advantage of this wave of feeling in favour of Pakistan”, Malik Barkat Ali - 
patron on the Muslim Student Federation – had proudly announced in his late 
1941 July letter.60 As the wheels of the newly-reorganised student association got 
going, the idea of Pakistan had started spreading among ordinary men and 
women.  
What was then the image of Pakistan that the Federation had been 
popularising across the whole Punjab? Speeches that had appealed to the rank 
and file presented the Partition of India as a fait accompli. The methods and 
channels through which Muslim League students’ plans had been thwarted 
measure their success among social groups, revealing their contents the while. In 
1942, the Jullundhur District Magistrate issued a caution to all those Muslims 
who had been planning to organise or attend the Muslim League conference in 
Phillaur. Special orders would allow the meeting, provided that the question of 
Pakistan and the Lahore resolution were not discussed. “It should not be 
mentioned” – it was stated – “that the Mussalmans and the Hindus [are] two 
separate nations and that therefore the Mussulmans of those provinces where 
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they are in a majority [have] right to secede from the Centre”.61 In spite of its 
vagueness, the idea and image that the average Muslim had attached to the P-
word deeply resonated with Atlee’s own comments. Pakistan meant Partition on 
the basis of religion. The gist of the problem was to understand what this would 
geographically and institutionally entail for the region of the Punjab and its 
inhabitants. 
It was no surprise then that the Partition plan was welcomed by a curious yet 
quite unsurprising popular disregard. Muslims who ran into each other in 
Lahore’s markets and parks had just a short chitchat over the issue.62 They were 
by contrast quite critical of the behaviour of local Muslim League leaders.63 
Indeed, these latter appeared to be groping in the dark. Apparently, the symptoms 
of that curious dysphasia that had been affecting the political life of the Punjab 
since the early 1940s were quite difficult to treat. While anti-Pakistan rallies 
were organised across the whole of the region, a taboo remained on discussing 
the interrelations between Partition and Pakistan at both the lower-rank political 
and institutional level.64 Even when, in early May, the unmentionable word first 
appeared in an official meeting, indeterminateness reigned supreme.65 The Khan 
of Mamdot kept postponing the release of any formal declaration indefinitely. 
Doubts and questions over the immediate institutional future of the Punjab or the 
formation of a special Partition Committee remained unanswered for days.  “The 
summons should not issue until the Muslim League Council has ratified. 
[Mamdot] thinks ratification [of the Partition Plan] almost certain. […] will 
                                                
61 Malik Barkat Ali to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 30th May 1942, PPMS.  
62 Jenkins to Mountbatten – Telegram No. 119/G, 5th June 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR and Jenkins 
to Mountbatten – Telegram No. 120/G, 6th June 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.  
63 Jenkins to Mountbatten – Telegram No. 118/G, 4th June 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR. 
64 Jenkins to Wavell – Telegram No. 39/G, 10th March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.  
65 Jenkins to Mountbatten – Top Secret No. 667, 1st May 1947, MSS.EUR.F 200/130A, IOR.  
 73 
consult his colleagues and let me know his final opinion when he has done so”, 
recorded a frustrated Governor of Punjab.66 Off the record and during informal 
meetings with their supporters, Punjabi leaders agreed on the idea they did not 
agree on anything. Muslim League associates started the rumour that the 3rd June 
Plan was the result of Jinnah’s stroke of genius. Local Congress representatives 
flattered themselves to have pushed Muslims into a corner. Sikhs could not help 
but play on an atavist fatalism and trust to the Boundary Commission.67  
Publicly, Master Tara Singh maintained his previous standing, inciting Sikh to 
carry on their fight in defence of their own community and its existence “until 
[their] object was obtained”.68 Jinnah voiced the dissatisfaction of the Muslims 
by highlighting the differences between the Muslim League platform and the 
British plan. In Dawn (Karachi)’s words, “the Muslim nation can never reconcile 
itself to the act of vandalism which truncated Pakistan”.69 Nehru tried to bring 
back the debate to the rioting and looting. As he blamed British officers for their 
failure to handle communal violence, he praised the efficiency of local Ministries 
in containing disturbances in Congress-ruled regions. Nehru’s line of reasoning 
implied a subtle narrative that would become both a leitmotiv and a widely-
accepted explanation of the Government of Punjab’s inability to restore law and 
order in its towns and villages.70   
The unsuitability of the Muslim League and its leaders to manage the 
government apparatus properly was then counterpoised with the supposed 
efficiency of the United Provinces’ authorities in tackling the 1947 communal 
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breakdown. In late 1947 spring political jargon, this argument turned into an 
opportunity for the Congress and its followers to challenge Jinnah, the Muslim 
League, its supposed suitability to rule Pakistan and, for all its vagueness, the 
idea of Pakistan itself. To some extent, it subtly reversed the grassroots campaign 
policy that Jinnah’s party had put forward during its early 1940s political rooting 
process among the Punjabi electorate. In the words of Malik Barkat Ali, Muslims 
had “changed […] [their mind] because […] [their] experience of the Congress-
governed provinces from July 1937 to October 1939, when they were in power, 
shattered all our confidence in the good faith of our Hindu countrymen”.71  The 
shift from the Muslim League support of a united India to the cause of Pakistan – 
whatever the P-word had meant in those years – had then resulted from the 
misgovernment of Congress-ruled province in the late 1930s. 
Political parties and leaders – no matter whether from the UP or the Punjab – 
tended to go back on their words. Appeals for a normalisation of social 
relationships went hand in hand with an undercover abetment of conflicts. Peace 
committees started to crop up in towns and villages across the whole of the 
Punjab.72 Unluckily, they were doomed to failure even before being founded.  At 
the negotiating tables and in everyday ‘social transactions’, their founding fathers 
equally instigated communal attacks and “made no efforts to maintain peace”.73   
As the timeframe of the path towards independence was revealed, the 
everyday and familiar face of communal violence showed its true colours. 
Attacks impacted on the solidarity among the different religious communities by 
fuelling a climate of mistrust, hate and fear. Places, buildings and people acted as 
a prism whereby high politics came face to face with popular understandings of 
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the political ideas that were at stake in those months. Cases of the poisoning of 
water sources made the simple act of drinking a glass of water into a spring from 
which mutual communal allegations poured.74 This peculiar act of violence 
dredged up age-old inhibitions that would leave their mark on future everyday 
interactions between the various different communities. “When we went to drink 
water,” – recalls the well-known wrestler Zahoor ud-Din – “they wouldn’t let us 
use their glasses. They wouldn’t even pour it for us. They had a long pipe and 
would pour it through the nozzle. […] The Hindus considered us more 
untouchable than the untouchable”.75 Bombs thrown at people resting on roofs 
turned sleep into a nightmare. Private houses stored arms, bombs and other 
incendiary material, losing thereby their traditional image of being safe and 
protective places.76  
Any moment that triggered off a process of normalisation of people’s lives 
was thus under attack. The ability to carry on a normal life suddenly slipped 
away. In early May, the Senate Hall of the University of Lahore was crammed 
with striking students.  According to their elected representatives, the communal 
fury had been a nerve-wracking ordeal and they demanded the postponement of 
their examination session.77  Many of them were certainly looking for excuses 
for their laxness. Nevertheless, the British Governor in Lahore admitted, 
“students belonging to the Pindi, Lahore and Amritsar divisions have anxious 
time and can reasonably ask for a postponement”.78 Workers on their way to 
their factories or craft workshops were further notable targets for 1947 violence. 
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In less than twenty-four hours, two assaults targeted Hindu and Muslim workers 
in Lahore in late June.79 There, some weeks earlier, an attendant had been 
stabbed at the petrol pump where he worked during the rush hour.80 Only few 
shops and offices ran a partial service with reduced personnel and scanty 
resources. The supply and the demand for food, fruit and vegetable did not 
reconcile, as the delivery from suppliers were frequently delayed. To top it all, 
the provision of clean drinking water and adequate sewage disposals fell to an 
all-time low.81  The stoppage of almost all financial activities short-circuited the 
very basis of the whole credit system and encouraged smuggling and the black 
market to flourish. Attacks and assaults not only aimed at destroying the 
economic wealth of opposing communities but also paralysed towns, cities and 
villages through acts that hindered the resumption of normal living conditions.  
In their roles as both victims and perpetrators, single individuals and small 
groups appeared as the basic building blocks of the 1947 upheavals. Chronicles 
are packed with information on incidents, assaults and murders inflicted by a 
single person or bands of no more than six or seven members. “People seem to 
have discovered during the actual riots how easy is to burn the average building 
in an Indian city. […] Our first problem was […] to deal with stabbing and 
burning – not by crowds or even groups of people but by individuals”, declared 
Jenkins in June 1947.82 Indeed, arms could be easily collected among those that 
were lying near dead bodies or found in many abandoned properties and 
houses.83 Incendiary material became an important tool within easy reach for a 
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large number of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, frequently causing deaths and 
injuries even among its inexperienced makers. But single persons or small 
groups were not part of an irrational and unstructured mass in a moment of 
temporary madness. Targets were carefully picked out from among all the 
possible ones, as no one stabbed “his victim without choosing his moment 
carefully”.84  
Everyday life in the Punjab was thus gripped by a paralysis that resonated in 
the socially as well as politically-perceived indeterminateness of the idea of 
Pakistan.  This odd feeling would keep its tight rein on and in suspense the local 
society for a few more weeks.  
 
“In you nestles songs of blood and sword”: moulding both personal and 
political identities out of the Partition mayhem 
 
On 23rd June the Punjab Assembly met in Lahore under curfew. Police 
precautions and barbed-wire barricades isolated the building from the clashes 
that were occurring just a handful of meters away from there. The agenda under 
scrutiny focused on the momentous vote for the partition of the region. Although 
members of the western wing opted for a united Punjab, the rejection of the Khan 
of Mamdot’s motion on the same issue by the eastern group sealed the 
geographical division of the Punjab into two halves. The spaces within which the 
identity of Punjabis now had to be reasserted added a new and relatively clearer 
dimension. The withdrawal of the British raj would entail the partition of the 
subcontinent as well as the geo-political division of the province. Historians, 
                                                
84 Jenkins to Mountbatten, 25th June 1947, R/3/1/176, IOR.  
 78 
socials and political scientists appear to have been affected by a peculiar 
labelling syndrome. This approach has resulted in a substantial corpus of 
literature that tries to tag the fury of the summer of 1947 by delving into almost 
all the entries of the dictionary of human atrocities.85 At the other end of the 
spectrum, gender- and subaltern-studies have focused on both the socially 
excluded and weaker individuals of local society. Thus, following on from the 
previous one, the present section aims at providing a clearer picture of the 
everyday dimension of the June to August events that tends to be overlooked.  It 
will seek to cast light on those ‘grey areas’ where the so-called big ideas that 
were at stake in these months encountered the perception of the average men and 
women of the Punjab. 
Political identities, Charles Tilly argues, are structured around boundaries that 
split social groups along the distinction ‘us’ versus ‘them’.86 With the summer of 
1947 approaching, all the communities of the Punjab relied heavily upon their 
religious experience. “A fortnight earlier he would replied emphatically ‘No’, or 
‘I have no religion’ or ‘religion is irrelevant’. The situation is different now”, 
avows the narrator of Khushwant Singh’s Train to Pakistan.87 This was indeed a 
difference that bore heavily on the everyday dimension of the relational self. “I 
had Muslim friends and we used to play together and there was no one from our 
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families who put any obstacle between us. But when this is strife began, then I 
was [?] out my Muslims friends”, looks back Aridan Singh Dillon at his 
childhood through a mist of fears.88 
Shrines, mosques, Hindu temples, gurdwaras along with religious fairs or 
rites remained the main targets of the July-August 1947 fury. Identity, its 
expression and assertion, deals unavoidably with spatiality. Places come to be 
identified with the definition of the self and are the support on which the 
elaboration of both individual identities performances relies.89 In Verka in mid-
July, a bomb hit a group of Muslims gathered in a mosque for their salat, causing 
one dead and five injured.90 A few weeks before, a roll of five killed and a 
hundred wounded had been the result of a blast during a Muslim fair in 
Mandhan. The slaughter of pigs, cows and individuals and the eventual exposure 
of their corpses in temples acted as warning for all those who were still alive. In 
early July, the attack of a Muslim shrine in Jullundhur that had been visited by 
Muslims, Hindus and Sikh alike, mirrored the radicalisation of local religious 
sentiment of belonging and fervour. Sufi lodges had long represented a shared 
social place. In many cases, they had also established themselves as the fulcrum 
around which the social harmony of the local communities had rotated.91  
The 1945-6 electoral campaign, however, had further exacerbated the 
polarisation of religious identities. In a private conversation with the then Punjab 
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Governor, a Muslim League notable from Campbellpur admitted that the Punjab 
was reaping the harvest of the early 1940s rooting of the Pakistan idea and what 
he termed “the extreme communalism of the election campaign of 1945-6”.92 
Indeed, in those years, pirs and sajjada nashins had left the Unionist Party in 
increasing numbers to support Jinnah’s platform. Public appeals, leaflets, mural 
posters and publications testifying to this switch had been issued in great 
numbers and reached a wider and growing audience. Increasingly animated by 
religious leaders, the political debate had been imbued with a rhetoric that, 
especially in rural areas, made the Muslim League campaign equal to a peculiar 
religious movement.93 In 1945-6 Punjab, votes for Jinnah’s party had not been 
granted on the basis of people’s own perceived identity and opinions. Yet, the 
adherence to its political platform was perceived as a proof of the Muslim-ness 
of each and every individual and as an “act of incorporation in the body of 
Islam”.94 Pirs and sajjada nashins had then further helped the early-imagined 
community of Pakistan become a real and perceived entity. Local social actors 
and influential individuals had staged a so-called choreography of religious 
pilgrimages. As the Muslims of the Punjab had provided the “dense, physically 
reality of the ceremonial passage”, local religious leaders had conducted “the 
unifying rites, interpreting to their respective followings the meaning of their 
collective motion”.95  
This weaving together of the religious and the political dimension enriched 
the local arena with new integrating rituals. The vernacularisation of the 
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messages of religious and political leaders, along with the idea of an independent 
India and Pakistan, implied a re-elaboration of traditional and new symbols, 
identities and contrapositions. Unquestionably, the high politics of political 
developments affected how all the different Punjabi communities looked at each 
other and interacted in the everyday. Normative patterns of behaviour 
expectations and the day-to-day projection of the lives of millions of Hindus, 
Sikhs and Muslims onto the local public area were then refashioned along new 
lines. Indeed, the new political context within which the British raj, the Muslim 
League, the Congress and some revivalist associations framed events broke the 
mould of local people’s image of their own social existence and relationship with 
others.96 
 Although substantially ‘laic’ and political, the idea behind Pakistan 
encapsulated a few religious hints that the deployment of communal violence 
embodied. Originally born as an alternative to nationalism, communalism came 
to be part of it and shared its fallouts and actions with state-building processes. 
These socio-political dynamics translated into the co-presence of both religious 
and civil symbols as the main targets of the attacks. In early July, a group of 
Muslims assaulted a Public Works Department van that was announcing the 
imposition of the curfew on the city of Gujranwala.97 On 13th of the same month, 
late at night, the beating of two constables on duty rocked a small village in 
Jullundhur District.98 A couple of days later, the local Police Recruitment Centre 
was set on fire, and the Muslim League flag replaced the Union Jack that was 
flying on its mast.99  For their part, Muslim League National Guards scoured the 
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streets of Lahore while local police officers could not help but stand by unable to 
react.100 Bombs frequently highlighted the extent of popular mistrust in the local 
judiciary. In late July, an incendiary device exploded outside the Session Court 
in Amritsar where two murder cases that had occurred during the spring 
disturbances were being heard.101 
New symbolic cosmogonies came then abreast of old ones in a continuous 
process of definition and re-definition of both public and private identities and 
spaces. With Independence fast approaching, attacks on trains registered a steady 
increase in number and ferocity. In late July, Jullundhur and Hoshiarpur districts 
reported four attacks in less than three days.102 The need to build up an early 
administrative apparatus that could handle the immediate institutional needs, 
pushed Muslim League leaders into organising large-scale transfers of 
bureaucratic cadres by train via the Punjab. During the second week of August, 
one such train with many prospective employees on board was attacked a 
handful of kilometres outside Bhatinda. The assault resulted in four persons 
killed and twenty injured.103 The carefully-planned choice to conduct a swift 
campaign of onslaughts on the so-called ‘specials’ was, it seems, an attempt to 
undermine those foundations that would have allowed Pakistan to stand on its 
own feet. Former President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf adds a further nuance 
to the general picture. His is a “story of a middle-class family, a husband and 
wife [Musharraf’s parents] who left Delhi with their three sons. […] The little 
boy [Musharraf himself] […] remembered his father’s anxiety about a box that 
he was guarding closely. It was with him all time. He protected it with his life, 
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even sleeping with it under his head, like a pillow. There were” – Musharraf 
reveals – “700,000 rupees on it, a princely sum in those days. The money was 
destined for the foreign office of their new country”.104  
Attacks were carried out along military-style lines. A first wave of saboteur 
shot at train roofs with the aim of driving out their passengers. As soon as 
grenades hit the coaches, the real massacre began: attackers drew their kirpans 
and swords to proceed to the killing itself.105  The numbers that were involved in 
single attacks, arson and robberies could now grow to as large as a few thousands 
of persons. Up to five thousands Sikhs – armed with spears, bombs and guns and 
led by a retired army officer – raided a Muslim village.106 The 1947 summer 
violence acted as a wave that occasionally hit and withdrew by spreading from 
urban settings to rural areas. In a curious twist of fate, it was in the countryside 
that it reached its peak and assumed its most organised guise. In late June, a 
couple of miles far from Phillaur, Jullundhur District, an attack that was 
perpetrated by a well-organised group of Sikhs caused the death of fourteen 
Muslims and injured as many.107 Meanwhile, the rural areas of Amritsar were 
swept up in the same communal fury: over there the death roll on one occasion 
comprised thirty-three persons in less then twelve hours.108  
Nevertheless, the bulk of the devastating effects of the June-early August 
communal violence remained an apanage of the banality of evil and, to some 
extent, of small figures.109 The daily proportion of deaths to the overall 
population of the region was surprisingly low. “Casualties are running between 
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50-100”, recorded the Governor of the Punjab in a private letter to the 
Viceroy.110  However not particularly frequent, bombs that targeted crowded 
places took the lion’s share of the toll of dead and injured.  That was, for 
instance, the case of the already-cited explosion that, in late July, rocked the area 
in front of the Session Court in Amritsar and resulted in forty-eight injured 
among passers-by, demonstrators and employees.111  In most cases, the 1947 
summer communal bouts turned into a surreal manhunt. “Raids” – Jenkins 
pointed out – “caused most casualties but there were many individual attacks”.112  
In Bharowal, on the hot and dry night between 3rd and 4th July, a group of Sikhs 
shot down a Muslim who was irrigating his fields.113  Not even local well-known 
personalities were spared. On 31st July, Ashiq Hussain – former Unionist Minster 
– was killed at a road post soon after having squabbled with the sentry.114  
 24-hour reports of the everyday life of the citizens of the districts of the 
Punjab clearly exemplify the magnitude of communal clashes. On 2nd August, 
the list of dead and wounded in Amritsar City had a total number of twelve on its 
roll. In the local rural areas, gunfire and stabbings brought about the death of two 
Sikhs in Vairowal and Ghavinda. A further person – a Muslim – was injured as a 
result of a bomb explosion near Tarn Taran.115 Three days later – on 5th August – 
Jenkins recorded no more than twenty-four casualties in the districts other than 
Amritsar.116  
Putrefying corpses lying on the streets among the garbage and being eaten by 
animals, the brisk smell of blood and wrecked houses represented the other side 
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of the summer violence. Starvation, fear, despair, hopelessness and anger carved 
out socio-geographical spaces wherein the dialogue among social actors was 
almost impossible.117 Unsurprisingly, the result was the deconstruction of the 
familiar ‘word’.118 All the traditional points of references and the usual everyday 
experience of the self vanished. In early July, some Sikhs attacked their 
neighbours, injuring eleven people.119 A bomb hit the Hindu-run Crown Cinema 
at Bhati Gate, Lahore and caused the death of fifteen persons among its usual 
clientele of lower-class Muslims.120  Unquestionably, the so-called communal of 
war of succession placed a strain on all those relationships, which had 
underpinned local society. It “dissolved old loyalties and created new ones, and 
[…] produced many symptoms of a revolution”.121 
Partition fast approaching, loyalties – both old and new – and symptoms 
would be fully unveiled.  
 
 “In you the migrating birds”: when Independence came to India and 
Pakistan 
 
As he addressed his audience at the Council Chamber of the Sindh Legislative 
Assembly in Karachi, Jinnah did not let his feelings show at all. He did not even 
seek the eyes of his beloved sister Fatima who was sat in front of him. He talked 
“quietly and unemotionally like a lawyer arguing a case”, the correspondent from 
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The Times (London) recorded, towering over the fifty newly-elected members of 
the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.122 Pakistan, he argued, would be a state 
where individuals who belonged to religious minorities were “citizens with equal 
rights and obligations”. Complete religion freedom would be granted, modelling 
the new state on the British separation of the religious and political spheres.  
Ironically, at that very minute, Hindus Sikhs and Muslims were quite literally 
conquering towns and villages by fire and sword. After all, Pakistan and India 
were two independent states whose borders had been neither known nor 
internationally acknowledged as yet. It was then violence that in several areas – 
those thought to be quite close to the yet-to-be-announced border – carved out 
spaces and sketched out the future geography of the region. During the week that 
preceded independence, Lahore and Amritsar were set on fire. Mainly inhabited 
by Hindus and Sikhs, the walled city of the ‘Paris of East’ was almost completely 
burnt out up to the Muslim mohallas. Similarly, fires and attacks razed the 
Muslim suburbs of Amritsar to the ground.123 The result was, needless to say, an 
almost complete exodus of all those who perceived that their religious identity 
put at high risk their lives. On 21st August, about 30,000 of Hindus and Sikhs, 
who had previously lived in the shadow of the Badshahi Mosque, were believed 
to have already reached the Indian Punjab.124 Apparently, their departure, like 
that of the 70,000 Muslims who trekked westwards, had the discernible effect of 
appeasing local communitarian rivalries.125  “Improvement in Amritsar and 
Lahore maintained”, telegraphed – with a certain amount of relief – the British 
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High Commissioner in Lahore to the London headquarters in late August 
1947.126 
Nevertheless, in those villages and small towns whose future geographical 
status was a matter under discussion at the negotiating table of the Boundary 
Commission, disturbances snowballed into full-scale riots. In the rural areas of 
Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Jullundhur, Hoshiarpur and Ludhiana Districts, attacks, 
arson and reprisals showed no sign of improvement even after some pockets of 
refugees had left their suburbs.127 One may think that tempers cooled as soon as 
the proceeding of the Radcliffe Award were released on 17th August.  “Whatever 
the fault of the award by the Boundary Commission, both the Governments of 
India and Pakistan had to abide by it and there was no question of making a 
protest”, declared Ghazanfar Ali Khan.128  In the Congress headquarters, the 
outcome of the negotiations was said to be accepted as a “settled fact”.129 
Official declarations however only scratched the surface of the general popular 
mood. A long editorial published in Dawn (Karachi) précised the real-life 
discussions within the lower ranks of the Muslim League. “Even a cursory glace 
to them [Commission’s papers]” – it stated – “shows that these reports have been 
drafted in the most cowardly fashion and do not possess the essential 
characteristics of a legal judgement. […] Let us make it perfectly clear that even 
if the Government accepts this territorial murder of Pakistan which is miscalled a 
judicial award, the people will not”.130 For its part, The Hindu (Madras) opted for 
a far more ironic twist. “There is” – its columnist argued – “something […]  
[true] in his [Radcliffe’s] plea that when the Bengal Commission was taking 
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evidence he had to study the Punjab records, and when the Punjab Commission 
was taking evidence he had to study the Bengali records”.131 
The publishing of the Award not only further exacerbated communal tensions 
but also gave them a more marked political twist. “The crisis in the Punjab is 
changing in character. […] The chief problems now are large-scale looting on 
both sides of the frontier and sporadic attacks on the minority communities as 
they evacuated on foot, trucks, and by railway”, reported a correspondent from 
The Times (London).132 Despite them issuing soothing statements on an almost 
daily basis, Indian and Pakistani leaders appeared unwilling to cast off the chains 
of the vicious circle of retaliation. “Our State is not” – Nehru declared in late 
August after having toured the Punjab – “a communal State […] I have been 
assured by Liaquat Ali Khan [the then Prime Minister of Pakistan] that this is 
also the policy of the Pakistan Government”.133 Reassurances notwithstanding, 
the political and party narrative on and around violence played on a multi-faceted 
argumentative fabric. In everyday conversations, the development of a spirit of 
reconciliation was always subject to an equally powerful act of appeasement 
from the counterpart.134 Apparently, Pakistani authorities turned a blind eye on 
the hundreds of angry appeals – in Nehru’s words, “threats of war and of ex-
termination of Sikhs” – that appeared in Dawn (Karachi) and Zamindar 
(Lahore).135 An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. During his visit to 
Amritsar in late September, the words of the Deputy Prime Minister of India 
Patel acted as a wake-up call for the local inhabitants and refugees. “If you do 
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not have faith in Pakistan Government [on the exchange of population] or its 
people” – he polemically argued –  “you can hold your hands for week and see 
what happens. If they do not observe the truce in the right sprit the world will 
know who the breakers of laws of humanity are”.136  
“If only […] politicians would not interfere with the practical work, the army 
and civilians would get on far better with the job”, confided Kondem Subbaya 
Thimmayya, commander in chief of the Punjab Boundary Force, to a British 
attaché.137  East and West Punjab presented a scene of an endless flow of 
millions of persons who, according to contemporary sources, literally clogged 
streets, town and village. Party propaganda that aimed at pushing individuals 
away from their homes and into reception camps met with rumours of a Sikh 
rearmament policy and plans for the founding of their own state.138  
Contradictory messages and appeals further inflamed public feelings. Leaders of 
majorities encouraged minorities to express their loyalty to the state, making 
clear to them that there would be no room for their political representatives in 
future institutions.139  
Attacks on mile-long refugee kafilas, ‘special trains’ and temporary camps 
plunged the whole of the Punjab into further chaos and violence. A group of 
armed Sikhs attacked a Muslim column in the outskirts of Amritsar in early 
September, killing and injuring ninety persons. On the very same day, a train 
packed with refugees was halted between Jullundhur and Karpurtala. The assault 
resulted in death toll of seventy casualties.140 A couple of weeks later, an 
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uninterrupted two-hour siege of another ‘special’ to Pakistan resulted in a similar 
bloodbath, with a mob of RSS members and Sikhs killing more than 1,000 
Muslim travellers.141 Meanwhile, in the Pakistani Punjab countryside, groups of 
Muslim peasants were planning their own raids on those Hindus and Sikhs who 
were on their way to India.142 Held to ransom by the early bouts of nationalism, 
women were raped on public roads frequently in front of their own relatives. 
Their future of pain and shame was all mapped out for them.  
The tents and the makeshift huts of temporary refugees camps would soon 
replace refugees’ cosy and comfortable houses.  The long journey of the Punjabi 
migrant community towards its resettlement and rehabilitation had just begun.   
 
***** 
 
Chapter 1 has delved into the records of the communal upheavals and the early 
flow of migrations that rocked the region of the Punjab between the early spring 
and the late autumn of 1947.  Aiming at introducing the whole dissertation by 
framing it within its historical context, it has chronicled the progressive 
embitterment of communal relations and the continuous process of negotiation 
and re-negotiation of the political ideas at stake.  Individual subsections have 
dealt with the interplay of historical correspondence between local ‘mainstream’ 
communal conflicts and Partition violence, the commonly-held and politically-
perceived indeterminateness of the idea of Pakistan, the individual everyday 
dimension of the conflict and the somehow lethal encounter between the ‘big 
ideas’ at stake and the common perception of the average Punjabi of that time. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
There is no place like home: the politics of intimacy, domesticity and 
resettlement among West Punjabi refugees. 
 
 
“A happy home is the single spot of rest which a man  
has upon this earth for the cultivation of his noblest sensibilities” 
(F. W. Robertson, Sermons Preached at Trinity College, Brighton,  
Boston, 1870, p. 318) 
 
 
Amidst walls of flames, tears and the smell of death blended with latrine and life, 
millions of refugees flocked along the roads that brought them to what they 
perceived would be their new personal, institutional and safer home. Novelists, 
poets and commentators alike have articulated this sense of loss and made of it 
one of the earliest and finest pages of Pakistani literature.1 For their part, 
however, anthropology, political science and history have remained trapped in a 
long series of unproven assumptions regarding the processes at work during the 
post-Partition years. Muhammad Waseem summed up these hypotheses in two 
articles that were published in 2000 and 2004, and thenceforth set the pace for all 
subsequent studies.2 Despite acknowledging the long-term repercussions 
involved in the rehabilitation of Partition refugees in West Punjab, his analysis 
concluded that the processes of resettlement was “relatively well-planned and 
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therefore quick and orderly”.3 The advent of oral history has subsequently added 
refugees’ perceived absence of a state and the celebration of their self-reliance 
onto the debate.4 Nevertheless, these interpretative trends have prevented a 
careful investigation of how the migrant community elaborated its relationship 
with the new state and how its sense of belonging to a wider institutional corpus 
subsequently developed.  It is precisely this long-overdue re-examination that 
provides the main focus of this chapter. 
As soon as they crossed a border that was not properly demarcated, refugees 
were accommodated in temporary camps and structures. Some sought refuge in 
the houses of friends or relatives; others illegally occupied Sikh and Hindu 
abandoned properties. This chapter thus first traces the history of the early 
attempts of West Punjabi migrants to become better integrated into their new - 
local - social, political and institutional milieu. It reveals how and in what ways 
refugees thought of themselves as citizens of a new independent state, while 
dealing with the dislocating and traumatic fallout from Partition.  Homes – the 
search for, the life in or the lack of them – proved very important in moulding the 
formation of an everyday political and institutional identity. They epitomised the 
deep-seated malaise of all those refugees who were hovering between 
contradictory feelings of alienation from and intimacy with their surrounding 
environment.  
This chapter therefore also chronicles the growth of the migrant community’s 
sense of citizenship amidst tremendous setbacks, a drive for modernity and the 
return to traditional social structures.  The troubled history of both the urban and 
the rural resettlement of Partition refugees betrays a re-elaboration of local !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 M. Waseem, “Muslim Migration from East Punjab”, op. cit., p. 70. 
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traditions as well as the need to reckon with new and unexpected scandals. 
Hence, the tension between modernity and deep-rooted rituals experienced by 
many refugees also forms an important dimension of the following exploration. 
 
Liminalities of Citizenship: the big-bang model of refugee camps and 
temporary structures 
 
Lahore, December 1947. The sun dipped below the horizon. The amber colours 
of the sunset and a slight fog enveloped the city. A crackling loudspeaker 
allowed the muezzin’s voice to reach even the remotest area of Walton Road 
temporary refugee camp. It was Maghreb time. Thousands of refugees left their 
tents and lined up for their evening prayer amidst mud and washing just hung up 
to dry. Supported by tumbledown structures and furnished with boxes and trunks, 
these tents were the temporary houses provided to hundreds of thousands of 
citizens belonging to the newly-created state of Pakistan. An area of 
approximately 8ft x 7ft stored the meagre belongings, the feelings and the hopes 
of a six-member family who had just left Jullundhur, India. 
Existing secondary literature, however, has overlooked the relevance of the 
experience of and in West Punjabi refugee camps, and relegated its significance 
to an arena where collective grievances were voiced and expressed.5 Yet, as new 
primary sources are brought to light, the temporary structures that were intended !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to accommodate the millions of persons pouring into Pakistan instead reveal their 
potential to disrupt personal lives and inner emotions, while, in the meanwhile, 
acting as a perfect breeding ground for new individual feelings of belonging to a 
wider political community to blossom. As this section will argue, the tension 
between inner and outer selves and the contamination of private and public 
spaces wove these different sentiments together and carved out space for a new 
identity and the subsequent claim of its distinctiveness within local Punjabi 
society.   
In many ways, the bundle of tents, the management of the time and space, and 
the structuring of social life in Walton Road as well as in many other refugee 
camps, established the boundaries of both public and private life within this new 
framework. In the parts of South Asia that constitute pre- and post-independent 
Pakistan, domesticity has always been a clear-cut notional and physical domain 
from whence individuals have not offered up to the so-called ‘outside world’ 
their secrets, intimacy and feelings easily.6 Sections of about 40ft x 15ft housing 
80 or more persons in tents and barracks reshaped the boundaries and the 
contents of both the ideas and emotions of private and public life.7  In those tiny 
spaces, tension between bahir and ghar exploded.8 The intimacy of a married 
couple going about their daily routine – previously safely hidden from prying 
eyes – was brought, whether they liked it or not, into the open. Filth, squalor and 
inadequate hygienic arrangements challenged once again the reorganisation of 
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spaces that had followed the imposition of colonial rule over the subcontinent.9  
As Bulent Dilken and Carsten Lausten have argued, inclusion within a person’s 
private affairs and exclusion from their public life typify the human experience 
in any camp environment.10 For all their efforts, authorities and staff members in 
these Punjabi refugee camps were only partially able to minimise the effects of 
such intrusion and marginalisation. It recalled a “Dante’s Inferno or some of the 
mediaeval pictures one sees of the nether regions”, reported Angela Limerick, a 
British Red Cross officer, in her diary.11  
Rites and rituals of death and burial underwent the same blurring and forced a 
further process of redefinition of the social and personal sphere. The dislocating 
effect of Partition had ripped apart the familiar and community ties that had 
traditionally comforted the deceased’s relatives, and the subsequent lack of the 
extended family’s support turned into a feeling of isolation. Nevertheless, this 
loneliness of sorrow walked alongside the phenomenon of mass grief: one 
person’s bereavement was that of any other refugee’s loss. Death and life, public 
and private, became intimately entwined. The murmurs of prayers that had 
previously been recited behind closed doors for the three-days period of 
mourning now became an ordinary buzz in the background of refugees’ lives in 
camps. The mechanical arms of bulldozers excavated communal graves and 
unfamiliar hands filled in them with earth.12 Stacks of corpses showed up among 
huts and tents, and marked off the areas intended to accommodate refugees from 
the other suburbs of cities and towns.  
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9 1594/9, R-N-4, BRCMA and 1940s/Pakistan/Services: Pakistan relief (photos), BRCMA. 
10 B. Dilken and C. B. Lausten, The Culture of Exception. Sociology facing the Camp, London-
New York, 2005, p. 58.  
11 1594/9, R-N-4, BRCMA. 
12 Letter from UKHC to CRO, 13th October 1947, DO 142/440, NAKG. 
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As Limerick continues, “on the waste land on either side of the road 
[Ferozepore Road, Lahore] was a continuous stretch of graves for practically the 
whole distance”.13 Mass and individual graves were thus strung out along the 
axes of refugee camp premises, and frequently identified these temporary 
facilities as specific geographical locations. In practise, circumscribing and 
signposting them proved to be a way of establishing distinctions between insiders 
and outsiders, and a consequent principle of order.14  This imposition of an order 
implied in turn the establishment of a shared set of laws, rules and regulations. 
According to this process, normality and everyday life are to be considered as a 
pre-condition of any kind of law and its related implementation.15 Yet in the 
immediate aftermath of Partition both normality and everyday life were brought 
to a standstill. Beyond the fences of refugee camps, the closure of industrial 
concerns and banks were matched by disruptions to transport, communications 
and health services.  The number of scheduled and non-scheduled banks dropped 
by approximately 80%, and, in March 1948, Pakistan’s railway services reported 
a loss of Rs. 1.97 crores.16 Up to December 1948 the toll of murders and 
robberies in Pakistani Punjab registered a steady increase that was not related to 
1947 communal upheavals.17 Poor and ineffective administrative arrangements 
thus imported a sense of alienation from everyday normal life to many West 
Punjab temporary camps. Overcrowding as well as multiple or triple registrations 
of the same family in different camps epitomised the kind of rifts that emerged 
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from the bureaucratic processes of form-filling and reception.  Indeed, in some 
temporary facilities these calculations did not add up. The overall capacity of 
Multan Qila Camp, for instance, was estimated to be nearly 80,000 refugees, but 
in August 1948 the demand for food rations stood at more than double this 
figure.18  
Meteorological quirks over the region harbingered further difficulties. “The 
summer of 1947 was not like other Indian summers. Even the weather had a 
different feel […]. […] No one could remember when the monsoon had been so 
late. For weeks, the sparse clouds cast only shadows. […] People began to say 
that God was punishing them for their sins”, reveals Khushwant Singh in his 
Train to Pakistan..19  When the heavens opened, floods and cold snaps hit the 
region hard. While warm clothing and proper bedding were in short supply, the 
price of coal, coke and fuel rocketed. In camps, food - widely acknowledged to 
be a symbolic and primeval source of security20 - proved insufficient.  Misery, 
havoc and monotony reflected the feelings of starvation, apathy and work-
shyness that crept over many refugees.    
To what extent did this mood mirror an apathetic attitude among refugees 
towards nation- and state-building processes as well? How did they think of and 
project themselves as their status switched from subjects of the British raj to 
citizens of an independent state? It would seem that unpredictability and the 
occasional eruption of violence are often the hallmark of the social and political 
lives of displaced persons. Partition refugees in post-independent Pakistani 
Punjab were no exception to this rule. News reports of incidents and protests !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 A-17, 28th August 1948, NND 765024, NARA. 
19 K. Singh, “Train to Pakistan”, in Memories of Madness. Stories of 1947, New Delhi, 2002, p. 
3.  
20 Welfare Division, Report on Psychological Problems of Displaced Persons, 1945, HA5-4/3, 
The Wiener Library, London. 
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taking place on camp premises and in towns echoed across the whole of the 
Punjab on a daily basis.21 As early as March 1948, a group of refugees 
demonstrated in front of the Punjab Assembly and joined hands with other 
protesting social actors.22 In late August that year, persons lodged in Dher Pindi 
camps went on hunger strike and attempted to march into the city centre of 
Lahore. In other places such as Multan and Bowli temporary structures, refugees 
attacked census officers in violent fashion and angrily opposed the collection of 
their data.23 The mere mention of the name of refugee leader Rao Khurshid Ali 
Khan – well known for his ability to keep camps in a state of semi-rebellion – 
threw officials into a panic and rendered their nights sleepless. His arrest in 
August 1948 generated a rumpus in Montgomery, where 50,000 protesting 
refugees clashed with the local police.24  Ian Talbot has acknowledged the ability 
of such demonstrations to cement social solidarity among their participants and 
keep hardships and claims under the spotlight.25 Nevertheless, the political 
dimension of refugees’ acts did not, it is suggested here, stop at the threshold of 
mere recrimination for better living conditions. Their protests can instead be 
viewed, as this chapter contends, as avant-garde acts of citizenship. No matter 
the precise reason for their complaints, refugees showed themselves to be 
responsive to an idea of injustice in ways that made them embryonic activist 
citizens.26 Hence, the progressive shift from the status of subject to that of a 
citizen started quickly to become apparent.  
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21 Report from UKHC – POL 7730/48, 27th March 1948, DO 142/440, NAKG.  
22 Ibidem. 
23 A-17, 28th August 1948, NND 765024, NARA. 
24 Ibidem and Reuters – Indian and Pakistan services, 30th August 1948, DO 142/440, NAKG. 
25 Talbot, Divided Cities, op. cit., p. 179. 
26 E. Isin, “Theorizing Acts of Citizenship”, in E. I. Isin and G. M. Nielson (eds.), Acts of 
Citizenships, London-New York, 2008, pp. 38-9.  
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New sites and scales of struggle were introduced during the period following 
Partition, and new and extended lines between outsiders and insiders started to be 
delineated. Carving out their space as distinct from any existing local identity, 
refugees found their own ways of being political and channelling their claims, 
and, in the last resort, their own ideas of belonging to a state. The anger that 
results from the violation or the perceived violation of a right, Ernest Gellner 
reminds us, bespeaks of a sentiment of belonging to a wider national 
community.27 “Disgruntled refugees in the villages and in the camp just near us, 
have used the rumours as their opportunity to threaten and frighten our 
Christians. This was interpreted as an effort to get them to leave their homes and 
the meagre lands they are working so they, the refugees, may take possession. 
[…] The threats of the refugees here in Montgomery camps are directed not so 
much at the Christians as against the town officials and the world in general”28, 
reported a member of a religious association in his correspondence with his 
mother house in the United States. Previously, the transfer of Hindu deposits 
from banks in Lahore had resulted in angry migrants targeting the local District 
Commissioner’s car.29  What the press sympathetic to the government hastily 
labelled as hysteria or psychological disorder was actually a political demand 
that – it should be noted here – was not at this stage attached to any kind of 
religious or theological claim or rift. Indeed, giving voice to refugees’ unrest and 
complaints meant swelling the ranks of “certain dangerous lines of anti-State 
propaganda”,30 and facing the possibility of a temporary prohibition on the 
publication and circulation of pamphlets and newspapers. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalisms, Oxford, 1983, p. 1. 
28 Letter to Mr. Cootes, 9th June 1948, NND 765024, NARA. 
29 Enclosure in Karachi Despatch No. 77, 22nd November 1947, DO 142/440, NAKG.  
30 The Times (London), 26th August 1948. 
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As their integration into the local socio-economic fabric of West Punjab 
became a necessity, the political essence of refugee protest surfaced more fully 
and the complexity of the tangle in which they were blew up. Camps proved to 
be just the tip of the iceberg. Many thousands of refugees were accommodated in 
either civil or religious hospitals, school buildings and homes for women and 
orphans. In Lahore, patients in Lady Mayo Hospital outnumbered the usual 
bedspace by approximately one thousand units.31  Surgical cases resulting from 
the 1947 atrocities and migration engulfed its operating theatres as well as those 
of many other hospitals made worse by an acute shortage of trained medical 
personnel. Large numbers of high and middle schools put aside desks and 
blackboards and served instead as temporary reception centres. Meanwhile, leaks 
in the institutional reception network and policies were plugged through 
refugees’ self-managed construction of mud huts and occupation of empty 
houses. In early October 1947 official estimates warned of the presence of about 
200,000 migrants who had settled within West Punjab without governmental 
sanction and then proceeded to travel back and forth between camps and the 
middle of towns and cities of the region.32 In the old city of Lahore, the collapse 
of a crumbling house claimed 18 lives among the refugees living in the area.33 
Soon afterwards, nearly 2,000 persons targeted the offices of the Lahore 
Municipality, badly damaging its contents and a couple of cars. Local authorities 
tried to take immediate counter-measures by emptying 3,000 tumbledown houses 
and relocating the families concerned in schools, go-downs and parks. Yet, for 
all their efforts, tension and discontent remained palpable and widespread among 
refugees and, in late 1948, this dissatisfaction went as far as to threaten seriously !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 1594/9, R-N-4, BRCMA. 
32 A-2, 8th October 1947, NND 765024, NARA. 
33 A-17, 28th August 1948, NND 765024, NARA.  
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the stability of Mamdot’s Punjab ministry.34 The losses, hardships and sufferings 
undergone in their dreadful journey to Pakistan allowed all refugees, whatever 
their immediate circumstances, to claim the kind of morality that turns groups 
into communities able to embody and put forward a politics of the governed.35   
Refugees who rushed the Municipality of Lahore aimed at opposing the 
delays that were making the early allocation of houses almost impossible and, in 
the last resort, at shaping government policies.  In late 1948, after an informal 
meeting with the Minister for Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Refugees Raja 
Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Limerick recorded that, despite governmental enthusiasm, 
rehabilitation plans “didn’t consist of much more than getting some of the 
refugees out of the camps and into the village, but without taking any adequate 
steps to get them on their feet or established in any trade or occupation”.36 The 
ongoing continuous rationing of a wide range of basic resources together with 
acute shortages of trained personnel in key sectors dealing with the reintegration 
of displaced persons further exacerbated the problems associated with local 
living conditions and hampered the deployment of resettlement projects and 
plans.  By flicking through the lists of shortages of materials and jobs published 
in local gazettes of those years, one actually experiences almost first-hand a 
Pakistani society that seemed to be starting at zero. Food grains, building 
material, chemical and surgical instruments, paper, electric goods, coal, coke and 
medicines were all added to the list of the items to be requisitioned and 
rationed.37  Wanted – Dead or Alive: civil, electrical, mechanical, wireless, 
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765024, NARA. 
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36 1594/9, R-N-4, BRCMA. 
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!! 102 !
sound and marine engineers, chemists, surgeons, radiologists, pathologists, 
nurses and bacteriologists, published the West Punjab Gazette in early March 
1948.38  
A whole social imaginary had thus to be reshaped and reframed. The interplay 
between local social interactions and the weaving of mutual normative 
expectations is inextricably interwoven with both a spatial and a narrative 
dimension.39 Formerly inhabited by a single family of Muslims and well-stocked 
in terms of Hindu temples and Shivala buildings, the old market of Ghumti Bazar 
within the walled city of Lahore represented one of those hundreds of local 
microcosms where personal and collective histories intermingled to produce the 
rich tapestry of West Punjabi society.  Houses and huts would soon replace 
camps and temporary structures, and the anguish of the creation and re-creation 
of respectively a state and a social imaginary thus became immediately tangible 
and visible. 
 
Elective affinities: refugees, homes, domesticity and belonging  
 
Home and domesticity embrace both the social and personal experiences of their 
inhabitants by serving as the building blocks of a relational self. Their constant 
presence in the everyday lives of individuals has, as Amanda Vickery in a 
different context argues, overshadowed the need to dig into the feelings that 
bring their rooms to life.40 South Asian houses – and Pakistani ones, in particular 
– proved to be no exception to the rule. The exposure of architecture and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 West Punjab Gazette, 5th March 1948, UPL.   
39 C. Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, Durham, 2004, p. 23.  
40 A. Vickery, Behind Closed Door. At Home in Georgian England, New Haven-London, 2009, 
p. 3. 
!! 103 !
colonialists to an idea of domesticity and feelings of being at home has provided 
the parameters for most of the critical analysis that has attempted to tackle this 
issue.41 Houses, homes and domesticity will be used here as both the physical 
and emotional space within which refugees perceived the state as a ‘trauma’. Its 
inability to fulfil what they perceived as its duties and hence to live up to their 
expectations brought about a disenchantment among refugees that materialised 
itself in a perceived lack of intimacy with and casual attitude towards the 
surrounding environment and a troubled process of construction of an everyday 
Pakistani state.        
In the aftermath of independence, West Punjabi homes were piled high with 
all the emotions and the dynamics that the search for, and the life in, them 
triggered in terms of reconstructing a social imaginary. “Oi, b***ch*d, you’re 
living in my f***ing house!”, would thunder a threatening Martland in a room in 
McLenburgh Square, London, more than sixty years later.42 Martland and 
Ahmad had met by chance and became good friends thousands of miles away 
from their home countries. Each of them was respectively an Indian and a 
Pakistani child of that midnight hour that changed the course of South Asian 
events. 90 Upper Mall, Lahore is the address of a so-called evacuee property 
that, having been vacated by Martland’s family in 1947, was allotted to Ahmad’s 
grandparents in 1959 thanks to the help and intercession of the then Punjab 
Inspector General of Police Qurban Ali Khan. Temporary residents or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 See, for instance, E. Butcher, Empire and Families: Britons and Late Imperial India, Oxford, 
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Housekeeper and Cook, New Delhi, 2010; M. Former, “Postcolonial Domesticity Amid 
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commuters of friends’ houses, flats that were rented at exorbitant prices and, in 
the last resort, of life itself, Ahmad’s grandparents finally found a place of their 
own, more than a decade after crossing the border into Pakistan. Resettlement 
and compensation in this way were two sides of the same problem. As Ahmad 
went on, “families that had opted to migrate to Pakistan were compensated, if 
that is the correct term for this situation, for what that they had left behind”.43 
Special registers that were progressively filed with the Custodian of the Evacuee 
Properties recorded meticulously all the entries of the forms that refugees were 
required to complete in order to claim the value of their immovable properties 
left behind in India and consequently to get a house allotted in West Punjab.44 
Information such as the extent of share or interest of the evacuee, estimated value 
of the property, amount of the mortgage and dates of auction and serial number 
of sale list headed the list of information that refugees were asked to supply.45 
This level of detail provided by the form, however, did not reflect the attention 
given to allocating housing, which was done on a much more ad hoc basis. 
Numbers did not work to the refugee’s advantage. According to Pakistani 
sources, the Muslims who had poured into West Punjab outnumbered by far the 
Hindus and Sikhs who had fled to India. The wave of looting and fires that 
accompanied the Partition of the subcontinent had severely damaged entire 
mohallas, leaving hundreds of streets unviable and thousands of houses unfit for 
use:  105,367 out of the 106,010 evacuee houses in the towns and cities of 
Pakistani Punjab were classified as ‘not easily reparable’: crumbling walls, 
uneven floors and broken window frames made most of these buildings little !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Ibidem. 
44 First appointed by the West and East Punjab authorities in late August 1947, the Custodian of 
the Evacuee Properties took over the ‘property of all abandoned properties and was tasked with 
their care and protection’. See, Sind Observer (Karachi), 15th January 1949. 
45 West Punjab Gazette – Extraordinary Issue, 16th December 1947, UPL.  
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more than heaps of rubble.46 Despite government optimism with regard to its 
resettlement schemes, endemic delays in the clearance of temporary structures 
left their mark on refugees’ feelings of anxiety, precariousness and 
disillusionment.47  In late 1948 the afore-mentioned bundles of sticks and well-
worn tents were still sheltering about 400,000 refugees distributed in camps 
across the whole of the Punjab.48 Among them were around 2,500 refugees from 
non-agreed areas who were lodged in Bowli camp and who, on a foggy winter’s 
day of early 1951, took the streets of Lahore. Their march towards the Wahga 
border and their attempt to reach India voiced their concern about the need to 
feel truly at home.49 The claim to a roof over their heads was closely linked to 
the idea of taking part, and being involved, in a wider project of both a nation- 
and a state-in-the-making. Indeed, the conceptualisation of a sense of belonging 
to Pakistan meshed with the elaboration of a physical and emotional domesticity. 
If their obstinate refusal to take part in census data gathering exercises had 
previously marked the desire of refugees from non-agreed areas to be considered 
as equal citizens of the newly-created state, the political significance of their 
protest over the lack of proper accommodation now flagged up disillusionment 
with the early projects of national integration. As loneliness pervaded their souls 
and a house was perceived to be a chimera, refugees felt that that the “final 
heaven for the stars” that they had found in the immediate aftermath of the 
Partition was slowly becoming “tarnished rays [and a] night smudged light”.50 
‘Squatter’ and ‘jhuggi’ would soon replace their usual label of ‘refugee’, and the 
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model of katcha mud houses – imported by rural migrants into urban centres – 
would draw the border around their domestic lives. Refugee self-resettlement on 
land arranged itself into a structured and proper business. Squatter and refugee 
entrepreneurs and community leaders asserted their power and ‘sovereignty’ over 
the illegally-occupied plots: no property could be sold or transferred without 
their approval on prices and future allottees.51 Frequently demolished by 
calamities or town development authorities without any proper notice and offers 
of alternative accommodation, huts perfectly matched their precariousness with 
the possibility of being rebuilt in the same place almost overnight.52  
Counting on a safer and solider building was by no means a byword for 
stability and intimacy with the surrounding environment. An aura of weirdness 
enveloped the sense of relief that usually followed the allotment of a house. 
“There was a dinner service on the dining table and, in a study in an annexe in 
the back, a glass of water lay on a desk as if someone had just risen to answer the 
phone. ‘I told them I didn’t want a house like this’, my grandfather told me”, 
explains Ahmad while drawing his readers into his family’s inner feelings.53 The 
idea of a mutual contamination of personal spaces came here into play. Muslim 
hands opened front doors whose inlays finely entwined Sanskrit characters with 
images of Hindu deities. Mere kilometres away, in East Punjab, Hindu or Sikh 
eyes decrypted Quran verses that had been carved over the doorstep. Furniture in 
rooms, dishes and glasses in cupboards and clothes in wardrobes traced the taste 
of unknown persons. The familiar and reassuring smiles of those who had been 
portrayed in pictures and paintings adorning domestic walls turned into !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Squatters and Squatting – Extract from the Draft Report of the UN Housing Mission to 
Pakistan, 1957, NND 948832, NARA. 
52 On governmental action towards the elimination of refugee shantytowns see Punjab Assembly 
Debates, 5th May 1952, PCSL.  
53 The Express Tribune (Lahore), 29th August 2010. 
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emotionless exhibitions of artists’ talent. The intimate space of the city – an 
everyday and domestic leeway on which cultural differences had previously 
harmoniously met – was accordingly torn apart.54 A persistent feeling of 
domestic space being violated framed the tapestry of the refugee’s life and, when 
the Government of Punjab ordered the requisition of stocks and commodities 
from private premises for public use, it was even sanctioned by law. Private 
stocks and commodities were frequently transferred to temporary structures that 
were put to use as lodgings. In February 1954 the District of Lahore still had no 
fewer than eight schools that were used both as ‘private’ houses by several 
refugee families and Homes for Refugee Women and Orphans.55  The word 
‘home’ was also attached to the Centre for Abducted Women that was hosted in 
a local civil jail where iron bars functioned as front doors and the usual roll call 
of residents as the doorbell.  
Yet, despite the bureaucratic jargon, refugees rarely perceived houses, and 
educational and reception institutions as a proper home. “Home. The very 
thought of home threatened to shatter their sanity just as a storm threatens to 
uproot trees”, reveals a fictional character in Intizar Husain’s Kishti (Ark).56 
Home – crossroads of emotions, tenderness and affection – finds its main 
personification in the metaphor of the heart.57 Arguably an incurable arrhythmia 
affected refugees’ hearts.  An initial first-come-first-served method of allotting 
evacuees’ houses and a subsequent assignment of urban premises on a 
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provisional basis deepened the sense of insecurity and alienation that had already 
crept into the mindset of many refugees. The immediate and tangible effect of 
this mood was the progressive decay into which large numbers of buildings 
irremediably fell. The poor conditions of the evacuees’ properties caused 
recurring front-pages headlines that screamed out their warnings. “Evacuee 
homes in state of despair. Many refugees may become shelterless in Punjab”, 
announced the Pakistan Times (Lahore) in the midst of the torrential 1950 
monsoon season.58 “Refugees living in sub-human conditions”, would bawl five 
years later an emaciated kid strolling along Mall Road in Lahore while trying to 
sell the same newspaper to passers-by.59 The reorganisation of spaces that had 
followed the social reformism of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century, as well as the formal and informal set of rules that buttressed it, were 
thus placed in jeopardy. Houses were no longer those images of perfect engines 
of neatness that had permeated gender and domestic reformist literature.60 As 
allottees refused to take charge of the repairs and the upkeep of their allotments, 
houses teetered on the brink of collapse. Famous addresses were by no means 
immune. Immediately after independence, Iqbal’s former residence at 94/A 
McLeod Road, Lahore was first declared evacuee property and then occupied by 
a family of refugees. The progressive deterioration of its structure over the 
following years threatened the safety of the occupants to such an extent that the 
Lahore Corporation eventually demanded its demolition.61 Maintenance work, 
rents and permanence of the allotment were the indissoluble and lethal 
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combination of elements that spoilt remaining furnishings, frames and walls, and 
swayed refugees’ sense of attachment to a physical space. For many, a 
straightforward and simple equation lodged in their minds. Realising no return 
from the rent of the houses that they had abandoned in India, refugees contended 
that neither payments nor repairs were due for premises allotted to them in West 
Punjab.62 Consequently, the ambiguity that was implied in any claim to 
compensation fully surfaced. Equally, their feelings and ideas of belonging 
engaged in a tongue-twisting fight fraught with danger and contradictions. 
Pakistan consequently embodied the reality that ‘home’ had turned out to be 
powerless in arranging a home away from home. As a local saying puts it, jehri 
mauj chhaju de chobare, na oh Balakh na Bukhare.63 There could be no surprise 
then that, when the occasion arose, refugees literally overflowed back into East 
Punjab. In early April 1955, a hockey match between the teams of the East and 
West Punjab police forces gave them the right chance to enter the neighbouring 
state. More than 65,000 refugees rushed to the Indian diplomatic representation 
in Lahore in order to secure one of the reduced-rate visas that had been made 
available to them. They reportedly wanted to meet old acquaintances and 
overcome the nostalgia of past and familiar places.64  The 1955 spring peace 
between India and Pakistan was the formal guise of a much-perceived need to 
feel ‘at home’.65  
On the top of such challenges, how could lodgings that had been allotted on a 
temporary basis ever be worthy of both physical and emotional affection? “The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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restrictions on the free movement of persons across the border. See Talbot, Divided Cities, op. 
cit., p. 69. 
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news appearing in a recent issue of your newspaper that an ordinance regarding 
the quasi-permanent allotment of urban immovable properties will be 
promulgated shortly is most welcomed”, commented with relief ‘A refugee’ in 
his letter to the editor of the Pakistan Times (Lahore).66 Administrative 
requirements by the early 1950s had dragged many refugees into an exasperating 
battle of nerves. Requests for the allocation of any evacuee property had to be 
first substantiated and then verified through proper documents and revenue 
records. Within this bureaucratic framework, claimants grappled with the need to 
trace back the papers that they had left or lost in East Punjab, and government 
desks were packed with crabbed Devanagari-written files.67 Their own houses 
and belongings left behind in India had been or were being apparently sold at 
insignificant prices while, as a Dawn (Karachi) editorial eloquently entitled 
‘Shall We Only Talk?’ argued, “in Pakistan the Hindu evacuees were reaping a 
rich harvest”.68 Fuelled by repeated difficulties and setbacks, refugees’ souls and 
minds were permeated with deep feelings of resentment and bitterness towards 
India.69 Yet, paperwork duties were just a symptom of a wider malaise. 
Opponents of the government scheme of a permanent resettlement revealed the 
silent illness that affected many persons who had embarked on that dreadful 
journey in 1947. “To cancel the existing allotments and orders, the new ones 
would amount to robbing lakhs of people of their habitation and livelihood”, 
warned one of them who concealed himself behind the frequent pseudonym ‘A 
refugee’.70 A deep-seated anxiety paralysed his thoughts. The habitation that ‘a 
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refugee’ feared to lose was something more than just the building to which he 
returned after work. Rather it incorporated all the immaterial yet vital galaxies of 
relationships, balances and hierarchies that filled his life and allowed him to rend 
the silence of anonymity and be part of a pattern of mutual expectations and 
trust. The feelings of both of these ‘A refugee’ resembled a hall of mirrors: what 
one longed for, the other one feared to lose.  
Partition, the disruption that followed and the massive migration of millions 
of persons unwittingly encapsulated potential elements of social modernity. After 
touring the region in the aftermath of Partition, a correspondent from The Times 
of London discovered that refugees’ economic and material losses were 
accompanied by the even more distressing tearing of their social and living 
patterns.71 Indeed, entire biraderi, tabbar and gharana – essential social units of 
local Punjabi society – had been ripped apart. Disorientation then further 
sharpened as the allocation process began and households underwent dramatic, 
and often involuntary, changes. The houses that had previously sheltered 
extended or joint families were now fragmented and allocated to claimants who, 
in most cases, were not related to, and did not know, each other. Thus, for 
instance, it happened that a 12-flat building was redistributed according to the 
unfamiliar method of one flat for each one of the twelve applicants.72 Elements 
of individuality, anonymity and social autonomy slowly crept into the so far 
highly personalised Punjabi society and became an everyday challenge to 
anyone’s sense of belonging.   
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How did refugees react to this sudden change? If some adapted to the new 
circumstances, most of them deliberately violated regulations and resettlement 
plans. An official of the US Embassy at the time recorded that “the main 
difficulty is that of keeping refugees settled. There is a natural tendency to seek 
to settle in village groups as they came over”.73  Their identity was substantiated 
through these old or newly-created relationships that provided them with a 
‘survival kit’ in what was still a highly-personalised and trust-based society: 
credentials of reliability, solidarity and stability.74 Renouncing or rejecting them 
would have been suicidal. However, these were not the only and main concern of 
our “A refugee”.    
 Congested towns and cities exacerbated a housing crunch that made rent 
prices soar. A person who looked to rent a three-bedroom house in Charing 
Cross, Lahore, for instance, was asked to face a rise of an astonishing 84.8%.75 
Funny jokes on the subject spread from month to month. ‘Look here, young man, 
you must either pay your accounts or leave the home’ – ‘Thank you very much, 
my last landlady made me do both’, stated one of them. When, in the early 
1950s, this joke managed to draw a smile from a refugee who was sharing a cup 
of tea with some friends along a dusty and chaotic road in Montgomery, satellite 
towns – a government-funded undertaking that aimed at tackling the emergency 
– and housing schemes were still mostly projects in government officers’ minds 
and on papers inside architects’ drawing tubes.76 However, as soon as new or 
repaired properties started to become available, it was immediately clear and 
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evident that most refugees could not afford them.  Despite the fact that the sale of 
urban sites and houses operated on the basis of a quota reserved for refugees, 
their prices often went far beyond the Rs. 5.000 limit of affordability and hence 
prevented low- or no-income persons from any kind of purchase.77  
Above and beyond such economic concerns, a stubborn resistance to any kind 
of relocation was registered among many refugees. As soon as a new 
accommodation was allotted to them, subtenants rather than proper allottees took 
possession of the dwellings.78 As the years rolled on, jobs – no matter whether 
‘under the table’ or legal ones – provided a draft for the still uncertain geography 
of refugees’ everyday lives. If new allotments spelt the loss of their traditional 
livelihoods, then people relinquished their proprietary or tenant rights and looked 
for new sources of income.79 In 1976 Farhat Oulzan, an urban geography 
research student at the University of the Punjab, exposed the secrets of the urban 
development of Lahore in a Ph.D. dissertation that remains one of the few 
available comprehensive studies on the subject.80 This superimposition of the 
mappings of both commercial and industrial activities and the refugee 
concentration in different areas across the years traces and provides reasons for 
the apparent oddities of local urban planning. Accordingly, in 1950s the Lahore 
Improvement Trust embarked in a series of housing developing schemes that 
initially pushed the city’s boundaries more and more north- and westwards.  It 
was there and along the other main thoroughfares that businesses, workshops and 
factories started to spring up, setting Lahore’s new economic life in motion. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Housing construction sites, their supervisors and contractors grappled with 
skyrocketing raw material prices that inevitably made an impact on the bill for 
potential buyers and automatically meant that only better-off tenants were 
shortlisted. At the other end of the spectrum, although they offered the prospect 
of a better future and higher income, the unskilled and manual jobs available on 
the outskirts of towns and cities proved desirable in practice only to those who 
could afford the cost of transport or, otherwise, had nothing to lose. When the 
full details of this picture became apparent, the local Improvement Trust diverted 
projects and funding from the urban fringe to the city centre.81 The coming of 
public transport in time would subsequently enhance social mobility by 
narrowing the gap between workplaces and homes. 
The situation was serious but by no means hopeless, or, at least, this was what 
some refugees thought.  In early 1950s, in the city of Lyallpur, in order to solve 
the local paucity of accommodation facilities and endemic delays in the 
implementation of both private and public-funded housing development 
schemes, an enterprising group of them combined forces and embarked upon the 
building of new houses at their own cost. After years of delay, cooperative 
societies finally gained a new impetus. Lyallpur entrepreneurs’ advertisements 
were soon placed in local newspapers together with of those of hundreds of other 
similar business organisations across the whole of the Punjab.82 Cooperative 
properties, Ian Talbot has established, attracted attention mainly from among 
middle-class Punjabi and governmental officers. High costs prevented most 
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refugees from any investment.83 If truth to be told, a quick inspection of the 
different houses that were advertised by both housing and commercial 
cooperatives reveals that size and price diversification made flats and houses 
relatively affordable even to low income persons. The revival of the cooperative 
movement came in the shape of a multi-faceted phenomenon that cannot be 
easily explained along binary lines. Groups of urban homeless persons frequently 
organised themselves into cooperatives, whose buildings reproduced, on a larger 
scale and on unexploited evacuee land, the local mainstream architectural 
mixture of housing facilities and business premises. Indeed, in 1957 a UN officer 
noticed, for instance, that “in Lahore squatters’ settlement […], some 350 
weavers ‘resettled themselves’ in a cohesive working, community of 
comparatively well-built brick building in which they live, weave, and sell their 
products through a cooperative organisation”.84    
Thus, this combination of business activities and everyday life helped to 
mitigate the side effects of swallowing the bitter pill of an image of a state in 
trauma; yet at the same time it opened a window on those ‘grey areas’ where 
tradition and modernity manoeuvred side by side with each other.   
 
Something old, something new and something borrowed: the rural 
resettlement of refugees in Pakistani Punjab 
 
The process of re-elaborating a tradition succeeded in replicating itself even in 
the post-Partition Punjabi countryside. It was there on its fertile yet still 
historically unexplored lands that many refugees caught sight of a state and its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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authorities in the guise of malleable agents of change.85 Tradition, change and 
modernity are widely-discussed concepts in the current theoretical, colonial and 
post-colonial literature.86 The recent introduction of the idea of ‘multiple 
modernities’ has brought under the spotlight those intersections wherein different 
communities embrace “modernity without giving up their own traditions”.87 The 
allotment of rural evacuee properties to refugees can therefore be framed within 
this process of elaboration and re-elaboration of the ideas of tradition, change 
and modernity. Instead of constituting an infringement on the modern, the 
traditional – it will be argued here – moulded the structure of refugees’ labour 
and economic relations into a new collective identity and, in the process, 
established new social boundaries.88 
In the space of the sixty-year period that spanned the decades from 1880 to 
1940, the southern rural areas of West Punjab had experienced one of most 
imposing projects of social and agricultural engineering of the British raj.  In the 
so-called canal colonies in particular, the introduction of modern cultivation and 
irrigation facilities had proceeded in tandem with a progressive shaping of those 
human characteristics that would eventually culminate in rational homines 
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oeconomici able to maximise crops and profits.89 M. L. Darling’s earlier words - 
“men all connected by common descent, all physically fit to take up a life in a 
new country under considerable difficulties, all hard up for land” – now 
epitomised the quintessence of the new Punjabi agricultural workers or tenants.90  
Almost ten years later, although the quantities of available materials and the 
quality of migration fluxes had changed, social and farming operators produced 
an almost identical result. Willing to sell their own soul to the devil, refugees 
tussled with each other in order to secure even a single plot of the renowned 
fertile and fruitful lands of West Punjab. Hundreds of artisans, shopkeepers and 
merchants turned overnight into supposedly professional agriculturalists. A 
persistent lack of thorough administrative controls over declarations on forms 
allowed refugees to turn their hands fraudulently to agriculture and subsequently 
to secure an allotted property.91 This peculiar scramble for evacuee lands 
designates the experience of their applicants or allottees as quite distinctive. In 
1989 the collapse of the Soviet Union would force or push almost three million 
Russians who were living as a minority in the newly-independent states to seek 
refuge in Russia. Unskilled jobs and a consequent professional downgrading 
would distinguish their lives in their perceived homeland and intensify their 
feelings of frustration and dissatisfaction.92 By contrast, the experience and the 
conditions of many refugees who put down new roots in rural Pakistani Punjab 
modulated on a quite different pitch. Evacuee rural properties demanded !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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substantial technical investments and high levels of professionalism and 
expertise in return for almost guaranteed high profits. Opportunities for personal 
and financial advancement were indeed the other side of the coin minted by a 
post-Partition Pakistani economy on the brink of collapse.  
But did refugees have any real prospect of success as they embarked on a 
project that gave the impression of being beyond their actual means and 
possibilities? In 1955 many departmental officers of the West Pakistan 
Government received a copy of The Cooperative Inquiry Committee Report on 
their desks.93 While sipping their umpteenth tea of the day, they would have 
leafed through its chapters and finally seized upon the condition of the 
agricultural market and the magnitude and limitations of the cooperative 
movement.  In the early 1950s Punjab farming cooperative societies sprung up at 
impressive rates and registered an overall membership of 1,100,000, out of 
whom nearly 770,000 were refugees.94 Their motto was simple and trenchant: 
“popularise Pakistan’s products”.95 Societies developed frequently as a stimulus 
to the enhancement of local infrastructures or, in some cases, even as a village 
within the village itself. In the lapse of time between January 1951 and April 
1955, more than 6,000 houses, 70 adult education centres, ten mosques and about 
270 hand pumps were built in connection with the cooperatives’ activity in rural 
Punjab.96 Apparently both Lyallpur and Sialkot Districts confronted the 
rearrangement of those hierarchies and delicate balances that had traditionally 
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imbued ideas of local prestige and power. The unwillingness of past and present 
zamindars to portion out and share their properties mirrored the close 
identification between their own lands and their prestige, honour and influence 
over local society.97 It is no surprise then that those groups of landowners who 
disclaimed their rights over their lands in Lyallpur and Sialkot in order to set up a 
joint-cooperative society with their tenants immediately hit the headlines. This 
news sounded so shocking that the local US representative asked his officers to 
double-check the information: “The assertion that ‘a number of landowners in 
Sialkot and Lyallpur have surrendered their proprietary rights […] in favour of 
cooperatives set up by them’ has been checked and found to be true”, noted 
down the still sceptical functionary.98  
In fact his scepticism was by no means groundless. Giuseppe Tomasi di 
Lampedusa’s voice echoed throughout rural Pakistani Punjab and whispered in 
the ears of both zamindars and tenants: “If we want things to stay as they are, 
things will have to change”, it repeated incessantly.99 Admittedly power 
relationships withstood any kind of substantial transformation during this period. 
Landowners – although frequently only temporary allottees of evacuee land – 
kept their properties firmly in their hands and structured their partnership with 
their tenants and kammis along traditional lines.100 When in 1954 the 
Government of Punjab vested in them the right to eject tenants, refugee allottees 
exposed through their behaviour the social pattern that in reality underpinned 
their enterprises. “A crisis is impending in this Province because of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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threatened mass ejectment of refugee tenants. Reliable statistics will show that 
refugee tenants constitute more than half the entire number of refugees. If such a 
huge body of refugees are ejected, it would mean an unprecedented crisis in the 
Punjab”, condemned the umpteenth refugee writing to the Pakistan Times 
(Lahore) while hiding his identity under a pseudonym.101 Government authorities 
thus merely ratified a social attitude and a modus operandi that had manifested 
itself years before and had reached its zenith during the late August 1951 Matta 
incidents. Over there, 72 Muslims were charged with murder, attempted murder, 
arson and dacoity in connection with a communal flare-up with a death roll of 11 
Christians.102 Apparently, the circumstances behind the riot were shrouded in 
mystery. On the spur of the moment, word got out that it “was due to the relation 
between a Christian boy with a Muslim girl”.103 Nevertheless, the details soon 
began to emerge. “The real cause of the trouble – declared Joshua Fazal Din, a 
prominent Christian member of the Muslim League – was primarily economic 
[…]. The refugees find the locals stand between them and their dream of 
prosperity”.104 Indeed, the relationship between Christian tenants and allottee 
landlords had been passing through troubled waters throughout this time. Their 
tenancy agreements had been progressively flouted, and ejection notices had 
dispossessed these tenants from both their lands and sources of income. Refugee 
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zamindars instead had to hire their relatives, friends and members of their 
extended families.105  
Biraderi, byword for power and authority, incarnated both resistance to, and 
the elaboration of a new idea of, social change. The resentment and hostility that 
were reported to be widespread among native West Punjabis were only partially 
linked to competition for the allocation of resources and evacuee properties.106 
On a far deeper level it was the traditional image of villages as economic and 
social self-sufficient units that was at stake.  Rural labour markets had been 
structured around the narrow and closed circuit of the village where the interplay 
of demand and supply together with the subsistence economy had flourished.107 
Excessive fragmentation of lands, and inexperienced manpower as well as the 
crippling effects of recurrent summer floods during the immediate post-Partition 
period, were certainly to blame for the extremely low agricultural production and 
quality rates recorded in late 1940s and 1950s Punjab.108 Yet, as a US officer 
discovered, “there is […] another cause of the growing poverty of the resources 
and the production in the country, when the right type of people are not 
encouraged at all, with the result that so many useful brains and bodies are 
simply wasted”.109 Potential for any increase of local zamindars’ power, prestige 
and loyalty instead topped the list of the most needed skills that farm labourers 
and tenants were asked to supply and develop throughout their working lives. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Within the tiny space where the border between the shock of change and the 
affirmation or re-affirmation of old ways became blurred and porous, the failure 
to improve agricultural methods of production and villagers’ lives and 
opportunities found its most fertile breeding ground, and merged with refugees’ 
own needs to re-weave their fabric of biraderi alliances, hierarchies and balances 
of power.110  
These thin interstices of interaction between tradition and modernity disturbed 
not only the relationship between locals and refugees in the rural areas of West 
Punjab.  When packing up their belongings and leaving for local towns and 
cities, both refugees and locals alike could hardly imagine that ideas of change 
and conventional customs would once again embroil their lives in a curious yet 
crucial scandal.   
 
How scandalous! Government plans of urban resettlement and refugees’ 
perception of the State 
 
When the countryside proved unable to keep its promises of prosperity and 
economic assistance, expanding cities lured unemployed persons by their 
glimmering lights and prospects. Over there the image of a State as a ‘scandal’ 
was spreading across their roads and suburbs. Generally associated with debates 
regarding the gender perception of authorities and institutions or the intimate, 
sexual and private sphere,111 the public dimension of ‘scandal’ here will be 
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broadened out to encompass how both refugees and locals experienced the early 
Pakistani state (and its related weaknesses) as an instrument of egalitarianism 
and emancipation from previous social constraints. This will then provide a 
useful lens for capturing and understanding the mechanisms used by refugees to 
live in, with and within a state in-the-making and to articulate their own sense of 
belonging to it.  
Lahore, like Lyallpur, Gujranwala and many other towns throughout the 
province, turned out to be the first port of call for all those jobless refugees and 
local people who had previously been employed on the lands of rural Punjab. 
Indeed, accounts and reports of exceptional opportunities were giving them new 
hopes. Women with their intricate yet noteworthy world represented an 
interesting prism through which urban dynamics were projected onto local 
society. For many of them, particularly those belonging to more privileged 
classes who got together in the Lahori suburbs of Model Town and, at a later 
stage, Gulberg, Partition had presented an invaluable opportunity to leave purdah 
and become active members in the social construction of the new state of 
Pakistan.112 Keeping up with its well-established tradition as a pioneering hub for 
gender-empowerment and female activism, Lahore buzzed with trepidation and 
even enthusiasm.113 Health, education and social care were perhaps not 
surprisingly the main fields where women played a prominent and a pivotal role. 
Immediately after its foundation in 1948, the local Fatima Jinnah Medical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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College for Women could boast a waiting list comprising 550 candidates.114 On 
the opposite side of the street, the Sir Ganga Ram Hospital’s Training School for 
Nurses reckoned with a similar roll of potential trainees. Between 1948 and 
1960, the number of Muslim students who enrolled at Kinnaird College – the 
first women’s higher education institution in the whole of the Punjab and local 
breeding ground of future teachers – hit 1177 units, thereby registering a tenfold 
increase from the previous decade.115 It was, as Shahnaz Rose has pointed out, a 
reproduction of their private roles in the newly-created public Pakistani domain 
that drew on, and even strengthened, the segregation between men and 
women.116  
But was this really a mere transposition of roles within which not that much 
changed? Lahori women appeared to seize difficultly but also slowly many of the 
opportunities that both a rising nation and an emerging civil society were now 
offering them in the aftermath of independence. Processes of gender 
empowerment and self-awareness took place at different levels of local society, 
albeit amidst tremendous setbacks. Nearly 500 cooperative spinning societies 
provided thousands of women with new opportunities to earn their living by 
setting up their activities both in Lahore and all across the whole of the West 
Punjab.117 Clinics and hospital hosted and established free birth control and sex 
education courses that were specifically intended for poverty-stricken and 
illiterate women.118  These women’s initial sense of belonging to a new and 
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wider community thus stemmed from an acquisition or, in certain circumstances, 
a re-acquisition of their sexual and body consciousness and their own economic 
self-sufficiency after the pain and shame that had followed their mass abduction 
during the summer of 1947 and the loss of their loved ones.119 Hence, despite its 
perceived absence and paternalist approach, the state in Lahore materialised by 
the way of a scandal rather than through a reassuring prolongation of colonial 
social and civilising reformism or as the by-product of the restoration of a 
nationalist identity. And its objective institutional weakness distanced Pakistan 
from its Indian counterpart in terms of the elaboration of an early gender 
agenda.120  As it pushed women out of their comfort zone by heightening their 
awareness of their own body and their human potential, Pakistan beat its bitter 
rival to the straw. 
Women – politicians and upper middle-class members of the so-called Lahori 
civil society – helped to set the agenda for the rehabilitation and integration of 
their less fortunate ‘sisters’. “Today your country needs you as never before […] 
You are the real soldiers of Pakistan […] Your helpless sisters await for your 
aid”, urged Begum Shah Nawaz in late September 1947.121 Female ‘militancy’ 
was unquestionably intended here in terms of those traditional activities that had 
employed women within their domestic ‘four walls’. Yet, the boundaries of their 
recognition were pushed towards the new, and so far unknown, field of all the 
different private, public and voluntary institutions that now emerged. What had 
previously been ‘private’ now became purposely and ostentatiously ‘public’. “I 
mention women, because after all they are the managers of the household. […] !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119 On women’s sufferings during Partition and their political value and impact see U. Butalia, 
The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India, New Delhi, 1998; R. Menon and K. 
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Let the women of Pakistan prove that they are good managers”, Begum Shah 
Nawaz insisted once again a few months later.122 Hence, female adab – as it had 
crystallised over the previous centuries – became a tool in state-building 
processes and a new way of conceptualising and expressing a sense of belonging 
to a wider national community. Women’s clothes accordingly borrowed their 
colours from the national flag’s palette and were refashioned along the lines of 
those worn by Italian actresses in the popular neo-realist films that were being 
screened throughout Pakistani cinemas at this time.123 Anna Magnani, Sophia 
Loren and Gina Lollobrigida became both the forbidden dream of many Lahori 
men and a ‘fashion model’ for their middle and upper class wives. Urban 
Pakistan resonated then with the echoes of the Romanovs’ Russia milieus. The 
appropriation of European clothes and patterns, however piecemeal and partial, 
epitomised the fashioning of a new identity and thus helped to delineate the 
passage from subject to citizen.124 Whether they gossiped in the halls of the local 
Gymkhana Club where the advertisement for film premieres adorned the walls or 
took up a job in private and public organisations, such women progressively 
eroded men’s spaces and undermined the latter’s power:  the embrace that 
fathers, fiancés or husbands had extended in order to protect women was now 
left grasping at the unknown.  
The ways in which these women thought of themselves and envisaged their 
role within society thus seemed to be changing and they were now faced with a 
cultural environment that was not necessarily ready to reckon with them. A rude 
and awkward anger voiced the much-awaited male reaction. Land, women and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 Pakistan Times (Lahore), 10th December 1947. 
123 5935(15) Series, 71021/2 (1.5), 0693a, 189/3146, 0795 I.S., 7109, 8095,V&A. 
124 C. Ruane, “Subjects into Citizens: The Politics of Clothing in Imperial Russia”, in W. Parkins 
(ed.), Fashioning the Body Politic. Dress, Gender, Citizenship, Oxford-New York, 2002, pp. 49-
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gold are the three things for which Punjabi men are ready to kill, warns a local 
proverb. Shahnaz Rouse’s mother was one of Pakistan’s first female bank clerks. 
Yet, as her daughter reveals, “she encountered incredible sexual harassment. 
Drawing on her own negative encounters in the workplace, she succeeded in 
establishing separate women’s department in the bank. This permitted women 
who would be reluctant to bank to do so”.125 Modernity and change, 
conservatism and tradition, messed around with each other, and the traditional 
segregation of roles became both a defeat and a tool of social change. It was once 
again Begum Shah Nawaz who, through her words, highlighted and set the pace 
of this contradictory and multi-faceted process. In early December 1954, while 
addressing her audience during a visit to a Home for Abducted Women in 
Lahore, she recalled that refugee abducted women had been “educated up to 6th 
standard and […] particularly trained in cooking, sowing and laundry” and were 
now ready to get married to “unmarried or widowers with no issues [who] should 
be no more than 30 years of age”.126  The idea and the feeling of an ‘unfinished 
revolution’ here come into play. Regardless of a new adab that was still-in-the-
making, women – especially urban middle and upper class ones – turned down 
the opportunity to publicly defend their position by, metaphorically speaking, 
retiring to their own rooms. 
An ascendant and almost identical dimension of scandal embroiled the 
economy of small urban businesses and the life of non-agricultural refugees. 
Their post-independent material and social crisis heralded a wide range of 
opportunities. The bundled relationship between occupation and position within 
the social ladder was almost completely torn apart. Eyewitnesses reported, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
125 S. Rouse, The Outsider(s) Within, op. cit., p. 56.  
126 Pakistan Times (Lahore), 10th December 1954. 
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although frequently with excessive emphasis, the withdrawal of social barriers 
among refugees and acutely forewarned of the far-reaching repercussions of the 
situation.127 Refugees’ favourable social condition was reflected in the colourless 
image of local people’s angry nostalgia and resentment. Throughout their process 
of integrating the newcomers, towns and cities progressively undermined that 
urban state of mind that allowed people to be culturally and socially identifiable 
through their jobs.128 Most refugees were artisans, shopkeepers, unskilled 
labourers and civil servants who contributed to engulfing further a labour market 
that was already saturated by local manpower.129 The mismatch between 
previous businesses and those allotted in West Punjab after 1947 was a 
frequently highlighted problem that eventually led to the failure or the financial 
collapse of many firms and enterprises.130  
High inflation rates and shortages of consumer goods certainly did not benefit 
the wide urban network of shops and commercial activities. Servants and 
housewives who intended to purchase their goods in the markets of mid-1950s 
Lahore were defenceless in the face of the weekly halving of their spending 
power: one pound of sugar required half an average daily wage, the cost of cloth 
for domestic manufacture rose by as much as 35% after 1953, and vegetable oils 
almost doubled their prices.131 Factories themselves operated below their usual 
capacity. Controlled prices and ration cards attempted to make up for endemic 
shortages and economic weaknesses, but, as the Heinz mission to Pakistan !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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discovered, “some commodities are […] simply not available at any price, others 
are available at what must be termed ‘black market’ prices”.132 This depressing 
economic conjuncture doubly harmed the bulk of the refugee population. On one 
hand, as allottees of evacuee properties with no capital and very little financial 
security, they frequently found themselves having to cope with the fall in the 
demand for all goods and commodities and to meet the bureaucratic requirements 
that governmental and corporation authorities fixed in return for their aid.133 On 
the other hand, the despairing path towards the recovery of their possessions in 
East Punjab and the lack of regular earnings and profit margins further 
jeopardised their prosperity and welfare. 
Such hardships notwithstanding, refugees managed not to forfeit that strong 
penchant for economic vitality and dynamism that would draw a distinction 
between them and local Punjabis for years to come.134 Most of them were 
attending the hundreds of public and private training centres and professional 
colleges that literally mushroomed across the whole province in the years after 
1947. Benefiting from a complex combination of fee concessions and stipends, 
members of the refugee community undoubtedly seized all the opportunities that 
the lack of trained personnel and the urgent needs of a State in-the-making were 
offering them.135 In 1949 one B. Khan Kakaji, refugee from Amritsar, put pen to 
paper and wrote to the US Consulate. Employee of the Irrigation Department in 
Lahore, he was eager to set up a business in the textile sector. Yet, as the 
interview with the American attaché revealed, he lacked both experience and 
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bank references.136 Was this the impromptu attempt of a reckless aspiring 
entrepreneur? Farhat Oulzan suggests otherwise.  His guided tour of the newly 
industrialised urban fringe of Lahore allows us to catch a retrospective glimpse 
of refugees’ ventures in the area. His meticulous survey of lands and their 
functional use discloses the real extent of the history of successes and failures of 
refugee entrepreneurship. The laissez-faire policy that inspired government acts 
and ordinances up to 1958, the frequent shortages of raw materials and 
commodities, and the interplay of the foreign exchange mechanisms brought 
about the apparently self-contradictory development of the retailing industry. 
Shops, stores and markets sprang up in all those areas where the concentration of 
refugees on land was particularly high.137 Groceries, workshops, canteens, milk 
and fodder shops topped the list of their commercial specialisation.138 Both the 
economic cycle and the production line were in refugees’ hands. Established and 
run by them, such businesses employed mainly refugee labour.139 Arguably they 
sealed themselves along the new yet old ties of family and blood. While the 
blood was the same that had been shed during the events of 1947, the family was 
the one that had met and learnt to care for its members after Partition, whether in 
camps, the offices of the Resettlement and Rehabilitation Department, jhuggi 
clusters or evacuee properties.  
 
***** 
 
 
This chapter has revealed the gradual path taken by West Punjabi refugees 
towards the elaboration of their own civic responsibility:  just as it questions !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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current understandings of their rehabilitation, it also argues in favour of the 
heterogeneity of their resettlement on the land. Thus, present-day terrestrial 
coordinates of the demographic concentration of the migrant community within 
the towns and villages of Pakistani Punjab are the by-products of an historical 
stratification that has progressively crystallised across the years.  Ranging from 
temporary structures to homes, factories and agricultural co-operatives, this 
chapter has investigated the different facets of refugees’ acts of citizenship, their 
expectations of the new state, and their contested feelings of belonging to a wider 
community. By drawing the curtain on the apparent and perceived silence of the 
state, it has engaged with the ideas of modernity, tradition and citizenship as they 
were perceived and re-elaborated by Partition refugees in the process of 
establishing new lives for themselves and their families in Pakistan.  Building on 
this understanding, the following chapter explores the potential of refugee family 
and blood ties in terms of the social capital that allowed them, often if not 
always, to get the better of the local bureaucracy in the years following Partition.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Whispers of held-back tears:  
producing a bureaucratic order out of the refugee resettlement chaos1 
 
 
In April 1950, the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan signed a treaty that 
would go down in history as the Nehru-Liaquat Ali Khan Pact. Among other 
things, they restated their firm commitment to give all refugees who returned 
home by 31st December 1950 their ancestral houses and former properties. 
Liaquat Ali Khan’s diplomatic ‘deal’ put Pakistani authorities in a difficult and 
awkward position. Indeed, the local bureaucracy – quintessentially weak and 
bungling – was unable to properly serve its citizens, let alone eventual 
‘newcomers’.  Thus far, its attempts to re-assert its authority and power over a 
slippery reality had proved an uphill struggle rather than a glorious series of 
crushing victories.  
The present chapter questions the traditional understanding of so-called 
corruption practices.  It instead reframes the patronage dynamics of these years 
within local institution-building processes as they were understood in a highly-
personalised society such as Pakistan. In particular, its first subsection explores 
the intrinsic and somehow ‘intimate weaknesses of the Pakistani bureaucracy. As 
old and newly-appointed civil servants grappled messily with the ongoing 
refugee emergency, cases of ultra vires decisions, excesses of power and cloudy 
legal frameworks all spiced up the life of both Government employees and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 An abridged version of this chapter was presented at the BASAS Annual conference in early 
April 2011. 
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ordinary citizens. The essence of the problem resulted from the subtle alchemy of 
a hall-of-mirrors game: the difficulties of the local bureaucracy in establishing a 
clear corpus of rules reflected the parallel difficulties of the ordinary men and 
women of mid-1950s Punjab.  And as the years rolled on, the progressive 
institutionalisation of patronage practices reproduced at administrative level the 
same dynamics of marginalisation that were poisoning the realm of social 
relationships. Only those who could count on or brag about influential 
acquaintances successfully took the upper hand over their ‘opponent’ fellow 
citizens during the everyday negotiating of basic – albeit limited – resources. 
Consequently, those who felt to be – and actually were – on the fringe of 
society had to dash for cover. The third section of this chapter accordingly 
pinpoints the ‘Pakistani’ definition of corruption by placing it within its ‘natural’ 
context. It reveals how and to what extend the bureaucratic steel frame was 
imitated at grassroots level so that even ‘marginal men’ could enjoy the 
‘administrative support’ of those ersatz ‘persons who really matter’. Finally, the 
chapter explores how the first and most immediate image of the state triggered 
off among some members of the refugee community a political demand for 
adequate representation within local political institutions. 
 
A hide-and-seek game: challenging the strength of the Pakistani 
bureaucracy. 
 
Lahore, Civil Secretariat courtyard, mid-1950s. Sat on a warm doormat, a 
petition-writer was filing an appeal for the umpteenth time. A refugee was 
standing in front of him with the hope of getting the better of Pakistan’s 
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bureaucracy and having a property allotted. A few miles ahead, another refugee, 
camped in a school, was drafting a letter. He would hide his identity under the 
pseudonym ‘desperate’. Both refugees shared the same emotional condition: they 
felt that the state as embodied by its own administrative institutions was 
marginalising their experiences and needs.  
Scholarly literature has so far sought to explain this feeling of marginalisation 
by the reference to an evident, overwhelming and somehow oppressive 
superiority of the Pakistani bureaucracy over any other politico-institutional 
organisation.2 According to this interpretative trend, the local civil service 
consequently established itself as a peculiar independent power and competed on 
a level playing field with the army, the intelligence services and the executive, 
legislative and judiciary powers from the very early years of Pakistan’s 
independence. Indeed, its autonomy regarding officials’ appointments, its 
discretionary powers and the initial pervasiveness of its nature have made the so-
called bureaucratic polity into a widely-researched classic of Pakistan’s 
historiography and political science studies. Careful analysis of the everyday day 
lives of millions of West Punjabi Partition refugees and the day-to-day 
administrative management of their emergency suggests however that the 
Pakistani bureaucracy was not a monolithic, somehow tyrannical and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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independent institution. The present section will therefore investigate the 
difficulties of West Punjabi civil servants as they grappled with the humanitarian 
emergency and the resettlement schemes in the years that followed Partition. 
Consequently, the challenges that were implied in a process of re-adaptation to a 
new socio-political framework will be exploited here to provide a counterbalance 
to the archetypal image of the Pakistani bureaucracy as a separate power.  
Soon after independence, patterns of patronage and networks of authority 
within administrative departments and among the various branches of all the 
different bureaucratic institutions had to be reconstructed and weighed up. As an 
attaché on the staff of the British High Commissioner observed, the ‘pioneers’ of 
the West Punjabi bureaucracy “started off by passing a number of silly orders 
[…] [and] the administration in rural areas […] [had] largely collapsed”.3 
Previous well-oiled hierarchies and linkages had been almost completely torn 
part: classmates, former superiors and juniors were no longer those figures on 
whom others were able to count at times of need.4 All the attempts to redress the 
balance of these institutional and power relationships unquestionably made an 
impact on both nation- and institution-building processes. The indeterminateness 
over roles and competencies – coupled with corruption and apathy – inhibited 
that cultural intimacy that encourages a sense of familiarity between institutions 
and citizens to bloom. The absence of the state as embodied by its bureaucratic 
apparata was in some cases a matter of fact. Patwaris in the rural areas of the 
Pakistani Punjab were frequently caught red-handed as they deserted their offices 
and disregarded their responsibilities towards their fellow citizens.5 Reported to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Copy of Report from H. S. Stephenson, 25th August 1947, DO 142/416, NAKG.  
4 P. Oldenburg, India, Pakistan, and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths, London-
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be anxious and shocked by the widespread occurrence of bribery especially 
among lower-ranking officials, refugees established and maintained distrustful 
relationships with wide sections of the administrative cadres.6 Indolence and 
inefficiency affected the everyday management of resources within provincial 
and federal administrative departments. As a consequence, these chipped away at 
refugees’ faith in institutions from the very moment that migrants entered 
temporary camps and structures.   
Producing order out of administrative chaos and the pressing requirements of 
a state-in-the-making called for the enactment of new sets of laws and 
regulations. According to a powerful metaphor conjured up by a The Times 
(London) journalist, it was all about “creat[ing] the [bureaucratic] machinery 
while […] learning to handle it”.7  The socio-political and economic entries in 
the dictionary of the administrative everyday had consequently to be re-
modulated into new meanings. In 1958 the Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore) 
was at the centre of a legal battle that revolved around the re-definition of the 
financial term ‘share’.8 As an evacuee shareholder opted to sell his own 
dividends, the Custodian of the Evacuee Properties was asked to pinpoint and 
reframe the idea of capital within the new legal context of movable evacuee 
properties. Earlier on, in 1957, the lexicon of everyday business had had to 
include new headwords that pertained to the more intimate spheres of family 
relations and the experience of Partition events. Following the 1947 communal 
upheavals, Messrs Sardari Lal and his family, for instance, had temporarily left 
West Punjab and handed over the running of their commercial activity to a few !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Political Alignments in the West Punjab – Confidential No. 25, 28th November 1948, NND 
765024, NARA.  
7 The Times (London), 26th February 1948. 
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reliable acquaintances.9 Was this sufficient to qualify them as refugees and their 
belongings as evacuee properties? Gathered in his council chamber, the 
administrative judging authority, together with his advisers, had had to string 
together intentions, feelings and notions of philological officialese. In the face of 
the failure of the local bureaucracy to act as a force for stabilising the 
relationship between the state and its citizens, legal experts had to cyclically put 
forward new interpretative views that harmonised laws, balances of powers and 
social dynamics.10  
“The true answer to the point depended on the meaning to be ascribed to the 
word ‘left’ and also the place of ‘residence’ occurring in the provision”, noticed 
the honourable Mr. Justice Ahmad as he opened the hearing in which Imdad Ali 
Malik and The Settlement Commissioner (Policy), Lahore, were at 
loggerheads.11  Judges and citizens were constantly asked to proofread and 
further pinpoint each and every bureaucratic act, law or ordinance that focused 
on the resettlement and the rehabilitation of the migrant community. Now, the 
ordinance at issue was the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) 
Act, 1958. A displaced person was therein defined as “any person who, on 
account of the setting up of the Dominions of Pakistan and India, or on account 
of civil disturbance in any area now forming part of or occupied by India, has, on 
or after the first day of March, 1947, left […] his place of residence […] and has 
subsequently become a citizen of Pakistan or is residing therein”.12 An employee 
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of the Government of India, Imdad had been transferred to Calcutta from his 
home village Arup, Gujranwala way back in 1945. His opting for Pakistan in 
early August 1947 entailed a further relocation and the allotment of an evacuee 
house in Model Town, Lahore. When, in 1959, he exercised the right of pre-
emption of all displaced persons on their allotted premises, the local authorities 
sifted through his documents and picked up a couple of irregularities. For a start, 
Imdad’s Punjabi roots challenged his status as a ‘displaced person’. The court 
ruling in favour of the conviction of the petitioner, the order of allotment was 
countermanded. Imdad was apparently suffering from a legal personality 
disorder. Under the existing laws, he was a refugee as “being previously 
domiciled in India, […] [he had] taken refuge in Pakistan from any part of India 
by reason of the disturbances arising out of the setting up of the Dominions of 
India and Pakistan”.13  Yet, as the Honourable Justice Ahmad pointed out, Imdad 
could not be considered a displaced person.  
 The limitations of the resettlement and rehabilitation law as it stood by the 
late 1950s were inexorably rising to the surface.  In 1959 the Punjab Co-
operative Bank Ltd. took legal steps to assert its proprietary right over its joint-
stock company.14 Its head office in Amritsar and its West Punjabi branches 
mostly closed, the bank had been declared an evacuee property and taken into 
possession by the Custodian in late December 1947. The sudden 1949 right-
about turn on the status of joint-stock companies as evacuee properties, however, 
unravelled the Co-operative Bank’s legal status. Once again, the nature of the 
problem pertained to the lexicon of the resettlement and rehabilitation practices !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Government of Pakistan – Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, Ordinance No. XVIII/1948, 
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and its several entries. “On one view, properties, which had already become 
evacuee […], continued to be evacuee under the doctrine of transaction past and 
close. On the other view” – the judge summed up in his abstract – “the 
definitions being declaratory in nature, properties […] could not continue to be 
evacuee, for this would render the new definitions nugatory to some extent”.15 
This was the umpteenth curious case of a definition that did not describe the 
nature and meaning of a reality that it was supposed to portray faithfully. Laws, 
ordinances, memoranda and internal circular letters simply did not keep pace 
with the manifold fallouts and implications of the Partition events. After 
Independence, the banking sector had been grappling with the lack of trained and 
well-prepared clerks for several months.16  The Punjab Co-operative Bank did 
not opt for the closing of its Pakistani branches. Like many other employers 
within the banking services, it was in no position to take on fresh manpower and 
give its affiliates a new start in business.  
Ultra vires decisions and excesses of powers seemed to be the order of the 
day in almost all the departments or institutions that dealt with refugee 
resettlement. Eventual plans to shake up all bureaucratic cadres after their initial 
hypnosis and disorganisation were a no mean task.17 In 1956, the honourable Mr. 
Justice Kayani and Ali tripped up the Lahore Rehabilitation Commissioner on 
the separation of powers.18 Indeed, the Rehabilitation authorities encroached on 
the judiciary’s territory by breaching the law that gave them only limited powers 
of review of deeds and ordinances. Writ petitions and review applications, the 
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Court pointed out, differed substantially from each other, and the administration 
of justice was up to the judges. A couple of years later, in the light of the recent 
promulgation of a new act, the Custodian of the Evacuee Properties felt the need 
to clarify further the responsibilities that fell within the scope of his institutional 
mission. As he adjusted the case between Ghulam & Co. and the Urban Secretary 
Rehabilitation Commissioner, the Custodian asserted his sole right to partition 
evacuee and non-evacuee jointly-owned properties and businesses.19 In 1959, it 
was the Rehabilitation authorities’ turn to take their own peculiar revenge when 
the strained institutional relationship between them and the Custodian of 
Evacuee Properties surfaced once again during a hearing of appeal chaired by 
Shabir Ahmad and Masud Ahmad.20 The power to pass an order of allotment 
belonged to the officers of the Rehabilitation Department as of right, ruled the 
two judges by dismissing quite quickly a case that found the Custodian guilty of 
acting ultra vires.  
Migrants likewise often ran into difficulties while attempting to comply with 
rules or meet bureaucratic criteria. Terms, conditions and guidelines were 
frequently amended almost overnight. Related new forms – usually released 
several months apart – invalidated automatically and retrospectively previous 
ones.  For instance, following the promulgation of Registration of Claims 
(Displaced Persons) Ordinance, 1954, claimants for urban agricultural properties 
were asked to fill in fresh documents, as formerly submitted application sheets 
were now no longer valid.21 Yet, as a refugee from Sialkot complained in his 
letter to the Pakistan Times (Lahore), “the details of this slow and lengthy !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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process and the policy and principles on which they are to be based are so far a 
sealed box, so far as the refugees are concerned”.22 One can bet that the migrant 
community were in the dark about the newly-introduced administrative process. 
The Director of the Public Relations, West Pakistan, would be asked to divulgate 
the new bureaucratic requirements only two years later in early February 1956.23 
Nevertheless, it all had to be done all over again in 1958. In that year, the 
promulgation of a Martial Law order enjoined refugees to re-submit all their 
claim forms.24 The need to pick up irregularities and vitiate applications entailed 
the umpteenth shifting of refugees’ bureaucratic ground.   
In Lahore, on 1st July 1954, ‘One Concerned’ correspondent to the Pakistan 
Times (Lahore) raised his voice against a notification issued by the Punjab 
Industries Rehabilitation. Set procedures granted the allotment of industrial 
properties only to those applicants who could show documentary proof of their 
evacuee premises left behind in India. Yet, what if “the properties of a migrant 
from East Punjab was burnt and demolished altogether? What is the Board going 
to do with such applicants”, countered ‘One Concerned’.25 The reaction times of 
government departments always seemed to lag far behind the expected schedule. 
Oddly enough, the procedures for the temporary allotment of houses, industrial 
premises and shops themselves had been formally finalised only in early March 
1949, that is once most of the properties had already been occupied or 
allocated.26 In fact, throughout the post-Partition years the Pakistani 
administration appeared unable either to grasp or to regulate the manifold 
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implication of refugees’ peculiar status. The day-to-day organisation of 
resettlement and rehabilitation policies slipped quite frequently through civil 
servants’ fingers, placing bureaucracy’s intrinsic weaknesses on public view. 
Consequently, officials, commissioners and government employees came across 
as panicking and somehow frightened pawns in the hands of a weak and 
bungling administrative demiurge.  
The burden of superimposing instructions and ordinances on a slippery reality 
was referred to district and municipal clerks. Over there, these latter had to cope 
with the predictable resistance of particular well-rooted local administrative 
institutions. Clashes among all the different authorities seemed frequently to be 
the order of the day.  In early October 1954, the Lahore Improvement Trust 
vociferously opposed the Government-proposed plans of allocating plots for new 
houses to be built under aegis of the Trust itself.27  Both of them were 
unquestionably looking after their own interests. The provincial authorities 
attempted to meet the housing needs of those thousands of persons – mainly 
refugees – who were leaving the Punjabi countryside to seek their fortune. The 
Improvement Trust, by contrast, was eager to protect long-time and Lahore-born 
residents.  
Endless lists of civil suits and cases further engulfed the administrative 
machinery of the offices of the Deputy Commissioners of the Evacuee 
Properties. In spite of the border with India being sealed, evacuees to East Punjab 
were summoned to appear in front of local administrative courts to claim their 
rights over movable and immovable properties. Should this not happen, “ex-parte 
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proceedings […] [would] be taken against them”.28 The number of cases was so 
high as to push officials first to timetable and then to serve hearings with a writ 
upon a week’s notice.29 Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana – the then 
Chief Minister of Pakistani Punjab – revealed the extent of the bureaucratic 
headache while introducing the annual 1953-4 Budget to the Punjab Assembly. 
Figures were staggering. 11 lakhs of claims had to be evaluated and 160,939 
objections checked.30  
It should be noted however that, in post-independent Pakistan, mathematics 
was not an exact science. In 1951, officials of the Revenue Department – now 
partially in charge of resettlement practices – had proudly announced that the 
early screening of the 1,100,000 applications for West Punjabi Hindu and Sikh 
evacuee properties had been successfully completed.31 No less a person than the 
Chief Minister would dampen their enthusiasm a couple of years later. In the 
already cited speech, he denied those figures by admitting that the settled claims 
were instead 722,803.32 The final report of the Claims Organisation would square 
the accounts. Established by the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 
1955, the Claims Organisation was tasked with verifying both the measurement 
and the street value of refugees’ immovable urban properties in India. By May 
1961, it would deal with about 386,000 files.33 This was more or less the same 
number of claims that were absent at the bureaucratic roll call, and squared the 
accounts of both the Revenue Department and the Chief Minister. According to 
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Daultana, Pakistani civil servants were tasked with closing them by December 
1952. In reality, they would only polish off the job nine years later. The 
screening of refugees’ claims was however only the first bureaucratic step in the 
whole process of allotment of the evacuee properties. In the early 1950s, the 
meticulous work of comparison between original jamanbandis and refugee 
declarations was still at its planning stage.34 The lack of a proper legal and 
bureaucratic framework was giving officials and clerks a watertight alibi. 
Procrastinators however held fixed-term contracts. In 1957, the Pakistan 
(Administration of Evacuee Properties) Act finally broke the deadlock by first 
acknowledging the urgency of the matter and then providing the necessary tools 
to speed up the whole process.35  
On a different note, the micro-management of refugees’ needs and multi-
faceted lives delayed the preparation of the seh partas of the rent of all evacuee 
agricultural lands in several districts of West Punjab.  Indeed, by early 1956, in 
spite of the repeated instructions given by the administrative headquarters in 
Lahore, no substantial improvement was recorded with respect to the estimates 
of the value and the planning of the collection of rents of the evacuee lands in 
Attock, Mianwali, Jhang, Muzzaffargarh and Gujrat Districts.36  “It has not been 
possible to ascertain as for how many harvests the demands have so far been 
created”, complained the Secretary Administration to the Rehabilitation 
Commissioner, West Pakistan, Ahmad Khan Tareen.37 No matter how detailed 
the guidelines were, refugees did not simply tick the boxes.  
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As a consequence, their problems – no matter whether hornets’ nests or not – 
dragged on for years. The allocation of evacuee lands to all those claimants who 
held qabza derina and paid a sharka malikana rent remained a bureaucratically 
outstanding controversy up to the early months of 1956.38 It was only in 
February that year that the Rehabilitation Commissioner, West Pakistan, lent his 
helping hand to local officers by regulating that tricky matter and providing a 
proper administrative framework. Likewise, the wait took forever even for 
refugee tuberculosis patients, invalids, orphans and old people. Their social 
position was first given state recognition back in 1953 and then finalised a couple 
of years later.39  For their part, the West Punjabi families of 50 government 
officials who had either been killed or permanently injured during the 1947-8 
communal upheavals received their compensation only in 1960.40   
Under these circumstances, it was then hardly surprising refugees turned to 
and adopted alternative ways when it came to claiming their rights over evacuee 
properties and how to get the better of the local bureaucracy. The malleability 
and the adaptability of the rules and the forces that stimulated and underpinned 
the everyday life of Punjabi society were, needless to say, ready to take up the 
challenge and compete with institution-building processes. 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Memorandum No. 11900/55 – R(P), 1st February 1956, PCSL. 
39 Punjab Government Letter No. 963-54/995-R (L), 27th January 1954, PCSL and Memorandum 
No. 1500-56/1740-R (L), 6th March 1956, PCSL.   
40 Meeting of Indo-Pakistan Punjab Partition Implementation Committee – Despatch No. 511, 
27th June 1960, NND 948832, NARA.  
!! 146 
Powerful friends, influential acquaintances: conceptualising and building 
the Pakistani bureaucracy 
 
As her husband closed their door behind them, she was overwhelmed by an odd 
sense of relief tinged with nostalgia. After all, that school in Lahore had been 
their home for almost seven years. Then, quite by chance, a couple of months 
earlier, her husband had run into that old acquaintance of theirs who enjoyed a 
high profile in the Resettlement and Revenue Department. They had lost sight of 
him after the 1947 summer madness.  Now he proved to be in the right place at 
the right time. He helped them to get a new and proper house allotted by bringing 
his influence to bear on a couple of other officials. There was nothing of which 
to be ashamed:  local society had always played, and relied, on trust and the 
chains of mutual favours.  
Historians and political scientists have frequently described clientelism and 
practises of bureaucratic favouritism in terms of corruption. Channelling public 
resources through informal, private and personalised networks is understood in 
this literature as a primarily dishonest and fraudulent conduct.41 Resulting from a 
transposition of the early studies on public power and patronage political 
systems, ideas of durability, asymmetry and face-to-face hierarchies underpin 
this analysis of the mutual and vitiated relationship between patrons, clients and 
administrative cadres.42 The social and material ‘transactions’ of the Indian 
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subcontinent’s everyday life, however, are durable, hierarchical and 
asymmetrical in nature.43 Negotiating deals – even bureaucratic ones – was (and 
still is) sociably and morally acceptable in the eyes of both citizens and 
institutions throughout Pakistan. “Eventually, it was Qurban Ali Khan, the SP 
Delhi before Partition and now IG Police of new Pakistani Punjab, who was 
instrumental in getting my parents a place their could call their own and where 
they could raise my family”, candidly admitted the Ahmad encountered in 
Chapter 2 referring to his grandparents’ intermediary by name.44 The present 
section thus investigates the ‘instrumentality’ of patronage dynamics at a 
moment when the state and its administrative cadres were failing to establish 
clear rules and regulations. Relying on Martin Shefter’s study of the relationship 
between patronage, bureaucratic absolutism, and the professionalisation of 
officials, it will argue the need to institutionalise administratively everyday social 
dynamics in order to plug the gaps of a bungling bureaucracy 45  
Unsurprisingly, refugees frequently felt misunderstood in terms of their needs 
and aspirations, as well as personal experiences. Migrants often resorted to 
hunger strikes, sit-ins and requests for judicial inquiries in order to channel their 
disgruntlement and keep their hardships in the spotlight.  Back in 1950, in 
Mianwali District, some of them grouped together and threatened to take to the 
street in protest against recurrent delays in the implementation of the resettlement 
scheme.46 Stemming from a similar complaint, the All-Pakistan Muhajir Board in 
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1954 solicited the judiciary to probe into the multitude of malpractices that were 
recorded within the Rehabilitation Department.47 Government authorities were 
accused of backtracking on their early promises. The road to the refugees’ 
bureaucratic hell had indeed been paved with a huge number of institutional 
good intentions. A Mamdot-supported draft ordinance that aimed at establishing 
special tribunals and entrusting them with the task of delving into civil servants’ 
corruption had been put on the back burner as early as 1948.48 Likewise, no trace 
remained of those appeals and orders that called on the Pakistani administration 
to ‘handle with care’ the refugee emergency’. Phantom parliamentary 
commissions of enquiry met to discuss the bureaucratic mismanagement of 
resettlement and rehabilitation plans and to take disciplinary actions against 
those official who were guilty of professional misconduct.49 Neither the minutes 
of their meetings nor the sanctions they proposed would ever see the light of the 
day.  
A sense of frustration, that combined powerlessness with loneliness, ensued, 
and literally poured even into the pages of local newspapers. In 1954 an anxious 
Syed Ikhitiar [sic] Abbas Naqvi put pen to paper to denounce his hardships and 
concerns to the readers of the Pakistan Times (Lahore). “I and my family are 
living on the streets and do not know how we shall linger in this miserable state. 
Our luggage and clothes are lying sealed in a room of the house from which we 
have been ejected”, he glossed at the end of his letter to the editor.50 Syed had 
just been made homeless. His cousin – head of the household and initial allottee 
of the premises – had been granted some agricultural land in distant Multan. The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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family had then split up: Syed with some other members of his family opted to 
remain in Lahore, while his cousin moved to southern Punjab. When the notice 
of ejectment was issued, the former immediately found themselves trapped in the 
maze of Pakistani bureaucracy. Their attempts to address Rehabilitation Officers 
fell on deaf ears. The newly-appointed allottees had already take possession of 
the house, and the dusty streets of Lahore – it seems – remained the only shelter 
available to Syed’s family. Apparently the premises had been allotted to an 
employee of the Rehabilitation Department well before the hearing of the appeal 
in front of the District Commissioner.  
Syed hinted cryptically what other refugees denounced overtly. “I am one of 
those thousands of refugees who on arrival in Pakistan did not occupy any house 
illegally and have from time to time applied to the Rehabilitation authorities, but 
due to the lack of influence, still remain without any permanent shelter”, 
‘Another Affected’ made it clear a few months later.51 His documentary evidence 
notwithstanding, the Rehabilitation authorities had repeatedly rejected his 
application for the allotment of an evacuee property in the city. Syed and 
‘Another Affected’ were refugees who could not brag about relevant 
acquaintances within the administrative and bureaucratic circles. Indeed, together 
with many other migrants, they found themselves having to re-map the chart of 
their relationships and, thus, their social accountability and role within society.  
As institutions panicked and proved unable to establish clear rules and 
procedures, the allocation of resources and services started to live up to very 
peculiar expectations. The Rehabilitation Commissioner and Secretary to 
Government, West Punjab, A. M. Leghari candidly put it down on paper no later 
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than March 1949. “[The West Punjab] Government consider[s] that the absence 
of adequate staff of the proper calibre and the lack of clear cut instructions in 
regard to [the] policy [of allotment of properties and lands] are largely 
responsible for this state of affairs”, he recorded while introducing his remarks 
on resettlement and rehabilitation practices and policies.52 Personal identity and 
links with influential individuals topped the list of the selective criteria that 
administrators and resource holders usually applied in order to redistribute 
available assets.53 In its formative process of reformulation within an 
independent state, Pakistani bureaucracy stemmed from and was shaped around 
personal and ‘informal’ systems of allocation of resources. Trust, reliability and 
reputation – ideas, qualities and attitudes to be found at very heart of any public 
and private transaction – had all to be reframed and regained after the dislocating 
fallouts of Partition. The institutional and the social tangle mirrored and 
nourished each other. While they ordered the jigsaw puzzles of their lives in 
early independent Pakistan, refugees rarely pointed at institutions in a formal and 
clear-cut way.54 They usually remembered their contacts with bureaucratic 
authorities and officers in terms of personal acquaintances and relationships. 
Where the tissue of friends, relatives and the so-called influential persons was 
quickly and successfully rewoven, gaining access to resources and services 
turned out to be more straightforward and easier.  
It was no secret, for instance, that values of friendship and guidance had to 
inform as constituent guidelines all the activities and the course of action of the 
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Rehabilitation Department.55 So-called social capital entered the realm of 
institution-building processes as a supporting actor by officially coming to be a 
way of transacting ‘deals’ over public or private resources. Mutual faith-based 
solidarity and social bonds – Antony Giddens argues – set individuals free from 
any constraints.56 At a moment when institutions were adjusting their hierarchies 
and power balances to suit the needs of a new state framework, personal 
acquaintances turned into the constraint par excellence.  
Accordingly the expression ‘as I lack influence’ flagged both the social 
marginalisation and the strong feeling of being in a condition of neglect shared 
by many Partition refugees. Unofficial estimates suggested that the number of 
migrants who could neither count on nor brag about influential acquaintances 
amounted to about 30 lakhs.57  The chance to make use of the multi-faceted 
galaxies of the spheres of influence and power within which public resources 
were at a relatively short reach, were arguably the realm of an elite. Their 
elitarian dimension mirrored the identity of their circles’ members and the nature 
of the transactions. “There was a [refugee] friend of mine who had not had a 
house the last five years. [...] I had his case examined by the Department and I 
found that he deserved accommodation”, nonchalantly admitted the Punjab 
Minister of Revenue, Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash during a session of the 
Provincial Assembly.58  Shaikh Sadiq Hassan – a Punjabi member of the 
Constituent Assembly – likewise owned up to having similarly submitted a 
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couple of property claims to the Rehabilitation Department on behalf of his 
friends.59   
The silence over the system of bureaucratic obligations had just, although 
only partially, been broken. Seemingly, all the traces of Muzaffar and Sadiq’s 
‘charitable’ intercessions had been removed from the local administrative 
records. There was no general outcry from the tabloids as well. No one had 
bought their silence, however. Handed in to lower-ranking officials without any 
“greasing [of] their palm”, the applications of Sadiq’s friends were rebuffed.60 
Sadiq, it seems, had failed to reproduce the free-of-charge market of obligations 
of those elite circles that, by contrast, were familiar to Muzaffar. After all, 
everyday relations and chains of politico-administrative favours and mutual 
indebtedness do not necessarily rely on economic transactions: the status of the 
persons involved and the privileges connected with them may act as a reliable 
guarantee of future rewards or help in case of need.61 Engines driving the 
everyday dimension of human relations across the whole region, these dynamics 
were now exploited to plug gaps in the local bureaucracy. Highly-placed 
individuals and members of the both the provincial and federal governments 
slipped their ‘wish lists’ to equally high-ranking officials who, in turn, referred 
requests and needs to a subordinate employee.62 Clear understandings breed long 
friendships. Protection, political accommodation and a friendly hand in case of 
need were the implied trading currency.63 The apparently unblemished reputation 
of the higher administrative echelons that found vast echo in the local and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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foreign accounts of the time resulted then from an administrative 
institutionalisation of the everyday.64  
Common people vulgarised their intense sentiment of marginality by talking 
about ‘have gots’ and ‘have nots’.65 “A real genuine and respectable family of 
refugees has been leading a miserable life for the last seven years”, complained 
one Muhammad Rafique from Lahore with regard to this distinction.66 He and 
his family had left for West Punjab from Amritsar, where they had run a 
jewellery shop. Their arrival and settlement in Pakistan meant the beginning of 
daily pilgrimages to the offices of the Resettlement and Rehabilitation 
Department in order to get the better of the local bureaucracy and secure the 
allotment of a business or a commercial activity. As he did not move in the 
‘fashionable’ circles of the local administration, Muhammad’s efforts were 
doomed to be wasted. Surprisingly, sometimes even civil servants faced an 
unexpected shortfall in proper and effective networks of relationships and hence 
the necessary clout. Despite a number of provisions introducing some kind of an 
administrative fast-track system, the process of allocation of an evacuee house 
appeared to be an uphill struggle for the bulk of the employees of the former 
Indian Civil Service.67 One particular correspondent ‘Muhajir’ exposed in a letter 
to the editor of the Pakistan Times (Lahore) the vicissitudes involved in his being 
a government employee in a desperate need for a house.  As his posting int he 
city came through, ‘Muhajir’ had to find and pay for accommodation amidst the 
housing shortages and the skyrocketing rents of the mid-1950s. He went straight !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to the heart of the matter. “How does the Government propose to repay his 
[refugee’s] loyalty and sufferings”, he asked.68 The hardships he had had to 
undergo surely demanded some kind of compensation. Yet the replies of the 
Pakistani State kept falling far behind his as well as other refugees’ schedule. 
Living on the fringe of the society, Muhammad and ‘Muhajir’ could not help 
but bank on those persons who pledged to open the door to the offices of the 
Rehabilitation Department. 
 
 “I need to look for a tout”: ersatz bureaucracy for people on the brink of 
marginality 
 
Muhammad and Muhajir probably passed one another in the streets surrounding 
the Punjab Civil Secretariat in Lahore. They might even have exchanged a few 
words while queuing in front of the sole person who could mediate between them 
and the state bureaucracy.  It was precisely along these roads that the marginality 
resulting from the lethal combination of the bureaucratic intrinsic weaknesses 
and the elitist dimension of the institutionalisation of the everyday surfaced and 
became a byword for bribery and corruption. The present section will delve into 
the narrative and the sociology of the bureaucratic misconduct in 1940s and 
1950s Pakistani Punjab. It will explore and document the administrative 
mechanisms and the workings of the human mind that allowed the system first to 
take root and then to flourish.  
Up to sixty petition writers were there, about forty yards far from Lahore’s 
Anarkali’s tomb, stationed on their doormats and filing in at an incredible speed 
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hundreds of documents and appeals per day. Refugees’ attempts at making the 
leap from their condition of marginality to the upper circles of ‘administrative 
society’ appeared to be a total failure on the bureaucratic market. “I would, 
therefore, request the postal authorities to expedite the verification of my saving 
bank account so that [the] early payment of the amount can be made to me. It is 
needless to add that being old and poor I am desperately in need of money”, 
implored Imam-ud-Din writing from the Lahore suburb of Qila Gujjar Singh.69 A 
retired teacher from Amritsar, he had been tilting at the windmills of the post 
offices to have his own money transferred from India. “I”– the aforesaid 
Muhammad from Lahore continued in his letter – “respectfully request the 
Minister of for Rehabilitation to consider my case, and after satisfying himself of 
my genuine claim, provide my unfortunate family with some means of 
supporting. I am confident that the Minister for Rehabilitation will give his most 
sympathetic consideration to my case”.70 Muhammad’s trust was about to be 
betrayed. His heartfelt plea together with thousands of other appeals to local 
ministers and highly-place officials went often unheard. Refugees had no choice 
but to pin their hopes on the petition-writers and the army of middlemen of the 
local Civil Secretariat.     
In July 1954 a well-placed observer leaked to the Pakistan Times (Lahore) 
interesting though not particularly exclusive data and information.71 In some 
cases former patwaris charged with corruption, petition writers served as a 
bridge between a few clerks within the Rehabilitation Department and those 
whom the collective imagination labelled as ‘touts’. These latter sealed the 
absolute need and relevance of a reliable network of acquaintances and in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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influential persons in the multi-layered formal and informal processes of 
allocation of resources. Indeed, they approached refugees and introduced 
themselves as someone “who really matters”. In other words, they put 
themselves forwards as those ersatz ‘big men’ who make things happen for their 
followers.72 These intermediaries interceded first with accommodating petition 
writers and then with lower-rank clerks of either the local Rehabilitation Office 
or the Record Room. Refugees were eventually issued with valueless documents 
where scribbles such as ‘forwarded to the A.D.C.’ or ‘please consider it 
favourably’ sounded as empty and meaningless words. Nevertheless, ‘have not’ 
migrants possessed the sense of enjoying the sweet smell of the bureaucratic 
success. Oddly enough, the backstage behaviour of a minority turned into the 
public representation of the everyday life of hundreds of thousands of persons, 
whose entry tickets came in the shape of bribes to officials and agents.73    
The whole system was then so oiled as to generate its own peculiar economies 
of scale. In mid-1950s, at the provincial level, it ‘employed’ 1,383 gazetted and 
non-gazetted officers within the bureaucratic cadres of West Pakistan’s 
government and thousands of persons within the ‘informal sector’.74 Common 
citizens appeared to consider this peculiar administrative economy as part and 
parcel of their everyday life and relationship with the local bureaucracy. 
Employees, middlemen and users all lived in symbiosis within this closed circuit 
where public resources were redistributed.75 Slackening the reins of the network 
of mutual relationships, balances of power and hierarchies proved to be an uphill 
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struggle for both provincial and federal authorities. Appeals that wholeheartedly 
called for citizens’ as well as civil servants’ support and cooperation were the 
corollary of any attempted far-reaching reform of the sector.76 Urdu and other 
vernacular newspapers captured their contempt in black and white via scathing 
editorials: “Corrupt officials in government departments [who] are sucking the 
people’s blood” were harshly stigmatised in editorials published by Musulman 
and Anjuman.77   
 Nevertheless, these kinds of despatched SOS calls frequently fell on deaf 
ears. Not even the increase in penal sentences in the early 1950s and the later 
provisional transfer of the capital city from Karachi to Rawalpindi in the early 
1960s made civil servants, brokers and citizens worry.78  Promulgated in 1953, 
the Civil Services Prevention Rule proved to be nothing less than a footnote in 
the margins of the history of this period.79 Indeed, the vagueness of both legal 
and political countermeasures did not cripple the relational and economic 
engines of the informal administrative machine.80 The resilience and adaptability 
of the latter won over any attempt to quash the vicious circle of an apparently 
wayward corruption.  ‘Touts’ and, to a certain extent, petition writers took the 
edge off any sense of guilt that might have tormented bureaucrats or the man in 
the street. By transacting businesses, those brokers triggered a subconscious 
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mechanism of shame-displacement that allowed officers and citizens alike to lay 
the blame on someone else for the act.81  
Likewise, those bureaucratic cadres who were involved in this twin ‘market’ 
made some kind of capital out of their name officially appearing on public 
records, legal deeds and newspapers.  Knowing to whom one could turn for 
advice and help made the job easier for everyone and safeguarded the whole of 
the subsidiary administrative process of social control.82 That the ordinary man 
in the street could easily identify and, through the intercession of the ‘touts’, 
make contact with accommodating clerks was almost an open secret. Officers 
and politicians provide us with the much-needed insight into the whole process. 
Ejected from a house that he had apparently illegally occupied, a clerk from the 
Revenue Department immediately turned to the person concerned. “What 
happened was that he talked to the other fellows of the Department, entered the 
house and came with a fait accompli and said, ‘I belong to the essential service 
and need a house, just say ‘Allotted’”, revealed, without flinching, the Minister 
of Revenue, West Punjab, to the Punjab Assembly.83   
It was only when officers were threatened with a substantial reduction in their 
wages and privileges that they made themselves heard. With the post-
independence austerity measures of the early 1950s harming their material 
interests, clerks and administrative government employees orchestrated a two-
week ‘pen down’ strike that, in mid-March 1951, knocked out the whole of the 
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Punjab.84  Under the umbrella of the Punjab Subordinate Services Federation, the 
wish lists of local patwaris and middle-ranking officials encompassed a wide 
range of claims. Among them, the monthly horse allowance of Rs. 45 and a 
guaranteed education for their children stood out in sharp relief against the more 
classical demands for higher wages or a pension plan.85  
This vociferous protest on the part of civil servants of the Government of 
Punjab appeared to meet with the approval of some local observers. It was, in 
their view, a way to break the bonds that nourished the vicious circle in which 
low salaries were in inverse ratio to corruption.86  They should have however 
been more circumspect with their predictions. The monthly wages of lower-ranks 
officials were unquestionably set at starvation levels, falling within the pay range 
of Rs. 50-Rs. 120.87 Their families barely made ends meet. Yet, the Jekyll and 
Hyde existence of the administrative apparata rooted primarily in its living was 
in symbiosis with the surrounding social environment. Mohammad Ali Bogra – 
Prime Minister and Minister for Defence and Commerce, Government of 
Pakistan – demonstrated in 1953 just how far he had his finger on the pulse of 
the problem during a session of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. In reply to a 
question from Sardar Asadullah Khan, he rightly pointed out that “prophylactic 
measures […] [had] to be taken. Corruption […] [had] to be fought on at all 
fronts. Corruption […] [had] to be fought in schools and colleges, in university 
and even in public life of this country”.88 One can bet that sniggers and sentences 
with double meanings most probably welcomed the speech. Nevertheless, the 
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Prime Minister was unquestionably right on target. These patronage structures 
that supported the Pakistani administration as well as its popular ersatz 
duplication in the streets surrounding Anarkali were first and foremost a socio-
cultural problem.  
“I am not putting the blame on any individual […]. I agree that it was the 
mentality which has got to be changed”, echoed a year later Muzaffar Ali Khan 
Qizilbash from the benches of the Punjab Assembly.89 In spite of their guise of a 
friendly society, preferential treatments and cronyism were poisoning the early 
life of what was a still-in-the-making civil society.90 Their tentacles extended 
dangerously into the sensitive realm of the state and provincial economies. The 
full extent of the financial damage was unknown. Yet, according to US sources, 
so-called malpractices in the early 1950s resulted in substantial cash deficits for 
both the provincial and federal exchequers.91 The cancer that was consuming the 
administrative life of the Punjab surfaced even in the language of the everyday. 
Ordinary citizens usually referred to the Resettlement and Rehabilitation offices 
as the ‘Carbuncle Department’.92  The idea and the risk that an unusual disease 
could slowly yet inexorably infect the whole socio-political fabric was by then 
subconsciously clear.  
Nevertheless, it was the everyday with its challenges and needs that attracted 
much of the refugees’ attention. Politics and the realm of the so-called political 
ideas were not clear of the same perceptions over priorities.  
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Turning political? Administrative failures and political demands 
 
‘A miss is as good as a mile’. As West Punjabi civil servants bungled their 
attempts to carry out a swift redistribution of evacuee properties, this saying 
turned into the war cry of many claimants. Izzat, power, authority and sphere of 
influence were on the line almost on a daily basis. The present section aims at 
providing a link between this and the following chapter. While focusing on the 
disrupting effects on the anthropological fabric of the migrant community, it 
discusses the refugees’ self-perceived need to assert their identity as a separate 
group within local society.   
Rehabilitation practices frequently threw all the migrants’ attempts to rebuild 
their networks of relationships and influence into confusion. In 1952, the Garden 
Allotment Committee in Lahore was, for instance, directed to re-distribute 
vegetable and flower path “to villages and chaks other than those where they 
have applied for allotment of land under the Rehabilitation Settlement 
Scheme”.93 Temporary allottees of those evacuee premises that were otherwise 
reserved for public purposes were evicted through official orders released by 
central Rehabilitation authorities.94 Withdrawn properties would then be assigned 
to some other refugees, widow and elders.95  
  The vicissitudes of Muhammad Siddiqui’s family was worthy of one of the 
finest serial stories or Lollywood films.96 A refugee from India, Muhammad and 
his relatives were temporarily allotted a property in the village of Qadirpur !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Rawan, Multan District. As the years rolled on, members of his family either 
passed away or moved elsewhere. Apparently, only Mst. Bashiri, widow of 
Muhammad’s paternal uncle, stayed behind and fought tooth and nail not to hand 
over the allotted premises. Another refugee together with a legal gap in the 
Resettlement scheme got in the way of the realisation of Mst. Bashiri’s dreams. 
Indeed, the Government of the Punjab only regulated the status of refugee 
widows, unmarried daughters and minors in relation to the evacuee properties in 
early 1953.97 Unfortunately, as it could not be applied retrospectively, the 
amendment did not benefit Mst. Bashiri. Her notice of ejectment had been served 
a year before, and her portion of land already allotted to someone else. Likewise, 
the laws of inheritance as embodied either in the Shari’a or in the customary 
justice system could not be fully implemented. Allotments resulted from a legal 
and bureaucratic conveyance, and no refugee had a vested right to obtain them. 
“The argument” – pointed out the honourable Mr. Justices Ahmad, Ali and 
Changez during a different hearing – “that on the demise of the right-holder his 
heirs, whether under custom or Personal Law [Personal Law (Sharia Act), 1948] 
became vested with the estate and therefore, were entitled to allotment of 
property in Pakistan in their own right and not as help has no force”.98 
A particular kind of ’honour’ killing – in this case, attacks against rights of 
land possession or exploitation – were bureaucratically committed all across the 
Punjabi countryside. The agricultural lands bordering on chak No. 13/1-L, tehsil 
Okara, Montgomery District were the scene of the crime that the Honourable Mr 
Justice Changez investigated in 1957. It was indeed there that the izzat of Rao 
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Zia-ud-Din and Muhammad Umar risked meeting its end.99 Rehabilitation 
practices and functionaries were immediately put on trial. They were suspected 
of re-drawing the borders of both Rao and Muhammad’s allotted lands by re-
distributing 10 acres of them to one Muhammad Khan through a procedure of 
revision and adjustment of early-assigned allotments. Tittle-tattle assaults on 
Muhammad Khan’s honesty assumed the quality of a malicious character 
assassination and spread across Montgomery District.100 For their part, Rao Zia-
ud-Din and Muhammad Umar filed an appeal to the local Additional 
Rehabilitation Commissioner and asked for records to be verified accurately. 
Lawyers, respondents and petitioners trudging round courts and offices of the 
Rehabilitation Department, the legal battle snowballed and occasionally turned 
into a cadastral survey competition. Officials revoked allotments, the local police 
launched an inquiry, and petitions or complaints piled up. “Elementary, my dear 
Watson”, exclaimed Changez while going through the documents. The 
umpteenth case of administrative authorities – those of the Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation Department – acting in excess of power was nosed out. Basically, 
he washed his hands of the gist of the legal action and the real rationale behind it. 
Rao and Muhammad went to court in order to preserve their own izzat and not to 
discover a bureaucratic blunder. 
As they levelled off and wound down resettlement schemes, local authorities 
had consequently to reckon with the resistance of particular groups of refugees 
and their determined attempts to preserve what they had regained with difficulty. 
Feelings, concerns and worries translated into the stronger sense of being part of 
a social group in need of special attention and protection. It was in courtrooms in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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particular that refugees sought a clear-cut demarcation of new social boundaries 
and claimed their exceptional status. In the face of the failure of the Pakistani 
administration to grapple with the humanitarian crisis and live up to refugees’ 
expectations, judges and lawyers were frequently called upon to smooth out 
disputes and in effect attempt to constitute an impersonal and equitable socio-
administrative order. 
Habibullah Butt – refugee resident in House No. 124 in Market Road, 
Rawalpindi Cantt. – shielded his own peculiar ‘self’ by a number of defence 
mechanisms, including the transfer of his desires and emotions to a judging 
authority.101  His own four walls were the ground on which the Pakistani 
bureaucracy gauged the success of its ability to respond to the challenge of 
meshing together refugees’ expectancies towards the state and institution-
building processes. The Governor General of Pakistan himself had leased these 
premises from their original evacuee owner back in October 1947. Habibullah 
had had them allotted when he was appointed to the local M. S. Branch as 
Officer Supervisor. In 1954, his retirement being imminent, both the Military 
Estate Officer and the local District Rehabilitation Commissioner asked him to 
surrender the property. The subsequent lodging of a writ petition to the High 
Court opened a proverbial Pandora’s box by revealing the extent of the confusion 
that existed among bureaucratic cadres and within institutions in relation to their 
specific roles and responsibilities. Which institution could claim the right to issue 
a notice of ejectment? Was it the Defence Military or the Rehabilitation 
Department? 
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In accepting the petition, the High Court argued the unsuitability of the 
military authorities sending out the ejection notice. In spite of claiming a lease 
from the Rehabilitation Department, the Minister of Defence itself could not 
wield the actual power to eject. Yet, the Judgment of Appeal upset the situation. 
According to its ruling, the military authorities were fully entitled to eject 
Habibullah, the Rehabilitation officers exercising no control over the property 
but the collection of the rent. Habibullah himself became dizzy in his attempt to 
unravel his legal and personal problems. Indeed, his early petition was filed 
against the Ministry of Defence in the belief that it was the local Deputy 
Resettlement Commissioner who allotted him his house. It was then to this latter 
authority that, after having been unable to document this process of allocation in 
the court of first instance, he turned in order to seek the allotment of the premises 
in question. Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court found out, Habibullah “had 
himself been requesting the military authorities from time to time to effect 
repairs on the premises”.102  
In 1951, Muhammad Sharif summoned Muhammad Iqbal and Amid-ud-Din 
to appear before him. Muhammad had filed a lawsuit against Amid over a 
controversy that resulted from a perceived breaking of the Punjab Rent 
Restriction Act, 1949. During the hearing, objections to refugee exceptionality 
were raised by one of the litigants and eventually rejected by the judging 
authority. In the abstract of the judgement, this latter clearly stated that regularly-
appointed refugee allottees “were no better no worse than the non-Muslim 
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tenants […] accepted as tenants by the owners themselves on payment of certain 
fixed rent”.103 
Both Muhammad and Habibullah had just upgraded their social status to some 
kind of a political demand. The hot potato was now in the hands of the local 
politicians and members of both Punjab and Pakistan Constituent Assembly. 
 
***** 
 
This chapter has questioned and reframed traditional ideas of institution-building 
processes, patronage and corruption within highly-personalised and trust-based 
societies such as the Punjabi and the Pakistani ones.  As it has traced back the 
administrative path towards the attempted full resettlement of the refugee 
community in places like Lahore, it has argued the intrinsic weakness of the local 
bureaucracy. As the next chapter will also demonstrated, this latter surfaces as an 
institution that was unable to cope with the everyday needs of its users, let alone 
to put forward a proper and swift bureaucratic policy.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Pawns in a political game: refugees, electoral rules and competitions and the 
politics of West Punjab’s stability 
 
 
“It is impossible […] to settle even one refugee because every refugee is a pawn 
in their political game; every refugee means a vote for the Muslim League”  
(C. E. Gibbon, Punjab Assembly Debates, 10th March 1954) 
 
“I have been knocking on the door that holds the throne […]  
We take care of our own” 
(B. Springsteen, “We take care of our own”, The Wrecking Ball, 2012) 
 
 
Once the assumption of an easy, homogenous and swift resettlement of Partition 
refugees is challenged, new avenues of interpretation of the early years of 
Pakistan’s history open up. The idea of Pakistan as a failed or failing state is not 
restricted to the myriad of geo-political analysis that frequently hit the headlines. 
Indeed, the list of historians and political scientists who have given in to the 
temptation to plumb the depths of the ‘Pakistani failure’ is almost endless.1 By 
contrast, Anatol Lieven has recently argued that, if judged by its own standards, 
Pakistan is a state that works.2 Stemming from his detailed and functional 
investigation of present-day dynamics, it will be argued here that Pakistan and 
the region of the Punjab in particular paved the way for the establishment of its 
own peculiar stable and workable political system back in the early years of its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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independence. The lens through which the phenomenon is observed is that of the 
electoral and party manoeuvrings that accompanied and resulted from the 1951 
provincial elections and the related debate on the adequate representation of 
refugees within the local Assembly, with a particular focus on Lahore.   
In the run-up to the 1951 provincial elections, the relationship between the 
bureaucratic cadres and the political actors of the West Punjab flowed from their 
mutual attempts to define and re-define their role within the frame of a newly-
established independent State. This chapter thus seeks to demonstrate that, as 
they engineered the new rules of the electoral game, both civil authorities and 
refugee politicians played on those values that typically underpinned local 
society. It will be argued that the hurly-burly of mutual exploitations, 
interferences and interactions resulted in a corpus of regulations and political 
practices that, by being socially sustainable, would contribute to a stabilisation of 
the West Punjab political arena.  
As the rules were first discussed and then established, local parties and 
factions started on their jockeying for a sought-after electoral and post-electoral 
success. A careful examination of the political manoeuvrings reveals, however, 
that the independence of Pakistan did not mark an entirely new phase in the life 
of West Punjab’s party politics.  The need to milk the state apparata in the 
search for limited resources and the atavistic ideas of loyalty and political 
opportunism merged there with the attempts to rise to the challenges that the re-
integration of millions of persons and a nation-in-the-making were progressively 
putting out. This chapter accordingly investigates the ways the Punjabi parties 
shaped up and drifted perilously towards a one-party system, hovering between 
the pressing demands of a newly-established public arena and past legacies. 
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Indeed, it unveils the political and anthropological episteme that in time 
stabilised the local party scenario by levelling down the ‘side-effects’ of 
breakups, personal rivalries, powers behind the throne and presumed 
conspiracies. 
Electoral campaigns aim at checkmating hurdles and opponents. In order to 
pursue their respective objectives, candidates and voters need to make contact 
with each other. In 1951, amidst heated debates on the role of religion in the state 
and calls for an Islamisation of the public sphere, traditional religious figures 
bestowed behind-the-scenes help on most candidates. Hence this chapter also 
aims at exploring the ways pirs and sajjada nashins progressively resumed their 
path towards emerging from the obscurity to which they had been relegated after 
the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century reformism, and put politicians – 
especially refugee ones – on course to renew contact with their voters. 
 
Pieces at the beginning of the game: engineering a new electoral system 
 
Chalie, chae pien. Gathered around a cup of tea Qutab Din and Rao Khurshid Ali 
Khan were engaged in an animated discussion. A long, silent pause anticipated a 
frank and friendly handshake. The agreement was finally made and the informal 
contract signed. Qutab Din, potential candidate for the constituency of 
Montgomery VII, and Rao Khurshid Ali Khan, powerful refugee leader and 
former member of the Punjab Assembly, set the seal on their electoral alliance. 
This decision however was by no means easy and painless. Indeed Qutab Din 
“after giving anxious thought to the pros and the cons of the case […] was of the 
opinion that Rao Khurshid Ali Khan’s votes would come to […] [him] and […] 
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[his] to Rao Khurshid Khan in pursuance of the pact”.3 Both of them were fully 
aware of the value and the eventual impact of refugees’ votes on the course and 
the outcome of the impeding elections scheduled to take place in the province in 
late March 1951. Frenzied political manoeuvring had pushed the whole West 
Punjab to fire and sword shortly after 14th August 1947.  
That Rao Khurshid Ali Khan and Qutab Din were beset with difficulties and 
hurdles has been acknowledged in existing secondary literature exploring this 
early period in Pakistan’s political development.  Indeed, it was Muhammad 
Waseem who, in his 1989 Politics and State in Pakistan, first drew attention to 
the implications of the massive migration of millions of persons for the electoral 
basis of nearly all the refugee politicians.4 In his view, it was by stepping into the 
political breach that resulted from their loss of public support that the Pakistani 
bureaucracy found a way to secure the upper hand over local society. Therefore, 
as H. F. Goodnow has argued, the newly-established Pakistan Civil Service stood 
in continuity with the attitude of the British administrators. A public façade of 
tolerance camouflaged the bureaucracy’s self-perceived superiority, and formally 
preserved government institutions.5 Markus Daechsel has asserted a similar line 
of reasoning in 1997, arguing that the dominance of bureaucracy is understood 
there as the absolute power to allocate resources through the intricacies of the 
administrative processes.6 However, the idea of what Philip Oldenburg and 
Muhammad Waseem have labelled as ‘bureaucratic polity’ will be challenged 
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and re-addressed in this chapter.7 By tracking down both the anthropological and 
historic episteme that led to the re-integration of refugee politicians and voters in 
the years following Partition and to the institutional choice of an electoral 
system, it will seek to explain the relationship between politics and bureaucracy 
through their intricate and subtle plots of mutual exploitation, weaknesses and 
interdependency.  
In autumn 1947, refugee leaders, new and old politicians alike, scoured almost 
all camps and temporary structures to be found in West Punjab. Thorough 
manhunts went hand in hand with their attempt to mould government policies 
and achieve the much desired and congenial resettlement of refugees on land. A 
refugee-saturated Punjab was facing the urgent need to re-accommodate the bulk 
of the migrant community by sharing this burden among all its districts and the 
neighbouring regions. Governmental projects – mainly based on a first-come-
first-served method of allocating evacuee properties – was biased against the 
eventual re-election and preservation of any political ascendancy, let alone 
refugees’ chances of benefiting from the peculiar perks of a political system that 
had already long featured patronage relationships. It was, Kenneth Post has 
argued in relation to another former part of the British empire, both a semantic 
and linguistic problem. Patronage political dynamics demand the representative 
to speak the same social ‘language’ of his constituents and to share the same 
‘ethnic’ background.8 Unsurprisingly, then, former eastern members of the 
newly-restructured Punjab Assembly pressured Pakistani authorities into a 
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district-wise resettlement of refugees and hence hampered the latter’s dispersal 
within the region or their transfer to Sindh, Baluchistan and the NWFP.9  
Indeed, they did not intend to turn swords into ploughshares. As a worried 
British Deputy High Commissioner (Lahore) warned in late 1948, their crusade 
against a non-district based rehabilitation was resulting in far more aggressive 
and resentful refugees.10 Nevertheless, the formal and institutional acceptance of 
the criterion of the much anticipated assignment of evacuee dwellings along 
district lines did not soothe politicians’ nerves and paralleled a much more fluid 
and slippery reality. The resettlement or self-resettlement of refugees had already 
started, and a prospective and further dis- and re-location was not an 
economically and socially sustainable and viable option.11 The laborious task of 
re-consolidating entire biraderis and spheres of patronage influence had to face 
the lack of a reliable system of identification, scarce means of communication, 
and the hurried scramble for a shelter that compulsively involved almost all 
refugees. The case of Meo refugees, for instance, stood out as paradigmatic. In 
July 1949 they were reportedly scattered across West Punjab despite their request 
for a homogenous rehabilitation.12 The ‘linguistic units’ of fidelity and solid 
relationships between any local leader and his followers – essential units of local 
political discourses – demanded thus to be partially reworded in order to retain 
their significance and power. Any attempt to solve the problem in theory was 
simply hopeless.   
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Ghostly shapes loomed out of the fog of the provincial elections scheduled for 
1951. Relatively inexperienced and new to electoral competitions, the region of 
Punjab held one the first elections of independent Pakistan.13 In a curious twist of 
fate, the so-called Punjabi school of public administration turned into the first 
laboratory within which Pakistani democratic aspirations were to be tested. It 
was, as Andrew Wilder has pointed out, one of those attempts at legitimising the 
status quo through an adaptation of all possible democratic needs to the 
supremacy of bureaucracy that would eventually spell out both federal and 
provincial political histories in the years to come.14 By April 1951, as the 
counterpoint voice of Iftikhar Ahmad insinuates, almost half of the newly-elected 
members of the Punjab Assembly would owe a favour to a public servant.15 
Grassroots politics and manoeuvrings bespoke however of a far more elaborated 
and multi-faceted reality. Politics and bureaucracy, my main argument is here, 
exploited each other’s weaknesses in an endless process of negotiation and re-
negotiation of their identities within the new institutional framework of an 
independent state. Thus the opening chapters of the apparently same old story 
talk instead about an odd process of vernacularisation and enthronement of 
patronage democracy wherein Partition refugees and their eventual 
representation in local institutions played a leading role.  
In early 1949 former members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, current 
members of the Central Constituent Assembly, secretaries of local boards and 
public associations were all caught up in answering a long questionnaire that a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The very first elections had been held in the princely states of Khaipur and Bahawalpur in 
1949. 
14 A. R. Wilder, The Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behaviour in the Punjab, 
Karachi, 1990, p. 17. See also A. Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s 
Political Economy of Defence, Cambridge, 1990, p. 193. 
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newly established committee had just submitted to them all. Questions 4 and 5 
stood out as being of crucial importance.  “Do you think it would be possible to 
secure adequate representation of refugees in the Legislative Assembly in West 
Punjab if the basis referred to question 3 [franchise qualifications based on 
taxation, education, service in the Armed Forces and, in the case of women, 
status of their husband]? In case you are of the opinion that it would not be 
possible to secure for refugees representation commiserated with their numbers 
on this basis, what other basis do you suggest for achieving the object?”, stated 
Question 4.16 Question 5 raised the political and electoral stakes and asked 
whether or not “it would be proper to prescribe different and concessional 
franchise qualifications for the refugees for the next general elections”.17 The 
problem was far from being trivial. Electoral systems lie at the very heart of 
institutions - and, in the last resort, even decision-making processes. District 
Boards and small towns initially co-opted refugees through the replacement of 
those of their members who had fled to India.18 Immediately after independence, 
the transfer of parliamentary seats from East to West Punjab had hewed to a 
similar principle and methodology. The upcoming scheduled elections presented 
Punjabi politics with the fait accompli of the absolute need for careful 
considerations and mulled-over evaluations.  
Interviewees and committee members finally tabled a three-option draft that 
attempted to solve the electoral and political quandary. Separate electorates and 
multi-member constituencies with or without a reservation of seats for refugees 
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were the formulas that, according to the proposals, had to be weighted up in 
order to secure an adequate representation of all the different sections now part 
of Punjab society.19  The committee rejected almost immediately the idea of 
multi-member constituencies without reserved refugee seats. Refugees were sure 
to cast their votes only in favour of refugee candidates and de facto prejudice the 
result of the polls. This would – as stated in the proceedings – clash with the 
institutional efforts to bridge the gulf between locals and newcomers by socially 
and politically acknowledging, and thus deepening, the rift.20 Bets were now 
taken on the two remaining solutions. A curious bungle beckoned on the horizon. 
Both refugees’ separate electorates and multi-member constituencies would 
institutionally ratify precisely the social split that Pakistani institutions were 
trying to mend amidst tremendous difficulties and setbacks. Regardless of the 
outcome of the negotiations, these two options would herald a realignment of 
urban and rural power and hierarchies along new lines. New powerbrokers who 
owed their position to means other than land would then emerge and play a 
leading role in the local political scenario.21  
The related debate on a possible revision of the franchise further brought to 
the fore the relevance of the question. Unable to prove their property, wealth or 
educational credentials, the bulk of the refugee community risked being kept out 
of the electorate and off the candidate rolls. Feelings thus were running high, and 
Punjabi public opinion split over the issue. The subtle implications of the 
introduction of adult franchise lurked in the recesses of the whirl of declarations, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 West Punjab Gazette – Extraordinary Issue, 28th October 1949, UPL.  
20 Ibidem. 
21 W. Singer, “Women’s Politics and Land Control in an Indian Election: Lasting Influence of the 
Freedom Movement in North Bihar”, in H. A. Gould and S. Ganguly (eds.), India Votes. Alliance 
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disclaimers and rectifications that resulted from the deliberations of the 
committee. Never a day passed but Imroze (Lahore) and Pakistan Times (Lahore) 
hammered away at their campaign that trumpeted unrestricted adult suffrage as 
the quintessence of Pakistan’s future democracy.22 For its part, the West Punjab 
Union of Journalists tagged its support on the abolition of all landlord 
constituencies and the debarment of landlords from labour seats.23 Opponents to 
an extension of the electorate feared that the Committee was biting off more than 
it could actually chew, and urged it to bring the matter to the Constituent 
Assembly. Someone went as far as to drag in the Quran in order to support his 
arguments.24 The thrill and the trepidation were the sort that usually haunt a 
person who is about to take a leap in the dark. All these ingredients looked set to 
‘ginger’ up Punjabi politics as soon as the Committee published its findings and 
final recommendations.  
The fictional Major Kayani of Mohammed Hanif’s debut novel questions our 
understanding of the weight of the decision. “Have you ever been inside the 
Palace of Mirrors? […] You look up and you see your face staring at you from 
thousands of mirrors. But these are reflecting the reflection of your face. […] Do 
you get my point?”.25 Indeed, the mirrors of Sheesh Mahal at Shahi Qila, Lahore, 
were the images that come to mind when commenting on the eventual results of 
the first experiment of electoral engineering in independent Pakistan. Assessing 
whether the choice of two-seat constituencies with a reserved seat for refugee 
candidates and the adult franchise mirrored or, by contrast, reflected indefinitely !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 See issues of Imroze (Lahore) and Pakistan Times (Lahore), January-November 1949.  
23 Prospects for Refugee Representation and Democratic Elections in the West Punjab – 
Confidential No. 23, 4th March 1949, NND 765024, NARA. 
24 Ibidem. 
25 M. Hanif, A Case of Exploding Mangoes, London, 2009, p. 200. 
!! 177 
the reflection of the strengths and weaknesses of local customs was a herculean 
task. Member constituencies perfectly matched the features and the needs of 
what was a highly personalised Punjabi society. The candidate-ballot mechanism 
– one available ballot to be cast for a single candidate – established a direct 
relationship between candidates and voters that was informed by particularistic 
benefits and incentives.26 Playing by the rules – both formal and informal – was 
apparently a child’s game for all social actors.  
Tracking down the basic elements of the local political system was instead the 
real challenge that lay ahead. Benefits and incentives needed, of course, to be 
targeted to specific individuals or groups. The chemistry and the chances of 
electoral success can be summed up in the following formula:  P2K.27 On the eve 
of 1951 elections, two atoms of patronage and one of kinship were the elements 
that potential candidates were trying to blend. Ostensibly the needs and the 
wishes of influential local leaders shaped the borders of the newly-designed 
constituencies by cutting across their natural administrative and physical 
boundaries.28 The electoral bureaucracy had finally to bow to the necessities of 
local politics and the geopolitics of the newcomers’ rehabilitation. No matter 
whether they intended to run for refugee or ‘normal’ seats, all future members of 
the Punjab Assembly would unquestionably have to worm their way into 
refugees’ affections. The feverishness that followed the announcement of the 
Committee converted itself into an almost desperate hunt for electoral alliances.  
Refugees’ resettlement, or self-resettlement on land, had shifted anyone’s 
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ground, and no candidate felt safe. Elections would be fought and eventually 
won inch by inch in every constituency. Potential candidates had to put their 
shoulder to the wheel and further step up the intensity of South Asian historically 
typical door-to-door campaigns.29  
Qutab Din and Rao Khurshid Ali Khan made a contract with each other with 
this picture in mind.  The pact, as proceedings pointed out, could be regarded as 
a “blindfold transfer of one’s influence in favour of the other”.30 Interestingly 
enough, by forming an alliance with the powerful contestant of a non-reserved 
seat, Rao Khurshid Ali Khan – whose arrest in 1948 had mobilised no less than 
50,000 supporters31 – incidentally revealed a substantial reduction in his electoral 
basis. The fluid dynamics of the resettlement of refugees spared no one. Many 
other potential candidates and refugee leaders across the whole of West Punjab 
were engrossed in similar negotiations and political transactions.32 For all three 
contracting parties – candidates, refugee representatives and, although frequently 
unwittingly, voters themselves – it was a win-win situation. The transfer of 
spheres of influence ensnared votes in a trap of checks and double-checks. 
Indeed, would-be members of the local provincial Assembly and the refugee 
leadership alike banked on the sheer weight of number: blocs of voters would 
seal former’s fate and provide the latter with the necessary power to thwart any 
broken promise. Both the electoral system and the agreements that political 
actors were signing led thus to a peculiarly Punjabi self-enforcing equilibrium of 
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group voting.33 The plank of the system was the incentives that pushed voters 
and candidates to take part in their mutual political and personal shares. 
Reportedly money and material benefits defined the parameters within which 
elections or re-elections were negotiated.34 On the understanding that mutual 
trust was the indissoluble clause, electoral ‘contracts’ were subsequently signed 
on this basis at all different levels. The everyday face of paternalism surfaced 
here and became tinged with the nuances of the ma-bap relationship. Politicians 
interacted with their voters by empathising with their needs and hardships within 
an intricate frame of emotional situations that mirrored the father/son bond.  
The economy of the Punjabi electoral system was accordingly far from being 
impersonal and modelled only on market dynamics. As Sir William Sleeman 
claimed when explaining the relationship between “the martial classes of the 
people of India” and “their immediate chief”, “he [the immediate chief] may 
change sides as often as he pleased, but the relations between him and his 
followers remain unchanged”.35 Punjabi politics were moulded out of the bundle 
of personal biraderi and charismatic community leaders. Alongside the 
brokering on the respective sphere of influences a peculiar and party-led diaspora 
of candidates took place and attempted to keep pace with the mirroring dispersal 
of refugees in their resettlement of self-resettlement efforts. In the constituencies 
of some of the most refugee-saturated towns in West Punjab candidates who it 
was rumoured would win the day easily in the reserved seats had previously 
taken up their residence elsewhere. Hence, “I Abdul Hamid Khan […] living at !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 K. Chandra, “Counting heads: a theory voter and elite behaviour in patronage democracies”, in 
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Women Home, Female Jail – Lahore […] do declare I am a refugee within the 
meaning given in clause (a) of Sect. 2 of the Punjab Legislative Assembly 
Election Act, 1950”, filled the form in one of them while putting himself forward 
as a candidate for the refugee seat in Sheikhupura VII.36 Sajjad Ali Khan, Zafar 
Hussain, Abdul Aziz and Altaf Mohy ud-Din – all resident in Lahore – were 
others who followed hot on his heels, in the constituencies of Gujranwala II and 
II and Sialkot IX and V respectively.37 
By early 1951 it was clear that politics and bureaucracy had begun a fight that 
was – and would be – informed by feelings of mutual exploitation, 
interdependency and self-perceived superiority. As regards the upcoming 
electoral competition, bureaucrats and party workers armed with their tactics and 
tricks yielded now the floor to local politicians. Political platforms had to be 
drafted and time was getting short.   
 
The king’s jewels: defining parties’ dynamics 
 
Biraderi and influential representatives of old or new power brokers indeed took 
the lion’s share in the run-up to 1951 elections. Still, the local political corollary 
involved a wide use by candidates to demonstrate publicly their strength and to 
test their own political platforms.38 Roads, squares and parks were the places 
where anyone could measure the pulse of local citizens on the topics that were 
inflaming public opinion. The number of knots of people who gathered around !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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politicians bowing and scraping gauged the success of new and old personalities 
in party conventions and reunions. At first glance, an apparent steadiness reigned 
supreme within almost all parties’ ranks. Accordingly, the direct proportion of 
the early weaknesses and failures of both the Pakistani political and 
parliamentary systems to the decline of the Muslim League has been raised to an 
almost widely accepted truism within existing secondary literature. A corrupt and 
landlord-dominated party, Safar Mahmood argues, was to blame for the flaws 
that marred local parliamentary politics.39 Yunas Samad and Ayesha Jalal echo 
very similar arguments as they identify in the decision to separate party careers 
from and government one and in the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 
scapegoats for the party’s decay.40 The crumbling empire of the Muslim League 
has been named in their writings as a suspect responsible for the political 
immaturity of Pakistan as a state. Its weaknesses notwithstanding, the Muslim 
League showed itself to be responsive to dynamics that were well known to the 
members of local society and paved the way for a stabilisation of the Punjabi 
party system. The debate on the resettlement of refugees that took place within 
both the government and the opposition reveal clearly how far Punjabi political 
factions played by the rules of all patronage and trust-based societies and, in 
practice, achieved their own political equilibrium.      
At its annual Council meeting held in Karachi in late January 1949, the 
Muslim League showed its utter inconclusiveness and indecision. All ten 
resolutions that were passed during the assembly proceedings turned out to be 
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empty hackneyed slogans that dealt mostly with trifling matters.41 According to 
rumourmongers, the Muslim League – the party that had guided Pakistan 
towards its independence – was in its death throes. The double-entry 
bookkeeping of its members revealed an irrepressible haemorrhage of persons 
that frustrated any attempt to further root the party throughout the whole of 
Pakistan. Initially working in a small room of a private house with scant 
resources and personnel, the Pakistan Muslim League was now establishing the 
provincial and federal secretariats and several organisational units.42  
Nevertheless, the West Punjab chapter had no more than 1,183,593 affiliates.43 
While the discussions at the Council meeting went on, a couple of persons 
were standing aloof and speaking in a whisper. One of them could be clearly 
heard complaining about the party’s “failure to put forward any concrete 
substitute for the pre-Partition attitude of militant agitation”.44 “[I am wondering] 
whether the League has any further useful function to perform in Pakistan”, 
reasoned the other one, voicing a concern that apparently was quite widespread 
among other fellow associates.45 Its organisational efforts notwithstanding, the 
Muslim League could hardly be considered as a proper party. It was rather a 
summation of splinter groups, factions and personal rivalries. Just tracing the 
complicated dynamics and in-fighting that characterised the Muslim League of 
the late 1940s and early 1950s was enough to threaten anyone’s sanity. The 
sanity at risk was, of course, that of foreign observers and commentators. Those 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Pakistan Muslim League. Meeting of the Council – POL 12044/49, 24th March 1949, DO 
35/3178, NAKG.  
42 IT to CRO – OPDOM No. 17, 3rd May 1949, DO 35/3178, NAKG.  
43 Pakistan Muslim League. Meeting of the Council – POL 12044/49, 24th March 1949, DO 
35/3178, NAKG.  
44 Ibidem. 
45 Ibidem.  
!! 183 
who had a vested interest were not taken in by appearances.  Delegates from 
Punjab joined in the Muslim League convention in Karachi with the declared aim 
of having their currents or personal ambitions backed by central party notables.46 
Hence, programmatic weaknesses together with the government’s failure to 
address the needs of both a state and a nation-in-the-making gave party leaders 
enough room for tapping into people’s mood and in the process increasing their 
own personal influence.47  
Outside the country’s new nerve centres and across the whole of the Punjab in 
particular, the average man in the street showed a total disregard for the collapse 
of the party. Any news coming from the Muslim League’s provincial 
headquarters was immediately pigeonholed as the umpteenth settling of scores 
between its different factions or an attempt by local politicians to pursue their 
own private interests instead of levelling down social and economic grievances.48 
Unquestionably refugees were amongst the more disillusioned. The hazy 
political platform cut them and their needs out of any party debate. The USA’s 
almost paranoiac hunt for potential communist threats stopped at nothing to x-ray 
the activities of any social or political movement whose identity appeared to be 
informed by communism. When they came to trace the contours of that Pakistani 
‘Red Menace’, whose backing of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy in 1951 caused 
uproar in the press, US officials unwittingly vouchsafed the details of refugees’ 
political claims. The withdrawal of the existing land tenure system, the 
containment of rampant corruption and widespread nepotism, and the right to a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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fair trial were the main points in a catch-all agenda that refugees failed to hear 
from Muslim League politicians and which they read instead mainly in the 
Communist Party’s leaflets.49 It was indeed the secretary of the Punjab 
Communist Party who, in early August 1950, hit the headlines by denouncing the 
fiasco of both the federal and provincial governments over the resettlement and 
the rehabilitation of West Punjab refugees.50 
He got his fifteen minutes of fame, one may argue. Appearing in the pages of 
the leftist Pakistan Times (Lahore) certainly did not earn him an award for 
bravery. However, pro-Muslim League refugee associations or parties were 
equally in no less deep water. Six months later in early 1951, Sirdar Abdus 
Sattari Faruqi, President of the All-Pakistan Muhajir League, convened a press 
conference in Lahore.  Soon after pledging his support for the Muslim League 
“at any cost”, Faruqi candidly acknowledged that “the Central and Provincial 
Governments had not efficiently worked for the rehabilitation of refugees”.51 In 
his view, the actual identification of the government ranks with the upper 
echelons of the Muslim League was apparently in no flat contradiction of his 
stance. The contradiction, and the problem, was instead crystal clear to the Khan 
of Mamdot who had already broken away from the Muslim League to found his 
own Jinnah Muslim League in 1950. To all those who call account for his 
withdrawal, Mamdot could not help but attack Daultana’s party for its failure to 
handle properly the resettlement of refugees, the institutional misunderstanding 
of the rigid borders between state and government responsibilities and, finally, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Analysis of Communist Propaganda in Pakistan in 1951, 25th February 1952, NND 842430, 
NARA.  
50 Pakistan Times (Lahore), 10th August 1950.  
51 Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 18th January 1951. 
!! 185 
for allowing Cabinet Minsters to become office-holders within its lines.52 The 
Muslim League, he thundered when turning a blind eye to his personal rivalry 
and skirmishes with the ambitious Daultana, “not only forgot to implement the 
promises made by the Quaid-i-Azam to the people, they have also failed to stand 
by the future program he laid before us. […] To end unemployment and poverty 
and to guarantee education and health is the guiding principle and duty of a good 
government. The League Government has failed to perform this duty”.53 
Indeed, no one but Mamdot, Chief Minister of the Pakistani Punjab between 
1947 and 1949, knew the state of affairs of refugee rehabilitation policies 
through and through. Furthermore, no one but him, whose Ministry had tottered 
from one refugee protest to another and, according to an infuriated Jinnah, had 
showed no interest in their fate, was fully aware of the potential and the strength 
of refugees as a political and electoral basis.54 Nevertheless, concern and 
curiosity about Mamdot’s new party haunted mostly foreign observers. Cunning 
worldly-wise politician with a troubled relationship with Mamdot behind him, 
Liaquat Ali Khan immediately numbered the Jinnah Muslim League among the 
“mushroom parties” that sprung up almost overnight across the whole Punjab.55 
Its chances of future success and its power to steal supporters from its contestants 
depended heavily upon its ability to act as a sui generis ‘charitable institution’. In 
other words, through the intercession of its own charismatic leader, the party 
should have been able to redistribute benefits and resources – especially limited !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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ones – among its constituents.56 By opting out of the Muslim League and, 
consequently, de facto alienating all government support, Mamdot reduced his 
room of manoeuvre to the lowest terms.  Hopes of milking the state and 
bureaucratic apparata any further clung to a mere possibility. It was no surprise 
then that, despite Mamdot being their long-standing representative, almost all 
influential Punjabi zamindars did not follow him out of the League to support his 
new political venture.57 As it allowed them access to government ears and to 
shape official land policies, the Muslim League umbrella was perceived to be a 
far safer shelter for their assets.  
Local landlords decided then to carry on and fight their own good fight within 
party ranks. They were not alone in their attempt to get the best out of the 
existing political situation by simply playing by the kind of rules that typically 
underpin highly personalised and patronage-based societies. Abdussar Khan 
Niazi, leader of a religious spin-off group called the Khilafat-e-Pakistan, turned 
his back on the Khan of Mamdot as soon as he saw which way the wind was 
blowing. As he slammed the door in the latter’s face, he made clear that “the 
League organisation should not [have been] allowed to play second fiddle to a 
lethargic Ministry which requires close vigilance by the parent organisations”.58 
Niazi’s attempts at ‘Islamising’ the local political and social arena were 
perceived to be more secure in the hands of those who could actually implement 
eventual reforms. The politics of the belly – a rhizome of personal networks and 
alliances that governs the allocation of resources through a combined mechanism 
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of self-ethnicisation of social groups and mutual benefits – rose to a well-
established way of administering party politics and dynamics.59 Mian 
Iftikharuddin had given the triangle of membership-party dynamics-state 
resources this new twist back in the early months of independence. Despite 
stepping down as West Punjab Minister of Refugees and Rehabilitation 
following a row with Mamdot over tenancy reforms, Iftikharuddin decided to 
remain within the League ranks where he could act as an annoying goad.60 With 
close communist connections, he brought his followers around to joining his 
internal leftist pressure group.61 This current, together with the Khilafat-e-
Pakistan, would remain a real thorn in the Muslim League’s side in the highly 
refugee-concentrated towns of Lahore and Lyallpur in the years to come.62 No 
matter how political and social actors translated and understood them, socialism 
and religious conservatism were by no means polar opponents in late 1940s and 
early 1950s Punjab.  
Husain Shaheed Suharwardy entered a packed YMCA room in Lahore on 29th 
June 1949. Members and guests of the West Punjab Union of Journalists were 
waiting for his speech.  Shortly after taking the floor, Suharwardy asked those 
present to switch their recorders off.63 No word of his speech had to get out. 
Nevertheless, a British officer from the local High Commission who had slipped 
into the venue managed to note down a summary of what he had to say. “He 
[Suharwardy] shocked his mixed audience by stating that whilst refugees !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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families were being compelled to sell their bodies of their womenfolk for bread, 
yet two such exalted statesmen as Zafrullah and Shahabuddin should announce 
that […] Pakistan had completely solved its refugee problem”, reported the 
functionary to his ambassador.64 The Bengali politician with all-Pakistan 
ambitions, who was just back from Sialkot where “the great industries of that 
city were now in decay and dissolution, the workers standing idly in the streets”, 
advocated “a vigorous solution of the refugee problem”.65 In his view “the 
present mixture of contempt, cynicism and indifference” could be tolerated no 
longer.66 Far from being a flash in the pan, Suharwardy challenged the prevailing 
position of the Muslim League within the Punjabi party system by exploiting the 
malcontent that was taking root in the refugee community. His dissension and 
bitter criticism of the policies of the party in power caused widespread 
embarrassment among the League associates, and earned him the title of 
champion of refugee grievances.67  
Rumour had it that, soon after the foundation of the Awami League in March 
1950, frenzy negotiations were underway between its leader and the almost all 
the splinter groups operating within the Muslim League.68 Iftikharuddin and 
Shaukat Hayat were fingered for potential natural allies. Yet Punjabi politics is 
rich in coups de théâtre. In January 1951, amidst general astonishment, 
Suharwardy announced that his Awami League had just merged with Mamdot’s 
Jinnah Muslim League to form the Jinnah Awami League.69  A strong penchant 
for socialism and populism married thus with the staunch conservative attitude of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Ibidem.  
65 Ibidem.  
66 Ibidem.  
67 Despatch No. 389/1504 – POL 15204/1949, 15th July 1949, DO 35/3178, NAKG.  
68 Extract OPDOM No. 22, 31st October 1950, DO 35/3178, NAKG.  
69 Political Handbook of the Lahore Consular District, n.d., NND 938750, NARA. 
!! 189 
the former Chief Minister of West Punjab. What bound together this odd couple? 
How could the standard-bearer of refugees’ claims ever act in concert with 
someone who was in the dock for the failure of his rehabilitation and 
resettlement policies? It was neither love at first sight nor an interesting case of 
opposites attracting. A small handbook on the post-1951 elections’ political 
dynamics of the Pakistani Punjab provides a much-needed solution to this 
enigma. Here we find the Jinnah Awami League described as the result of the 
merger of “Mamdot’s group […] of landed gentry and moderate religious 
leaders” [with] Suhrawardy’s […] combination of refugees, orthodox Muslims 
and disappointed Muslim Leaguers”.70 A quick spot-the-difference exercise 
reveals the foundations on which the alliance was based. The wind of another 
electoral campaign imbued with religious symbolisms was sweeping throughout 
the whole of Pakistani Punjab. No later than 17th July 1950 some 10,000 persons 
had rallied at the Delhi Gate in Lahore under the banner of the Jamaat-i-Islami, 
visibly flagging up the relevance of an Islamic agenda to the local community.71 
It was common knowledge that exploiting the refugee-local split as a way of 
gathering support would lead to an almost certain personal debacle. The 
reservation of seats made it somehow politically and electorally irrelevant. 
Refugees themselves appeared to have had their religious sensitivity further 
sharpened. Prominent welfare associations that were rooted in the local Islamic 
faith had been plugging many of the gaps present in the government schemes of 
resettlement. One of them – the Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam – had stepped up its 
efforts, and its orphanages and education institutions were working at full 
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stretch.72 Mamdot himself had handed over part of the activities of the refugee 
rehabilitation to the Jamaat-i-Islami and was now wooing again Maududi and his 
followers.73 The contribution of moderate religious leaders and orthodox 
Muslims, who were the benchmark of the new political party, was worth thus its 
weight in gold.  
As party hierarchies and balances of power revolved around the centre of 
gravity of personal or group interests and the redistribution of resources, all 
politicians were gearing themselves ready to fight the length and breadth of the 
whole Punjab.  
 
With friends like these:  checkmating political rivals 
 
His emissaries had done a really good job. As they announced to him that the Pir 
of Alipur had agreed to endorse his campaign, Muhammad Munir – candidate for 
the refugee seat in Sialkot X – could not hide his relief. The Pir of Alipur had 
played a vital role in the crucial 1946 elections. Head of one the most important 
and renowned revivalist shrines in the whole of the Punjab, he had devoted his 
energy to supporting and spreading the demands of the Muslim League.74 For 
Muhammad Munir having the Pir of Alipur on his side was thus a great 
privilege. He felt that he had victory in his grasp. A personalisation of both the 
political and campaign mechanisms that had been brought up to scratch during 
the Pakistan movement was taking place up and down the province. Existing 
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literature, however, has largely overlooked the dynamics and the fallouts of 1951 
elections.75 Vigorous criticism of its irregularities has overshadowed analysis of 
the various ways in which these elections and their related campaign made an 
impact on the frail structure of both a nation and a state in the making.  And 
while an attempt to plug the gap has been carried out by Sayyed Vali Reeza Nasr 
in his 1988 book on the history of the Jamaat-i-Islam in independent Pakistan76 
his analysis is restricted to the aim of his research. As it unfolds the events that 
led would-be members of the Punjab Assembly and voters to be on a mutually 
profitable footing with each other, this section will argue the relevance of 1951 
elections as a momentum that, even through the political ‘rehabilitation’ of 
refugees, shaped the local institutional arena as a stable and functional political 
system. As the electoral campaign stuck to the ongoing process of Islamisation of 
the local society, West Punjabi refugees, this section also contends, did not show 
that leftist political penchant that Prafullak Chakrabarti has attributed to their 
West Bengali counterparts.77 
If, in the earlier 1946 elections, pirs had channelled their support into the 
rooting of the Muslim League and of the idea of Pakistan among the rural 
masses, now they turned their hand to personally backing single candidates. The 
slogan that the Pir of Alipur, together with other local religious leaders, coined 
for Muhammad Munir was simple, straightforward and, in subtle ways, morally 
persuasive. Casting a vote for his protégé in 1951 would have saved anyone from 
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eternal damnation and the displeasure of God.78  In the constituency of Gujrat 
XII things did not change. Over there another key figure of the 1945-6 campaign 
decided to take the field once more. A naqshbandi with close connections with 
the Ahl-e-Sunnat-o-Jamaat Ulama and a devoted supporter of the Quaid-i-Azam, 
Pir Jamaat Ali Shah defected to the ‘enemy’ and joined the ranks of the Jinnah 
Awami League. Had not his followers supported its candidate Saee Muhammad, 
they would have incurred in both the divine and his own curse. In order to make 
his position further clearer, Pir Jamaat Ali Shah published a small leaflet to be 
distributed among all his murids. Its title – Ilahi Wajib ul-Azadi (On the Divine 
Duty of Freedom) – spelt its contents. A vote for Mamdot and Suharwardy’s 
candidate was described here as a “true service to the cause of Islam”.79 With a 
couple of different ingredients, the same receipt was tested even among Jhang III 
constituents. A tiny Shi’a majority village not far from Athara Hazari hosted a 
three-day meeting that was organised under the auspices of the Majlis-i-Izzar.80 
As widely expected, voters were asked to have God and imams’ feelings at heart. 
Voting for Abid Hussain Shah would have certainly tipped the balance of the 
Divine Justice in favour of the salvation of their souls. 
  In a context where politics was not a matter for weaklings, the exploitation 
of religious symbols along personal lines all too easily became a two-edged 
sword that could open new wounds on the sensitive body of a nation in the 
making. Muhammad Arif Khan from the constituency of Jhang-I knew a thing or 
two about the dangerous dynamics that were inflaming the whole of the Punjab. 
Pir Khawja Allah Bakhsh of Shujabad, Pir Qasim Ali Shah of Farid Mahmood !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Kahtia and a few maulvis lent a helping hand to Mian Faiz Muhammad, and 
started touring the villages of the constituency to support his candidacy. 
Reportedly, slogans that branded Shias as kafirs and enemies of Islam and Sunnis 
informed the bulk of their campaign in favour of their chosen nominee.81 Islamic 
cosmogonies had previously edged 1945-6 electoral campaign as a result of the 
activity of local pirs and sajjada nashins, who, as David Gilmartin points out, 
had anticipated the future identity of Pakistan by first understanding and then 
spreading the idea of a religious and Sharia-based state.82 In point of fact, 
religious leaders such as Pir Bakhsh or Ali Shah not only hinted at the dilemmas 
that would troubled Pakistan history in future years, but they also instilled a 
specific everyday idea of belonging to both the local and national community. 
The perilous syllogism that this twist entailed cannot be ignored. In 1945-6 
political and rurally religious rhetoric, a vote for the Muslim League and the 
Pakistan demand had embodied the quintessence of Punjabi Muslim-ness. The 
kafirs had been all those who had not followed this set ‘theological’ pattern.83 
Similar trends and ideas had re-surfaced in the local countryside soon after 
independence. “The community [Indian Christians]” – recorded a journalist from 
The Times (London) in late January 1948 – “[…] is being persecuted and 
maltreated by those who believe that Pakistan should be completely Islamic and 
by rabid nationalists who associate the Christians with the British […] and 
contend that Christians should not be allowed to remain in Pakistan”.84 Certain 
pockets of late 1940s and early 1950s Punjab accordingly experienced a further !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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radicalisation of that peculiar deviation that re-framed political and religious 
identities and dynamics along sectarian lines.  
Apparently, even the colours that the Electoral Commission now picked to 
identify every single party and the boxes in which their ballots would eventually 
be cast were bent to serve a very similar purpose. “The yellow colour […] seems 
to have been deliberately assigned to us, as it enabled the Muslim Leaguers to 
vilify our candidates and to indentify them with Sikhs and anti-Pakistanis. This 
propaganda has some effect on ignorant villagers”, complained Suhrawardy in a 
memorandum to US authorities.85 Through the demarcation of a border that 
separated insiders from outsiders in relation to cultural differentia based on 
religion, this process of re-elaboration of the self proceeded inevitably to an early 
ethnicisation of social relations within the newly-created national community.86  
On a completely different level, the tendency to personalise an electoral 
campaign set the scene for a further strengthening of voter-representative bonds 
and for a stabilisation of the whole provincial political system. Trust, reputation 
and knowledge of the counterpart were the values that underpinned the intricate 
network of all personal relationships within local society.87 On the eve of an 
election that would be conducted on the new and wider basis of the adult 
suffrage, pirs and sajjada nashins crowned those principles as a way of 
administering electoral ‘transactions’. The jockeying for political power on the 
one hand and limited material resources on the other enthroned them as 
mediators and reliable guarantors of any interaction between a candidate and its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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constituents within the new institutional frame of a state-in-the-making. The 
machineries that had safeguarded the British colonial system of political control 
could be seen to be in motion once again. As in times past, religious leaders 
channelled political change by providing the means that were necessary to the 
local society to learn to live with it.88  The body politics was thus playing by the 
same, well-known and reassuring rules that had informed the everyday life of 
persons and groups of individuals under the wing of colonial rule. Terms, 
conditions and eventual rewards were clear and familiar to anyone. One Saeed, 
refugee from Jullundhur, might have been a devotee of the Pir of Alipur but was 
probably a perfect stranger to Muhammad Munir. In turn, Munir might have just 
represented an anonymous picture on the glossy billboards that our Ahmed 
noticed across his suburb in the constituency of Sialkot X. The wheel was 
destined to turn full circle thanks to the intercession of the Alipur pir, who, by 
repairing the fabric of biraderi that Partition events had torn apart, would have 
been the point of intersection between Saeed and Muhammad’s personal and 
public lives.  
The whole system was not, of course, free from flaws and imperfections. As a 
consequence, candidates in these provincial elections deployed a wide range of 
remedies to counteract all the possible threats that loomed over their 
appointment. On the day of the poll, private transport companies or simple vans’ 
owners did a roaring trade. With their prices revised upwards, both professional 
and makeshift drivers roamed around local constituencies to give a lift to the 
nearer polling station to those persons who were present on the lists with which 
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politicians had previously supplied them.89 Surprisingly, however, the form of 
the ballot paper and voting procedures proved to be the real aces up the 
candidates’ sleeves. The counterfoil of every ballot paper quoted the 
constituency, the number of the polling station and the number of the elector or 
the elector roll with the particulars indicating the electoral roll or the part of the 
electoral roll in which the number was entered.90 If the vote was supposed to be 
confidential, then these details turned it into an open secret.  Secrecy was further 
violated when, by sticking to the regulations printed on the outer foil, voters 
casted their “ballot paper in the ballot box of the colour allotted to the candidate 
for whom […] [they wished] to vote”.91 As troops of party agents and workers 
literally garrisoned the entire network of West Punjab polling stations, no one 
could afford to welsh on a promise.92 Electoral laws put an official seal on the 
rise of those socially well-rooted and favoured-based dynamics of mutual 
interdependency to the ways of administering politics and the relationship 
between representatives and voters. This expedient allowed potential members of 
the Punjab Assembly to keep a very tight rein on the patronage mechanisms of 
punishments/rewards at precisely the time when the introduction of the adult 
suffrage and the arrival of millions of refugees were asking for a re-negotiation 
of hierarchies and balances of power.93 The high costs of those activities that 
would have aimed at curbing all kinds of opportunistic behaviour were kept to a 
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minimum, and candidates could afford the luxury of scrutinising the behaviour of 
each and every individual.  
Extrajudicial solutions were sought and implemented on several occasions 
across the whole region both during the campaign and on the Election Day. 
Candidates easily bypassed legal requirements, frequently asserting the 
supremacy of a play-it-dirty politics over a bungling bureaucracy. “How do you 
get an elephant into a voting booth? Register him!”, urged a poster that was 
commissioned by the US Democratic Party.94 But in early 1950s Punjab 
registering a voter was easier said than done. The labyrinthine swarm of rules 
and regulation that governed the inclusion of individuals in the local electoral 
rolls produced very hastily prepared records. In Ward No. 9, Gujranwala, for 
instance, all the 22,000 persons who were entitled to vote were listed in 
alphabetical order but no clear information was provided with regards to their 
residence.95  Proper identification of voters was thus almost impossible.  
Unfamiliar to local people and to each other and unable to prove their identity 
through proper evidence, refugees not surprisingly represented the weakest link 
on the chain and a much-exploited loophole for cunning politicians.96 As they 
arrived at their local polling stations, many voters found that their names had 
been left out of the rolls or witnessed psychic phenomena such as those of dead 
men walking and, even more important, voting.97 Someone else was allowed to 
vote well after the time limit or by, contrast, they discovered that unknowns had 
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cast their vote on their behalf.98 In this fight to the death, some members and 
supporters of the opposition parties were illegally detained and women brutally 
intimidated.99  
The day of the declaration in early April 1951 of the poll promised anger, 
relief, smiles and a few surprises. When the whistle for full time was blown, the 
Muslim League was leading by 143 seats to 54.100 By late July 1951 the curious 
political phenomenon of shifting alliances in order to suit personal needs had 
taken a heavy toll among the ranks of the Opposition parties, and resulted in a 
swelling of the Muslim League membership within the Assembly by 23 seats.101  
No one however escaped his own fate or the future that he had carefully made for 
himself.  Pirs and sajjada nashins hit the bull’s eye once more. Muhammad 
Munir, Abid Hussain Shah and Saee Muhammad won easy victories over their 
contestants.102 For their part, even biraderi did not fail to live up to the 
expectations of all those voters whose family networks and alliances had 
survived the fury of the Partition and the resettlement policies. Indeed, Abdul 
Hamid Khan, Sajjad Ali Khan, Zafar Hussain, Abdul Aziz and Altaf Mohy ud-
Din would proudly crossed the threshold of the building designed by Bazel M. 
Salune and take oath as members of the Punjab Assembly.103 Ejected in early 
1951 from the Muslim League and thus deprived of the protection that the party 
granted its members and the followers of its members, Iftikharuddin and his new 
Azad Pakistan Party grabbed a single seat and an unsatisfying 2.4% of the total 
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votes cast.104 Nevertheless refugees had unquestionably reshuffled the pack and 
altered the composition of the Assembly. At least 11 out of the 21 members who 
had benefited from the transfer of seats back in 1947 had either renounced the 
opportunity to run a campaign or lost their seats.105 Similarly, the refugee-
saturated cities of Lahore, Lyallpur, Jhang, Rawalpindi and Sialkot demanded a 
substantial re-graduation of the lenses through which hierarchies and balances 
were observed in both ‘normal’ and reserved-seats.106  
A revamped provincial Assembly was thus undoubtedly a gamble with both 
the future and the past in terms of the fulfilment of electoral promises and 
members’ need to come to terms with their new role and responsibilities as state 
actors. Settlings of scores and blood feuds would steep Punjabi party politics and 
the region in blood. It was all about letting things take their course.  
 
The after-match party of the 1951 elections 
 
In late 1952 the malaise of two zamindars and prominent members of the Punjab 
Assembly, Syed Naubahar Shah and Nasrullah Khan, reminded parliamentarians 
and fellow Muslim League associates of previous agreements and 
undertakings.107 The Punjab Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1952 and the ongoing 
party debate on a possible reform of the tenant-landlord relationship were bitter 
bills to swallow. A vociferous campaign marked by vicious declarations and by 
the retaliatory decision to withdrawn wheat from local markets and smuggle it to 
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India was gaining momentum and meeting general approval among Punjabi 
landlords and Muslim Leaguers. Reportedly at least 30 party members were 
ready to join the ranks of these two dissident zamindars and erect barricades in 
order to protect their interests from any further attempt to reform the primary 
sector.108 When Syed Naubahar Shah threatened to resign, Daultana caught him 
on the wrong foot and ordered his and Nasrullah Khan’s expulsion from the 
Muslim League. It was one of those cases when someone is used as a 
mouthpiece. Syed Naubahar Shah and Nasrullah Khan’s isolation from the party 
was tantamount to a marginalisation from the political nerve centre and to a 
debarment from their ‘right’ to milk the state apparata and effectively mould 
government policies. Apparently all the other landlords and members of the 
Punjab Assembly received Daultana loud and clear. Indeed the revolt was put 
down and, as an officer to the British High Commission (Lahore) reported, “held 
in check at least for the time being”.109   
 But both Syed Naubahar Shah and Nasrullah Khan signed their own political 
death warrants. Their flirtatious attempts to climb onto the bandwagon of the 
Jinnah Awami League ran into the buffers of Suharwardy’s resolute 
disapproval.110 The skyrocketing prices of atta and other food grains were 
lending weight and quality to the political platforms of all the Opposition parties. 
In February 1952 the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Azad Pakistan Party and the 
Communist Party combined their efforts with the Islam League in the 
organisation of a march in protest at government inability to tackle the 
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emergency.111 An 8,000-strong attendance spotlighted the potential of the issue 
in terms of both electoral and party successes.112 The sabotage of the Punjabi 
markets that had been concocted by the two ejected zamindars partially 
contributed to the price rise and epitomised the extent of outright resistance to 
any eventual agrarian reform.  Consequently, the Opposition’s leaders were not 
willing to lose popular support by taking Syed Naubahar Shah and Nasrullah 
Khan on board.113 Despite the intrinsic weaknesses of his party, Suharwardy’s 
sun appeared not to be about to set. Sir Khizr Hayat Tiwana, whose surname 
spelt decades of Punjabi political history, recorded that the year 1952 ended with 
authority of the leader of the Jinnah Awami League rapidly growing.114  
Sometimes even the most experienced politicians can make a mistake. From 
the very beginning, the Pakistani press showed a certain knack of gossiping and 
plotting conspiracies. Rumours now circulated that the strains within the 
coalition between Khan of Mamdot and the Bengali politician were shaking the 
Punjab branch of the Jinnah Awami League to its roots.115 It was no secret that 
the appointment of Suharwardy to the Cabinet would have calmed his polemic 
against the Government down.116 The cracks that were damaging the architrave 
of the alliance started to appear in the public domain in April 1953 and set the 
tone for those speculations that would pack newspapers in the following days. 
The Khan of Mamdot rebuffed his nomination as a member of the party Working 
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Committee, sending his political companion in arms into a rage.117 A couple of 
interesting pieces of news and a fresh proposal coming from the Punjab Muslim 
League headquarters were the straws that eventually broke the camel’s back. 
Under the pressure of the devastating events and fallout of the 1953 anti-
Ahmadiyya riots118, Daultana stepped down as both Chief Minister and President 
of the Punjab Muslim League. Firoz Khan Noon was called to the high offices of 
both the party and institutional seats and immediately sketched out his course of 
action. The standout point of his political platform encapsulated the introduction 
of a method of allotment of evacuee agricultural lands that stuck to the equal 
shares of the properties that refugee landlords had left behind in India.119 
Suharwardy vehemently rejected the proposal as, in his own words, it “was done 
at the expenses of the poorer refugees”.120 He then went too far and urged a 
nationalisation of all landed property. Unsurprisingly, the statement brought the 
situation within the Jinnah Awami League’s ranks to breaking point. Mamdot, 
who felt very exposed, stormed out slamming the party’s door behind him. Yet, 
in the early years of Pakistan’s history, political love affairs rarely lasted for a 
long time and old flames were rekindled quite frequently. In November 1953 
Mamdot made his triumphal return to the Muslim League. A convention of the 
Punjab Jinnah League, which was back in the land of militant politics after two 
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years of inactivity, voted for the amalgamation of the party with the Muslim 
League and allowed its 17 members of the Punjab Assembly to cross the floor.121  
Politically speaking, Suharwardy had become a marked man. In September 
1953 a few notable Punjabi political leaders declared that the distinction between 
‘locals’ and ‘refugees’ had become meaningless by then.122 All those black flags 
that welcomed the leader of the Jinnah Awami League to Lahore on 1st May 
1954 brought his political experience within the local area to an end and forecast 
the continuing marginalisation of refugees’ claims and needs from mainstream 
party debates.123 
 
***** 
 
The present chapter has argued that the early years of Pakistan’s political and 
parliamentary history were not an ‘abject failure’.124 If considered and analysed 
as a closed-unit system, the region of Punjab was mired in dynamics that 
progressively stabilised the political and institutional arena. The mutual interplay 
of party dynamics, electoral rules and local socio-anthropological features 
produced the ‘antibodies’ that protected the body politics from the germs of 
instability and unruliness. Indeed, the resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees 
on the lands of West Punjab proves to be the most suitable prism through which 
this phenomenon can be carefully observed. 
As both institutional actors and civil society reflected upon the representation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of Partition refugees within the Punjab Assembly, politicians and bureaucratic 
cadres played up their mutual interdependency. The dislocation that had resulted 
from the migration of millions of persons and the scramble for limited public 
resources prompted politics and bureaucracy to increase their reliance on 
patronage values and personal ties. Playing by the rules of politics thus meant 
playing by the rules of the local society. Traditional religious figures such as pirs 
and sajjada nashins added the icing on the cake by channelling political change 
and helping to provide a viable political platform. Still, was this enough to create 
a nation and instil a sense of belonging to it? 
!! 205 
Chapter 5 
 
 
Self-portraits in spherical mirrors: Partition 
refugees and the elaboration of the ‘basic (dis)order’ of Pakistan 
 
“The new constitution […] the new constitution.” But no one understood what 
he was referring to. “What are you shouting about? […] What new laws and 
rights are you shouting about? […] The new laws are the same old ones.” 
(S. H. Manto, The New Constitution)  
 
Challenging the widely-accepted assumption of a smooth and homogenous 
resettlement of West Punjabi refugees offers new insights into both the federal 
and regional elaboration of a foreign and domestic policy agenda during 
Pakistan’s early years. As talks on the new Constitution plodded on into the 
1950s, the everyday interaction between institutions and State authorities within 
Pakistan and across the border with India took the centre-stage by in practice 
replacing the Constituent Assembly. The early, cloudy, engagement of local 
authorities with wider debates over the role of institutions, foreign policy and the 
consolidation of a national community frequently softened the resilience of the 
particular socio-anthropological structures that underpinned local politics and its 
electoral dynamics.  Pakistan’s obsessions, self-perceived weaknesses and 
bungled attempts to dovetail its multiple and composite identities thus 
reverberated through the day-to-day management of the persisting humanitarian 
crisis that was Partition and its aftermath.  
Indeed, rehabilitation and resettlement practices almost immediately became 
sucked into the competing narratives on Pakistan’s polity and ‘ship’ of state. 
Hence this chapter’s first section explores the ways in which the need to 
accommodate millions of destitute persons mingled with a quest to re-define the 
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system of government, the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and 
freedom of the press. It sheds light on what shaped the underlying basic norms 
and order – perhaps even the only ones that have survived coups d’état and 
revisions – that informed the drafting of the Constitution of Pakistan.1 
Contrary to popular belief, their dispute over Kashmir did not provide the 
tinder for the early, and enduring, rivalry that emerged between India and 
Pakistan. It was refugees, their places of origin and/or status, that first set the 
pace for the troubled future of South Asian stability. This chapter’s second 
section accordingly focuses on the diplomacy of the unspoken subtleties that 
anthropologically and intimately balked any hope for a peaceful settlement of the 
controversies that divided the two newly-created independent States. The 
‘Manichean’ distinction between migrants from agreed and non-agreed areas and 
the mapping of evacuee properties operate here as the prism through which 
Pakistan’s paranoia and troubled relationship with India during this period can be 
revealed. 
In addition, the idea of Pakistan, itself a peculiar refugee, had from the outset 
to compete with the resistance of pre-existing local identities and provincial 
feuds. As the burgeoning numbers of refugees spilled over and were relocated to 
neighbouring regions, the federal authorities had to rule with an iron rod in order 
to try to instil a stronger feeling of belonging to a wider national community 
among both ordinary citizens and the country’s various provincial authorities. 
This chapter’s final section thus investigates how far the will to harmonise all the 
different sections of local society informed the coercive transfer of hundreds of 
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1 On this idea and the definition of basic norm (Grundnorm) see H. Kelsen, Verteidingung der 
Demokratie: Abhandlungen zur Demokratietheorie, Tübingen, 2006; H. Kelsen, Reine 
Rechtslehre. Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik, Tübingen, 2008. 
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thousands of refugees to Sindh and the introduction of the One-Unit 
arrangements in 1955. 
 
All that glitters is not gold: refugees, resettlement policies and the challenge 
of creating an everyday state 
 
The office was tiny and slightly claustrophobic. Heaped up everywhere, stacks of 
paper sent out a clearly perceivable smell of must. A civil servant took his eyes 
off the newspaper. “Speak of the devil, and he is bound to appear”, he mumbled. 
It was a day of informal meetings at the Punjab Assembly. A Minister had just 
entered the room to collect a copy of those documents he needed. As he sneaked 
a look at the newspaper, the member of the provincial Cabinet understood 
immediately what the functionary who was in front of him thought. He too had 
read that day’s edition of Dawn (Karachi) while having breakfast. The first 
couple of lines had been enough to spoil his appetite and his day. Both the 
Pakistan and the Punjab provincial governments were there severely reprimanded 
for their inability to cope with the crisis that had arisen from the massive 
migration of millions of persons.2  
In those early post-Partition days, the refugee emergency was a stark but 
accurate reflection of the state of affairs that existed within the institutional nerve 
centres of West Punjab and the whole of Pakistan. The Dawn (Karachi) 
columnist who set down his thoughts and his firm rebuke in a vitriolic editorial 
touched a raw nerve. Government authorities were bungling any attempt at 
sharing the burden of rehabilitating the refugees. The difficulties of the state and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Letter of UKHC (Karachi) Archibald Carter, KUB, KCIE, Joint Permanent under Secretary of 
State, 29th December 1947, DO 142/440, NAKG.  
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the provincial authorities in facing up to the nation- and state-building processes 
have always been acknowledged for their ‘centripetal side effects’. “There is a 
deep-seated jealousy and an aberrant inferiority complex among many Pakistanis 
over Indian abilities and achievements”, pointed out a US attaché in a 1956 
memorandum.3 These feelings, coupled with the paranoid fear of an imminent 
fatal attack from India, informed what Ayesha Jalal has called the “Pakistan’s 
political economy of defence”, and paved the way for a number of studies on the 
military-imbued outward appearance of Pakistan’s institutional identity.4  
Nevertheless, acts and deeds on the part of both federal and provincial 
institutions showcased intrinsic inadequacies that were independent from 
Pakistan’s relations with India or the plots of the ‘high politics’, and which 
affected the ways authorities instilled an everyday sense of belonging or feeling 
of citizenship among all Pakistanis.  
This new slant on the institution-building processes of an everyday state lies 
at the heart of the present chapter. The fallout from the refugee humanitarian 
emergency in terms of shaping the ‘Establishment’ still remains unexplored by 
historians and other social scientists, despite its clear potential for shedding light 
on the nature of political and institutional developments in Pakistan during the 
post-Partition years. The perceived absence of a state, the almost morbid 
attachment to charismatic figures and the disorienting experience of the 
bureaucratic maze that marked the refugee experience will be revealed here 
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3 Office Memorandum, 10th October 1956, NND 897209, NARA. 
4 A. Jalal, The State of Martial Rule, The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence, 
Cambridge, 1990. Further examples of this historiographical trend include H. Haqqani, Pakistan. 
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Army and the Wars Within, Karachi, 2008; A. Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military 
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through an exploration of their potential for acting as proactive constituent parts 
of the everyday state of Pakistan.  
The tension between the Pakistan and the West Punjab Cabinets was palpable. 
No later than November 1947, three provincial Ministers crossed swords with the 
Government of Pakistan and threatened to resign. Indeed, the repeated 
interference by the Centre in the management and early resettlement of the 
refugees sent the latter into a rage.5 All things considered, it was the West Punjab 
government that was paying the bill – admittedly a huge one – for their 
rehabilitation. Projections left no room for doubt or speculation. By the end of 
March 1950, the West Punjab Exchequer would have to pay out more than Rs. 
80,000,000 for the maintenance and the early accommodation of Partition 
refugees.6 Unofficial reports claimed however that the figures might have been 
higher. Local districts did not keep any record of the financial sacrifices they 
were making to fund the rehabilitation of the migrant community.7 Ministers 
candidly admitted that they had lost count of the expenses they had incurred in 
the early months of independence.8 “The Government did everything they could 
regardless of cost […] using up [even] their food reserves”, revealed one of 
them.9  
Grants-in-aid and loans that were being released by central authorities were 
tiny drops in the bucket. Indeed, in March 1950, the Government of Pakistan set 
the bar for its funding at Rs. 30,750,000.10  The drastic fall in local revenues 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The Times (London), 11th November 1947. 
6 Partial Text of Statement by Dr. Mahmud Husain, Deputy Finance Minister, on the Status of 
Refugee Rehabilitation, n.d., NND 948832, NARA.  
7 Punjab Assembly Debates, 2nd March 1954, PCSL. 
8 A-2, 8th October 1947, NND 765024, NARA.  
9 Ibidem.  
10 Facts and Figures on Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation, 19th October 1950, NND 948832, 
NARA.  
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placed a further strain on those provincial public finances that would soon run up 
an astonishing Rs. 68,500,000 debt.11 The bad habit of embroiling problems and 
difficulties in an endless demarcation dispute was – and would be – difficult to 
eradicate. “You try to transfer your responsibility to the Centre and the Centre 
transfers the responsibility to you and you go on hoodwinking the people 
[refugees] from the start to finish”, C. E. Gibbon, member of the Punjab 
Assembly for the Pakistani Christian and Anglo-Pakistani III seat, threw in the 
teeth of the then Chief Minister Malik Firoz Khan Noon.12  Unsurprisingly, the 
whirl of mutual allegations and institutional skirmishes dragged down even the 
galaxy of those agencies that were being set up to smooth over difficulties and 
controversies.  
This was the case, for instance, of the Pakistan-Punjab Joint Refugee Council. 
Established in October 1947 with the declared aim of coordinating the 
rehabilitation policies, it soon turned into the umpteenth battlefield where the 
two contenders challenged each other to a duel.13 The institutional ‘memorandum 
of association’ of this joint authority did not bode well by having a considerable 
embryonic vice of form. Admittedly, it justified any eventual misuse of power on 
the part of the central authorities. Invested with the power of asking provincial 
officials to submit reports without previous authorisation from the provincial 
minister, the Joint Refugee Council attracted, rather unsurprisingly, the wrath of 
West Punjabi authorities.14  Ministers banged their fits on the table, and 
perceived institutional sin found their transgressors out. In late March 1948 Chief !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 The Times (London), 22nd October 1947 and Partial Text of the Statement by Dr. Mahmud 
Husain, Deputy Finance Minister, on the Status of Refugee Rehabilitation, n.d., NND 948832, 
NARA. 
12 Punjab Assembly Debates, 19th March 1954, PCSL. 
13 Pakistan Constituent Assembly, 20th March 1953, PCSL. 
14 Political Alignments in the West Punjab – Confidential No. 25, 28th November 1948, NND 
765024, NARA.  
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Minister of the Punjab the Khan of Mamdot pointed the finger at the Federal 
Minister for the Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Refugees Raja Ghazanfar Ali 
Khan, who was apparently guilty of taking action without previous consulting his 
provincial counterpart.15  As expected, broadsides over personal political 
rivalries and rumours of ‘palace conspiracies’ would foul the institutional debate 
and allow the matter as well as the problems to fester. In spite of the eventual 
release of soothing statements, the aggrieved would tie a knot in his handkerchief 
and come out with the new old story of jurisdictional limits at the earliest 
opportunity.16 This latter – actually the most solemn one – arose in 1956. Indeed, 
the Constitution that was promulgated that year finally ‘dotted the i’s’. The 
central authorities, namely the President of Pakistan, authoritatively reserved the 
right to give directions to and legislate on behalf of a province, should “the 
security or economic life of Pakistan or any part thereof, […] [be] threatened 
[…] by internal disturbances beyond the power of a Provincial Government to 
control”.17  
Ministers, authorities and members of both the Constituent and provincial 
assemblies staged a comedy of errors and manners that reverberated around the 
early attempts by the Pakistani state to instil a sense of institutional belonging 
among the refugees. “The [refugees] are now an essential and valued element in 
our life, and it must be our constant and sacred endeavour to heal from the soul 
the sting of the memory of unspeakable suffering, both of body and mind, which 
they have undergone”, made clear Daultana in February 1952 by recalling to the 
other members the Punjab Assembly the speech that he had delivered as Minister 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 IT to CRO – Opdom No. 25, 25th-31st March 1948, DO 142/438, NAKG.  
16 IT to CRO – Opdom No. 29, 8th-14th April 1948, DO 142/438, NAKG.   
17 Art. 129 Const., Constitution of Pakistan, 1956, PPL. 
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of Finance in the same room back in 1948.18  Now, in his capacity of Chief 
Minister, Daultana reaffirmed his commitment to the rehabilitation of refugees. 
As he pointed out in his somehow purple prose, “every year that has passed 
since, every year with its own history of sufferings heroically borne and of 
endeavours magnificently justified has confirmed […] [him] in the views and the 
hopes […] [he] then expressed”.19 The Government of Punjab’s pledges to put an 
end to refugees’ hardships certainly did not appear to be far-fetched and were 
reflected in the hundreds of channels through which funding flew into their 
pockets. Fee-waiver concessions and stipends for students or substantial rebates 
on rents and taxes aimed, for instance, at not leaving any refugee lagging 
behind.20 Under the shadow of Anarkali’s tomb, a committee of local officers 
arranged marriages for abducted women who were hosted in temporary 
structures.21 As provincial government employees and prominent politicians 
turned the rooms of the Punjab Civil Secretariat into an introduction agency, the 
well-known and legendary slave lady was getting her own peculiar revenge.    
The provincial scheme of protecting refugees’ rights to their welfare was, 
however, not all of a piece with the federal one. “The Government [of Pakistan] 
believes that the refugees should be able to stand on their own feet and not be 
dependent upon any system of dole whatever its shape may be”, hit back in 1953 
the then Federal Minister of Refugees and Rehabilitation Ishtiaq Husain 
Qureshi.22  Since the very early years of its independence, the Government of 
Pakistan had not been willing to back the dependency culture that the measures 
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18 Punjab Assembly Debates, 29th February 1952, PCSL. 
19 Ibidem.  
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21 Pakistan Times (Lahore), 10th December 1954. 
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of its provincial counterpart – although frequently unwittingly – stirred up. The 
Pakistan Refugee Rehabilitation Finance Corporation Ordinance Act was only 
one among the hundreds of laws that embodied the rationale behind the federal 
attempts at moulding refugees’ sense of belonging to a wider institutional 
community. Promulgated in 1948, it set up a fund to further the rehabilitation of 
all artisan refugees.23 Yet, as the British High Commissioner found out after a 
careful examination of the twists and turns of the act, the Corporation could not 
benefit those persons who had no capital to invest and were unable to offer 
proper financial credentials.24 Federal authorities thus goaded people to into 
breaking free of the chains of paternalistic approaches. They were probably 
related to Moni Mohsin’s fictional Aunty Pussy: “And As Aunty Pussy’s always 
said, ‘God helps those who help themselves’ …”.25 Nevertheless, federal 
officials did not set great store by those intrinsic weaknesses that dogged 
Pakistan and made their institutional projects overt the local society mere wishful 
thinking. Schools, medical and recreational facilities and houses – the building 
blocs of the socio-institutional architecture that the Government of Pakistan was 
trying to erect – proved in practice unable to handle day-to-day office routines, 
let alone sharing the burden of ambitious federal state- and nation-building 
processes.26  Litmus test of the federal government institutional efforts, the 
Refugee Rehabilitation Finance Corporation proved to be an utter failure. In 
January 1954, local refugees and societies had claimed less than one fourth of the 
whole Rs. 3-crore allocated fund.27  
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Scanty administrative personnel and the lack of a reliable and widespread 
network of both senior and junior officers added further fuel to the fire of the 
demarcation disputes that were inflaming the relationship between the Centre 
and the province of West Punjab. The resettlement of millions of refugees was, 
as a journalist from The Times (London) observed, a problem of “gigantic 
proportions […] which [was] completely beyond the capacity of the civil 
authorities to handle”.28  ‘Hastily improvised’ and ‘lacking in essential 
components’ were indeed the labels that foreign observers recurrently affixed to 
the federal and provincial governments.29 Both the executive and the legislative 
apparata were themselves well aware of the problem, and worked to remedy the 
situation by devolving pockets of power and authority to their sister State bodies 
as well as to civil society. Calling for the creation of a peculiar institutional 
solidarity fund in effect disguised an admission of state powerlessness. 
Unsurprisingly, the result was a total mess over responsibilities, competences 
and roles.  
In August 1947 local magistrates – deemed to be ‘special’ – handed over the 
control of the towns of West Punjab and the restoration of the law and order 
therein to the military.30 However, this latter, it seems, failed to honour its 
commitments. In fact, tribesmen and policemen compensated for the omissions 
of the army and ensured the security of common citizens.31 The hustle and bustle 
of the army, the local police and influential men overlapped with the activities of 
the brand new Home Guards, whose duties involved the protection of persons, 
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28 The Times (London), 25th August 1947. 
29 The Times (London), 26th February 1948.  
30 Telegram, 20th August 1947, NND 765024, NARA.  
31 The Times (London), 26th February 1948. 
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the security of properties and the public safety.32 Officers in uniforms looked 
after abducted women across the whole of the region. Army-run refugee 
temporary structures mushroomed and surpassed in efficiency those that were 
administered by the civilian authorities.33 This clutter of activities consequently 
diverted the attention of the Pakistan Army from those tasks that were naturally 
in keeping with its institutional vocation.  In late 1948 an undeclared war was 
indeed being fought along the border of the West Punjab. On the Indian side of 
the frontier, slit trenches, gun emplacements and troop movements added spice to 
life in neighbouring villages and towns.34 For all that, Pakistan experienced a 
“complete lack of any similar warlike measures” as even the stronghold of 
Lahore was believed to be “untenable in case of large scale attack from across 
the border”.35 Movements of troops ricocheted from one side of the frontier to 
the other and frequently exposed the weakness of Pakistan’s countervailing 
moves. In July 1951, for instance, Pakistan authorities detailed only a single 
infantry division and a couple of armoured brigades to counteract the Indian 
deployment of two infantry divisions, an armoured brigade and an armoured 
division along the roads leading to the Indian capital.36 Previously, on 17th 
September 1948, a handful of policemen had been left to patrol the village of 
Viamian in Lahore District and put up a six-hour fight with the Indian platoons 
that were stationed in Lulakot and Pulkanjiri.37  
  The Pakistan state was apparently waiving its claim to the monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence by deputing it to its private citizens. Chaudhri Mehtab 
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Khan, member of the West Pakistan Assembly for Lahore District, brought the 
issue to the fore during a Question and Answer session in late September 1957. It 
had recently come to his knowledge that those refugees who had been re-settled 
along the border areas of the former West Punjab had received “a sufficient 
quantity of arms for their defence”.38 The Chief Minister’s sheltering behind 
state secrecy was almost equal to an admission of guilt. “When a lady says no, 
she means perhaps. When she says perhaps, she means yes. But when she says 
yes, she is no lady”, warns a well-known quotation that is attributed to Otto von 
Bismarck. Pakistani political communication was not in reality that different 
from the cryptic messages of a flirtatious genteel woman, and local politicians 
did not certainly want to compromise their reputation.  
The everyday life of those citizens – mainly refugees – who lived along the 
West Punjab-side of the border and the incidents that occurred there on what 
seemed like a daily basis were banned talking points in almost all public debates. 
The experience of the border itself was at times surreal, alienating and 
disorienting for both federal and provincial authorities and the average Pakistani. 
Until January 1960 the partitioning line between Pakistan and India along the 
districts of Lahore and Montgomery was neither fully drawn nor mapped out 
yet.39  India and Pakistan would take a further year to implement the 1960 
agreement and finally exchange areas and, once again, new refugees. Monsoon 
floods frequently diverted the course of the rivers and re-charted the uncertain 
geography of Radcliffe Award.  In 1950, for instance, some people who had been 
resettled on the Pakistani borderland found themselves to be – almost overnight – 
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on the Indian-side of the river Sutlej.40 After all, as the moony protagonist of 
Tender Hooks would comment sixty years later in her funny broken English, 
even “in Defence Phase V, on the very hedge of Lahore, where all upstarters live 
[…] the army only started making into plots and selling [the land] to people five 
years ago. Before it was boarder [sic] with India”.41 
When asked to supply figures and information on the Indian incursions into 
their territory, Pakistan’s authorities usually hid behind professional 
confidentiality.42  The Chief Minister of West Pakistan Sardar Abdur Rasheed 
Khan was no exception to the rule. Nevertheless, the case and the dust that 
Chaudhri Mehtab Khan had raised did not risk failing through lack of proof. 
Smuggling and activities “prejudicial to the economy and security of Pakistan” 
appeared to have become the favourite pastime and, in many cases, a proper job 
for many refugees that had been resettled near the border defence zone.43 Back in 
1951 the Government of West Punjab had backed the creation of the so-called 
Qaum Razakars.44 In fact, these voluntary groups were given the task of tackling 
rising crime and instilling a sense of discipline by means of the 
institutionalisation of a number of spontaneous associations that had previously 
cropped up across the region in defence of the country. For all the government’s 
efforts to make the border into an impermeable membrane, fluidity and porosity 
ate away at the film that was meant to protect Pakistan from any incursion and 
illegal activity.45 In March 1959, federal authorities blackmailed local residents 
to curb all the activities and transactions of the black market. Persisting in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Memorandum No. 1661-56/1403-R (P), 17th April 1956, PCSL.  
41 M. Mohsin, Tender, op. cit., p. 107. 
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45 West Punjab Gazette, 22nd October 1947, UPL. 
!! 218 
staying behind their peculiar deals would have cost runners their immovable 
properties and earn them the not particularly enviable status of ‘undesirable 
persons’.46        
However, the perceived feeling of inadequacy on the part of the authorities 
did not stop at the threshold of a consequent militarisation of the everyday or the 
delegation of part of its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence to private 
citizens and paramilitary associations. In August 1948 the Government of West 
Punjab fell back on the Punjab Public Safety Act to rein in the local press and 
curb criticism and dissenting voices.47 This would then become an essential 
feature of the early years of Pakistan’s history. Indeed, just twelve months later, 
its renewal met with total indifference and surprisingly tame acquiescence.48 The 
list of censored publications seemed endless. Apparently, it encompassed even 
the private correspondence of all the ordinary citizens of West Punjab.49 In 1956 
a US attaché took the trouble to make a list of the directly and indirectly 
government-controlled publications. These latter were meticulously recorded, he 
claimed, “in descending order of control”.50 Radio, textbooks, imported films 
and literature, Pakistani films, the local English and vernacular press and 
religious publications were all carefully scrutinised and eventually blacklisted. 
For instance, Pakistan Men Mazdoor Tahreek (History of Workers in Pakistan), 
Yeh Azadi (This Freedom), Inquilab-i-Chin Zindabad (Long Live the Revolution 
of Chiang [Kai-Shek]) did not find favour with censors, as according to the 
formula, they tended “to incite disaffection towards the Government established !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 West Pakistan Martial Law No.9, dealing with the Properties in and Residents of the Indo-
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by law in Pakistan”.51  Similar actions had previously been taken against the 
Urdu literary periodicals Savera (Dawn), Nagoosh (Evening) and Adab-e-Latif 
(Man and his Works).52 These pamphlets and magazines were probably not chef-
d’oeuvres of political literature or critical journalism. Yet they were functional to 
the development of a well-informed public opinion, a proper political opposition 
and a balanced party system.  
While newspapers and journalists were not powerful enough to tell people 
what to think, yet they still drew up lists of topics to be discussed and help 
common citizens to gain their own insight into the surrounding socio-political 
environment.53 As a consequence, vetoes and political complicities did 
jeopardise the process of forming an opinion on events. In early 1949, rumours 
spread that the popular and influential Nawa-i-Waqt owed the Khan of Mamdot a 
debt of gratitude. Apparently, through the intercession of the former Chief 
Minister, the Urdu daily had had been allotted a new and modern evacuee Press 
and its editor could enjoy some plots of agricultural land.54 The result was, 
needless to say, a plunge in credibility among its readership. Censorship and the 
somehow ‘intimate’ ties between the press and political authorities reduced many 
debates on politics and government policies to silence. Newspapers and local 
radios thus failed in their duty to inform and even suggest competitive 
interpretation of events.55 Citizens – no matter whether well-off and educated or 
not – were unable to fully face the complexities of the socio-political realty and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 West Punjab Gazette, 1st January 1949, UPL, West Punjab Gazette – Extraordinary Issue, 23rd 
August 1950, UPL and West Punjab Gazette –Extraordinary Issue, 29th August 1950, UPL. 
52 A-18, 3rd September 1948, NND 765024, NARA. 
53 E. F Shaw, “Agenda-Setting and Mass Communication”, Gazette – International Journal for 
Mass Communication Studies, 25, 2, p. 96; D. Roberts, “Nature of Communication Effects”, in 
D. Roberts and W. Schramm (eds.), The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, Urbana, 
1972, p. 371.  
54 A-9, 8th February 1949 NND 765024, NARA.  
55 H. D. Lasswell, “The Structure and Function of Communication in Society”, in L. Bryson 
(ed.), The Communication of Ideas, New York, 1948, pp. 37-51. 
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therefore strengthen their relationship with their community to which they 
belonged.56  
A powerful weapon in the hands of the Muslim League, the Public Safety Act 
was frequently exploited to outstrip eventual rivals.57 In turn, the fallouts on the 
electorate were devastating. In the words of Hussain Suhrawardy, it 
“suppress[ed] the organisation of [the local] public opinion”.58  In early 
November 1954, during a press conference with serving foreign correspondents 
in Pakistan, General Iskander Mizra himself candidly admitted that “the masses 
[…] [were] overwhelmingly illiterate [and] not interested in politics”.59 Trained 
at the ‘political academy’ of the British raj, Pakistanis had not lost their strong 
penchant for accepting prohibitions for all kind of demonstrations.60 Indeed, in 
1949, a very strict implementation of Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code banned processions and all kind of public meetings across the whole of 
West Punjab.61 The promises that the transition from subjects to citizens implied 
proved quite difficult to fulfil. In the long run, it is always better to own up to our 
own mistakes. No sooner said than done. The ‘betrayal’ was put down on paper 
in 1956 Constitution and later absorbed by the 1962 one as well. The right to 
freedom of speech, expression and association was therein subject to “any 
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restriction imposed by law in the interest of the security of Pakistan, […] public 
order, decency or morality”.62   
 The late 1940s and early 1950s witnessed a curious proliferation of 
committees, sub-committees and advisory boards that specifically dealt with the 
resettlement and rehabilitation of Partition refugees. Keeping an exact count of 
all of them was almost impossible. One of the last-ditch attempts to break the 
back of the continuing emergency was made in early 1953. On 20th February the 
provincial Punjab Cabinet constituted the Rehabilitation Consultative Committee 
for the purpose – it was stated – of “advising the Government in matters relating 
to the resettlement of refugees on land under the Rehabilitation Settlement 
Scheme”.63 The members of the Rehabilitation Advisory Board gave a nervous 
and surprised start and thought about pleading the crime of lese-majesty. Their 
board had been set up in 1951 when it had been similarly tasked with advising 
government authorities on “the existing policy and procedure for the allotment of 
agricultural lands to refugees and […] [eventual] modifications as may bring 
about an expeditious and satisfactory settlement of refugees”.64 The Central 
Rehabilitation Advisory Committee equally turned up its nose at the news. So 
too did its provincial branch that had been operating since 12th January 1951 and 
was supposed to advise the Government of Punjab “on matter relating to [the] 
refugees rehabilitation”.65 This newly-established Rehabilitation Consultative 
Committee was the umpteenth body with whom refugees and bureaucrats had to 
interact. The Head of the Central Committee could not help but think that his 
daughter’s wedding was less crowded than any other meeting with the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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administrative paraphernalia that had been deputed to the resettlement of the 
migrant community.  
Rather to everyone’s sympathy, local people frequently complained about 
both the central and provincial governments’ mediocrity.66 Levels of tax 
compliance mirrored and measured the success of the Pakistani administration in 
instilling a sense of belonging to a wider community among its citizens. In the 
early spring of 1953, the annual renewal of the Muhajir Fund Cess Bill loomed 
large on the agenda of the Punjab Assembly. Established in 1948, a 2 anna/Rs. 
tax was levied on all the lands of West Punjab to support the rehabilitation and 
the resettlement of Partition refugees.67  Five years later, C. E. Gibbon flew into 
a fury at the Minister for Education Sardar Abdul Hamid Khan Dasti who was in 
charge of introducing extensions to the terms of the West Punjab Fund Cess Act, 
1948 to the provincial Assembly. “The Muslim League at the Centre and in the 
provinces […] have made the life of every respectable, God-fearing and law 
abiding citizen, intolerable”, burst out the elected representative from the 
constituency Pakistani Christian and Anglo Pakistani III.68 The solution that he 
put forward was quite radical. In his view, the existing food crisis on one hand, 
and the recurrent heavy taxation on certain section of the society on the other, 
provided enough ground for what he called the “imperative necessity” of a 
revolution.69 Gibbon’s tax moral epitomised the widespread notion of a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 The Times (London), 26th February 1948.  
67 West Punjab Gazette – Extraordinary Issue, 26th January 1948, UPL and Punjab Gazette, 22nd 
February 1952, UPL. 
68 Punjab Assembly Debates, 31st March 1953, PCSL.  
69 Ibidem.  
!! 223 
mistrusted authority that was blundering in its attempt to integrate people’s 
preferences into its own political system.70 
Allegations of inefficiency coupled with, in particular, the clear perception of 
a total absence of proper federal executive and legislative bodies.71 A lethal 
combination of unelected officials lacking in a proper electoral basis, initial 
scanty economic resources, and confusion over roles and responsibilities made 
almost all federal institutions impermeable to those patronage and paternalistic 
dynamics that were instead gaining ground at the provincial level. The glaring 
inconsistencies of the central government ushered in then an almost morbid 
popular attachment to charismatic political figures.72 It was a textbook case, Max 
Weber would argue. The 1935 Government of India Act  - in effect the first 
provisional constitution of Pakistan – was written and then promulgated to suit 
the needs of the colonial political architecture.73 When Pakistan emerged as an 
independent state, the whole fabric of previously-established hierarchies, spheres 
of authority and systems of formal rules frayed and started to live up to very 
different institutional and personal expectations. Clear echoes of the absolute 
need for a re-alignment of the equipoise of powers were to be found in the 
resettlement and rehabilitation of the migrant community. Ahmad E. H. Jaffer, 
eminent refugee from Poona and member of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, 
pointed this out in mid-March 1953. “The refugees from India who are here and 
who have left properties at the other end are not asking for any charity or dole 
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from Government”, he proudly opined during an animated discussion with the 
Federal Minister for Refugees and Rehabilitation.74 By claiming his as well as 
other refugees’ right to be treated not only as displaced persons but also as 
citizens, Jaffer called the Pakistani authorities to order and urged them to face up 
their responsibilities as representatives of an independent state. 
 The process of transition from a colony of the British Empire to a sovereign 
country thus created an administrative, political and relational vacuum wherein 
the seeds of charismatic dynamics could easily germinate.75 Pakistani 
charismatic leaderships conformed, of course, to the local idea of eminence. In 
turn, this latter flowed from a person’s ability to be the first among his equals 
and make ‘things’ happen for his followers.76 Muhammad Ali Jinnah was the 
first proceed with the formalisation of charisma as a constitutional and 
constituting component of Pakistan’s new institutions. All the voluntary 
organisations and relief funds that were taking over the rehabilitation of the 
refugees were headed, or at least ostensibly headed, by him.77 The 
vernacularisation of their activities left no room for doubts and turned the wheel 
full circle. Names and their meticulous knowledge represent the essence of all 
highly personalised societies and form the basis for leader-centred institutions.78  
Attaching names and, thus, persons to institutions and associations provided 
these latter with both a clearly identifiable identity and a position within the 
complex local social ladder. In the eyes of the ordinary man in the street, it was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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accordingly Jinnah rather than specific the charities concerned who solved the 
riddle of their personal difficulties and made ‘things’ happen.  
A decade later, Muhammad Ayub Khan would attempt to win back refugees’ 
hearts after his coup d’état in October 1958.79 Lt. Gen. Azam Khan took over the 
ministerial portfolio for the Rehabilitation of Refugees and launched a vigorous 
campaign to expedite their resettlement. A so-called Evacuee Intelligence Bureau 
and a Martial Law Regulation initiated a ‘witch hunt’ of both bogus claimants 
and hidden evacuee properties.80 Personal and household properties worth Rs 
17,000,000 were recovered from friends and extended families in India.81  A plan 
for compensation – in both cash and properties – was set up to benefit all those 
refugees who had not a house or any land allotted.82 Repeated visits to towns and 
villages and a tight grip on the activities of his departmental staff further 
enhanced his reputation among the refugee masses of former West Punjab. 
Indeed, Azam Khan’s administrative endeavours resonated with the idea of Pak 
Jamhouriat (Pure Democracy) that reverberated in many government 
publications and speeches.83 Government authorities toured the whole of West 
Pakistan with the stated, and ambitious, aim of making personal contact with all 
citizens and demonstrating what they touted as their genuine commitment to 
serve the wider national community. As a part of the anti-corruption drive, 
division and district offices were frequently visited by staff members of the Chief 
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Secretariat, and nearly 1,500 officers were removed from service or reduced in 
rank.84  
Unquestionably, this was music to many refugees’ ears. They had been 
weeping metaphorical bitter tears at precisely the evils that Ayub Khan’s 
administration was now promising to stamp out. Indeed, the new course of 
political events appeared to rend the silence of that marginality to which some 
refugees had been relegated, by encouraging a self-reacquisition of their sense of 
responsibility. Apparently free from the dead-weight burden of administrative 
malpractices, displaced persons felt they could finally gain back control of their 
lives and the lives of their dearest ones.85 Decisions over their belongings and 
their future now seemed to be – however partially – in their hands and liberated 
from the constraints of the bureaucratic ‘oddities’. This newly-acquired refugee 
self-awareness set in motion that mechanism of ‘action-causation’ that is at the 
very heart of the local idea of responsibility and social order. As they were 
accountable for their own actions, refugees could now take on the responsibilities 
for their families and biraderi too.86    
Some of them disclosed these same feelings to Ayub Khan himself during his 
tour of the former region of the Pakistani Punjab in late 1959. Ceremonial arches, 
placards and thousands of persons chanting and waving their flags welcomed the 
new President to Multan on 17th December. According to the local accounts, “the 
tremendous mass upsurge and enthusiasm […] was reminiscent of the heydays of 
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the Pakistan movement”.87  A group of refugees was there ready to address Ayub 
Khan and expressed their gratitude for finally being able to get the better of 
Pakistani bureaucracy and secure an allotted property.88 The new anti-corruption 
campaign and legislative framework had however already highlighted numerous 
lacunae. The Chief Justice Cornelius would make these even more evident in a 
speech during a dinner hosted by the Lahore Rotary Club on 12th August 1960. 
Women whose earrings sparkled as they turned their heads and men with 
perfectly oiled hair entertained the distinguished guest. “The present pertinent 
laws [...]” – the Chief Justice pointed out over a mutton karahi – “debar citizens 
from ventilating their grievances before competent authority and thus could be 
made to ‘stifle’ prosecution of a corrupt public servant”.89 The Anti-Corruption 
Department was certainly able to inquire quite quickly into citizens’ reports of 
corruption against public servants. Yet, the majority of the cases rarely had a 
judgement passed on them as the heads of departments had to authorise the 
prosecution of their accused employees.  
Nevertheless, Ayub Khan’s reputation among common Pakistan citizens 
appeared during the early years following the 1958 coup to be unblemished. His 
power, leadership and civic individuality conformed to a very subtle plot that 
clearly echoed local religious processions. The Central Government freed up Rs. 
569 crores for the development of new housing plans as, Ayub Khan’s manifesto 
suggested, “urbanisation […] [was] a sign of progress”.90 New schools, 
dispensaries, banks, seed suppliers and cooperatives sprung up in Union 
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Councils across the most refugee-saturated towns and villages of former West 
Punjab.91 In Jhelum new roads were constructed and old ones covered with 
asphalt.92 Boosting education, cooperative associations and agriculture meant 
broadening the horizons of refugees as well as locals through an extension of 
their idea of ‘community’ into new spatial and social areas. As Ayub Khan 
toured extensively the districts of the country, he established himself as its most 
eminent political figure, and both sanctioned and cemented the development of 
the new ‘national’ body.93 Buntings, chants, ceremonial arches, huge crowds 
gathered along the roads to cheer the President and the idea itself of a journey 
within a specific domain were all part of a repertoire that owed its substance to 
religious processions. These latter’s transit along the streets or through the 
squares of newly-established suburbs marked both the acceptance and the 
accession of their inhabitants into the wider and historically-rooted social 
community. Likewise, Ayub Khan’s arrival in towns and villages shaped up to 
be a rite of passage together with an initiation rite for the bulk of Partition 
migrants. Hence, the inauguration of new residential units, hospitals or schools 
was used as a peg to spur refugees to “shake off the feeling that they were 
refugees”.94  
The never-ending disputes between the centre and the peripheries of the 
political power, the ‘committee complex’ and charismatic figures in this fashion 
established themselves as the Grundnorm of the everyday institutional life of 
Pakistan. A new state needs however to project itself into the international arena !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and become an active agent within the realm of the international relations. To 
many in Pakistan it seemed that India was lying in wait for it. 
 
Until death tears us apart: India, Pakistan and the resettlement of refugees 
in West Punjab 
 
The Gymkhana Club was hosting one of its renowned dinner dances that night. It 
was 11th September 1948. A couple of women with their hair backcombed were 
dishing the dirt on the new lover of that official who was having a word with a 
European High Commissioner. “Nest of vipers”, the cuckolded wife muttered 
between her teeth as she eavesdropped on their conversation. As the District 
Commissioner entered, the room fell silent. His face was as black as thunder. He 
cleared his throat and announced that Jinnah had just passed away.95 On 12th 
September Lahore was like a death city. The sensitive body of the newly-
established nation sank into a coma that that would last for days. Offices, shops, 
banks and factories remained closed and everyday life was brought to a 
standstill.96 The millions of Pakistanis who mourned the death of their leader 
staged an elaborate collective ceremonial that nourished their national 
consciousness and spoke of their identity to the outside world.97  
In a curious twist of fate, Jinnah’s demise coincided with the capitulation of 
the Nizam of Hyderabad in distant Deccan. In Lahore, mourners mingled with 
those demonstrators who were calling for immediate retaliatory action against 
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India.98 Unsurprisingly, one of the most well-attended memorial services was the 
military parade held in the local Cantonment area. The last post and the firing of 
a 31-gun salute topped off the march-past and sounded a clear warning to the 
neighbouring state.99 Pakistan was indeed reaping the harvest of the process of 
militarising the everyday. An unknown number of persons, probably in the 
hundreds of thousands, crowded around the Chief Minister of Punjab the Khan of 
Mamdot after another commemorative ceremony shouting anti-Indian slogans. A 
couple of hours earlier some of them had reached the Governor’s House and 
asked for his permission to personally attack Amritsar.100 
There was something of an atmosphere in the relationship between India and 
Pakistan. Classics of any theoretical handbook dealing with International 
Relations and World History, almost all the studies on the troubled relations 
between the two neighbouring states have focused on the twists and turns of their 
dispute over Kashmir and on the issue of nuclear proliferation.101 In spite of it 
being acknowledged as the very first serious test of South Asian regional 
stability, the impact of the refugee humanitarian crisis that had followed 
independence has been rarely looked into.102 This section accordingly seeks to 
fill this gap in the current literature by revealing the historical and ‘institutional’ 
roots of those deep-seated feelings of resentment at India that, even more than !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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sixty years later, still reverberate through the discussions and speeches of 
Partition refugees and their relatives. As it addresses the anthropological and 
‘intimate’ implication of the negotiations on refugees from agreed and non-
agreed areas and evacuee properties, it will explain how the so-called enduring 
rivalry between India and Pakistan bottled up a vicious circle of mutual 
treacheries.  
Refugees, their resettlement and their rehabilitation on land had set the tone 
for the way in which the two states would think of themselves and their mutual 
relations in the years to come. Indian and Pakistani authorities alike started off 
on the wrong foot by inaugurating their mutual policies of institutional 
duplicities and remarkable volte-faces. Leaders on both sides publicly nodded 
their consent to pave the way for a well-managed transfer of liabilities, persons 
and properties.103 Yet, their respective diplomatic corps frequently allowed 
negotiations to fall through and hindered provincial governments in their efforts 
to facilitate the transfer of refugees from East to West Punjab and vice versa. It 
was, in the words of US analysts, a “symptomatic […] inability of the Dominions 
to cooperate” that transmuted into an almost complete lack of any joint approach 
to the resolution of refugee emergency.104 
“The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have […] decided 
that the movement of these people […] is to have first priority. They have agreed 
to co-operate with each other on this matter to the fullest extent and to ensure 
that the movements in both directions are completed with the greatest possible 
speed”, stated the joint statement that Liaquat Ali Khan and Nehru released to 
the press after an inter-ministerial conference held on 19th-20th September 1947 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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in Lahore.105 The words, however, were doomed to fall on stony ground. Three 
weeks later, the ‘Paris of the East’ would host another summit meeting that 
aimed at attending to the humanitarian crisis. There, the idea of a military-
managed evacuation of those pockets of refugees who were waiting to reach their 
perceived homeland from across the whole of the East and West Punjab was 
almost immediately ruled out.106 For their part, the Pakistani representatives were 
strongly opposed to regular timetabled meetings at either central government or 
provincial level. The formula that settled the dispute between the two contestants 
turned out to be a masterpiece of diplomatic rhetoric. Ministers would have met 
at both levels “on ad hoc basis if there was sufficient demand”.107 What was 
supposed to qualify as ‘sufficient demand’ was a secret that died with both 
Liaquat Ali Khan and Nehru.  
Both leaders unquestionably reacted to the news – scars of them, actually – 
that they were receiving from the ‘front’. Rumour had it that the phenomenon of 
forcible conversion was driving India to restrict the passage of Muslim women to 
West Punjab through an introduction of a ‘special’ permit-system.108  In 
retaliation, Pakistani troops were hindering the extraction of pockets of Hindu 
and Sikh refugees from the districts of Attock, Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Gujrat and 
Sialkot Districts. Nehru flew off the handle and went berserk. As he raged 
against the behaviour of the neighbouring state, he went as far as to hint at a 
military intervention.109 Besides, it was the Indian Prime Minister himself who 
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had previously declared that the refugee emergency was “a situation which is 
analogous to war and […] [they were] going to deal with it on a war basis”.110  
Feeling ran even higher when diplomatic representatives and ministers moved 
on to the delicate subject of the distinction to be drawn between refugees from 
agreed or non-agreed areas. On 20th September 1947 both India and Pakistan 
concurred that the priority was to be given to the transfer of the evacuees 
between the two wings of the Punjab, the only exception being Pakistan’s 
government servants in other Indian regions.111 From then on, the difference 
between agreed areas and non-agreed areas migrants would become the 
constantly debated topic among both local and foreign observers and journalists. 
The situation spiralled almost completely out of control and West Punjab in 
particular progressively turned into a powder keg that was capable of exploding. 
Accords notwithstanding, in early October 1947 trains that were loaded with 
refugees from non-agreed areas in India were still reaching the towns of the 
Pakistani Punjab.112 Provocations were however far from over. Indian 
representatives likewise enraged their counterparts on other occasions. Later on, 
during an umpteenth conference, they tabled a report containing aggregate 
figures of refugees from both East Punjab and the western United Provinces. 
Pakistani authorities raised their voice in an attempt to jog the memory of these 
Indian envoys about their recent agreement. Yet, the latter’s only answer was to 
ask Pakistan to state publicly that it would not have made Muslims from western 
UP welcome.113  Pakistan unquestionably had its back to wall: refusing to 
accommodate these refugees would be the same as disavowing the ethics of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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country’s struggle for independence and life. Even the traditionally prudent and 
buttoned-up British High Commissioner went as far as to comment that 
“Pakistan will be sabotaged by the deliberate sending of ex-Punjab Muslims to 
the Punjab instead of getting the miserable refugees from East Punjab”.114 
A psychological warfare had just broken out. It was a no holds barred contest 
that would touch on everyone’s respective sore points. Pakistan’s jealousy and 
inferiority camouflaged a deep-seated feeling of mistrust.115 Negotiations were 
tantamount to those everyday aspects of life and politics that banked heavily on 
personal relationships. It was indeed the lack of faith – virtually a criminal 
offence in all trust-based societies – that informed this Pakistani paranoia and 
paralysed any attempts of regional cooperation.116 In a context where persons 
exist only if their reliability and honesty are publicly displayed, talks like those 
on Evacuee Properties resembled, and proved to be, an uphill struggle. The so-
called ‘cold war’ of the subcontinent in many ways revolved around the value, 
transfer by sale or exchange, and the utilisation of both movable and immovable 
properties that had been left behind by refugees in both wings of the Punjab.117 
Unofficial estimates put the monetary worth of Hindu and Sikh lands, houses and 
other permanent commodities at around Rs. 250,000,000.118 The figure was 
staggering. An eventual request for reimbursement could have sent Pakistan and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114 Ibidem. 
115 Secret No. 304, 6th August 1949, NND 897209, NARA and Office Memorandum, 10th October 
1956, NND 897209, NARA. 
116 Memorandum, n.d., NND 897209, NARA. 
117 Extract from Opdom No. 133 (Part II) from UKHC (Pakistan), 25th August 1949, DO 
35/2994, NAKG.  
118 Despatch No. 67(677) – Office of the UKHC (Karachi), 3rd February 1949, DO 35/2994, 
NAKG and Political Situation in West Punjab, July 1948, 2nd August 1948, NND 765024, 
NARA. 
!! 235 
its economy flying. By comparison, the sum of Rs. 20,000,000 that India would 
have owed to the Government based in Karachi was regarded as chicken feed.119 
Indo-Pakistan talks over the evacuee properties hit a snag not only over a 
possible future demand for compensation but also on the mapping of the 
properties. A leaked government document dropped hints that Pakistan 
authorities had set their sights on the inclusion of lands and houses lying outside 
East Punjab within the agreement.120 Sparks flew as soon as the Press 
approached the controversy. Allegations that the Government of Pakistan was 
concocting a campaign to devaluate the immovable evacuee properties appeared 
on the pages of the Hindustan Times (New Delhi).121  Between the lines, the law 
of retaliation was invoked. Dawn (Karachi) raised the stakes by encouraging “the 
timid doubter [to take into consideration] the Satanic provisions of some of the 
Ordinances promulgated by the Provincial Governments of India”.122 The 
administration at issue was that of the United Provinces. Apparently, it had just 
passed an ordinance that forced Muslims, whose relatives had fled to Pakistan, to 
relinquish their immovable possessions, despite them remaining resident in India. 
Sins were finally finding political institutions out, and even Pakistan’s authorities 
were no saints. The bank accounts of shops and businesses were progressively 
blocked as they were now considered ‘intending properties’.123 The bureaucratic 
definitions of evacuees, refugees and ultimately of Indian or Pakistani citizens as 
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well were proving unable to make sense of this multi-faceted, slippery and 
complex reality.  
Any news concerning evacuee properties usually cast a chill over both the 
governments of India and Pakistan. Authorities avoided each other in order not to 
deal with the topic. The Pakistani Minister for the Rehabilitation and the 
Resettlement of Refugees came under attack from foreign chancelleries for his 
prolonged and deafening silence.124 At the negotiating table, India and Pakistan 
shared the same non-verbal language. Refusing to meet in order to negotiate 
resources and commodities meant repudiating their identity and eminence, and, 
in turn, denouncing their unreliability and dishonesty.125 It was an institutional 
and, even more important, personal non-acceptance of the counterpart and its 
institutional representatives.  In mid-June 1949 Nehru’s patience wore thin. The 
Prime Minister of India threatened to cause all current negotiations to fail, should 
the question of Evacuee Properties not be given high priority on the Ministers’ 
agenda.126 A conference was finally held in Karachi on 25th-26th June 1949 and, 
in the orotund language of press releases and joint statements, ratified that India 
and Pakistan were a married couple legally separated but still living together in 
the same evacuee property. The fortunes of the affair would drag out for years, 
have their peaks and troughs but never be properly settled. Indeed, the march of 
time confused the issue. As a result of the overcrowding that had followed the 
early resettlement of refugees in the Punjab countryside, the whole of the region 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
124 Extract from Opdom No. 27 (Part II) from UKHC (Pakistan), 15th July 1949, DO 35/2994, 
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experienced a rapid fragmentation of a great number of its agricultural lands.127 
To top it all, family disputes and alterations in the condition of buildings made 
decisions over value and ownership even more complicated and, it goes without 
saying, negotiations almost impossible.128  
Negotiations on evacuee properties and the transfer or status of the refugees 
touched raw and very sensitive nerves. Their fallouts would not disappear 
without trace from the elaboration of an everyday sense of belonging to a wider 
community, and instead intermingled fatally with internal regional hierarchies 
and identities.   
 
All for one and one for all: creating a nation, levelling down differences 
 
Et j’entends siffler le train 
que c’est triste un train qui siffle dans le soir 
[…] 
que c’est triste un train qui siffle dans le soir 
J’entendrai siffler le train toute ma vie.129 
 
A long train packed with refugees left the station of Walton Road, Lahore in the 
late afternoon of a chilly day in October 1948. It was the 78th – and the last one – 
and would reach Karachi in a few hours. There were no relatives waving their 
handkerchiefs or mothers giving advice. Only the then Governor of the Punjab 
Francis Mudie and several officials had attended this hastily-arranged farewell 
ceremony.130 The atmosphere was pervaded by the kind of sadness that only the 
remaking of an old American folk song by a French chansonnier can convey. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127 Punjab Gazette – Extraordinary Issue, 2nd December 1952, UPL. 
128 Conversation with Dr. Saeed Elahi, Lahore, 14th February 2010; and Movable EP Agreement 
with India – Despatch No. 384, 19th December 1953, NND 938750, NARA. 
129 R. Antony, J’entends le train qui siffle, 1962.  It should be noted that Richard Antony merely 
revisited the popular folk song ‘500 miles’ (also known as ‘Railroaders’ Lament’). 
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Sarah Ansari has already analysed the negotiations and the iron fist that had 
anticipated the transfer of hundreds of thousands of refugees to Sindh in her Life 
after Partition. Migration Community and Strife, 1947-62.131 As 
comprehensiveness asks for a short discussion of the controversy within this 
section, it will only be briefly broached therein. Nevertheless, the dispute will be 
re-framed in the interpretative framework of the early attempts of the federal and 
provincial institutions at consolidating the Pakistani nation by coalescing all its 
different sections and groups. “Who is a Pakistani?”, wonders Farzana Shaikh in 
her latest book.132 When it comes to investigating the business of ‘national 
identity’, Shaikh relies on well-established arguments present in existing 
literature and concludes that the muhajirs from East Punjab did not show any 
kind of attachment to the label ‘refugee’ and its subtle moral implications.133  
This section will re-address this historiographical trend and argue the need to 
recognise the troubled and difficult path of the migrant community of the West 
Punjab throughout the early nation-building processes that followed August 
1947.   
Refugee resettlement and rehabilitation tested the stability as well as the 
institutional relationships that existed between the Punjab and the remaining 
regions of the western wing of Pakistan. The responsibility for the early 
reception of millions of displaced persons unquestionably fell mainly on West 
Punjab, almost bringing it to its knees and verging on the brink of social 
collapse. An initial estimated surplus of about 1,600,000 refugees tipped the 
balance of the fluxes in favour of a re-distribution of people to the neighbouring !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
131 S. Ansari, Life after Partition. Migration, Community and Strife in Sindh, 1947-1962, Karachi, 
2005. See also S. Ansari, “Partition, migration and refugees. Responses to the arrival of Muhajirs 
in Sind during 1947-1948”, South Asia, 18, 1995, pp. 95-108. 
132 F. Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan, London, 2009, pp. 46-80.  
133 Ibidem, p. 51.  
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provinces of Sindh, Baluchistan and the NWFP.134 Indeed, this succession of 
ordeals had placed Pakistan against the wall and forced federal and provincial 
governments through the hoops of the first-ever call for a demonstration of 
national cohesion. On 4th December 1947 all the delegates from the country’s 
different regions met in Lahore with the aim of getting the conundrum sorted out. 
Negotiations were not promising. Neither the official nor the off-the-record 
agenda of those who were sat at the negotiating table tallied. The representatives 
of West Punjab aimed at the transfer of no less than 1,000,000 persons to Sindh, 
Baluchistan and the NWFP.135 Sindh’s officials, by contrast, firmly kept their 
cards close to their chest. For their part, both Baluchistan and the NWFP opted 
for a cunning wait-and-see strategy.  
This give-and-take manoeuvring left a nasty taste in everyone’s mouth. 
100,000 refugees would soon head towards the NWFP, while 25,000 of them 
would reach the region of Baluchistan. The princely states of Bahawalpur and 
Khaipur did their share of work by accepting nearly 75,000 displaced men and 
women. Apparently, Karachi agreed on accommodating up to 500,000 
persons.136 Doubts were however cast upon the real intentions of the Sindh 
authorities. “Whether or not Sindh is really willing to take 5 lakhs is doubtful”, 
wrote British Deputy High Commissioner, Lahore, S. H. Stephenson in the 
margin of his letter to the Commonwealth Relation Office.137  His remarks were 
far from short-sighted. In February 1948, the Chief Minister of Sindh 
Muhammad Ayub Khuhro ate his own words and brushed aside the possibility of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
134 Brief Summary of the Refugee Problem, 12th August 1950, NND 948832, NARA. 
135 Extract from a Report from H. S. Stephenson, ESQ, Lahore to Sir Grafftey-Smith – Ref. No. 
PHC 29/47, 7th December 1947, DO 142/440, NAKG.  
136 Extract from Report from Deputy UKHC (Lahore) – POL 10384/48, 30th December 1948, DO 
142/440, NAKG. 
137 Extract from a Report from H. S. Stephenson, ESQ, Lahore to Sir Grafftey-Smith – Ref. No. 
PHC 29/47, 7th December 1947, DO 142/440, NAKG.  
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a relocation of more than 100,000 West Punjabi refugees to his region.138   The 
reaction of Pakistan’s central authorities was instantaneous. Ghazanfar Ali Khan 
stigmatised the about-turn as mere ‘provincialism’ and summoned Sindhi 
authorities to collaborate with both the federal and provincial governments.139 
The embryo of Pakistan’s cohesion and unity was at stake. Pakistan had been 
made. Making Pakistanis was now the new imperative.  
It had recently come to the ears of the Minister of Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation of Refugees that a violent campaign against Sindh – orchestrated 
mainly by local politicians and refugees leaders – was underway in the transit 
camps of the West Punjab.140 Anti-Sindh sentiments were taking root at an 
increasing rate among the displaced persons who were still hosted in these 
temporary structures. Some of them refused to move to the neighbouring 
province while others made their way back to the ‘Land of the Five Rivers’ after 
having been resettled in Sindhi towns and villages.141 Seen through the eyes of 
Pakistani leaders, having recourse to authoritarian measures was, for all their 
deplorability, the only workable solution.  
The need to establish a harmonious relationship among the different parts of 
the country’s western wing was not the only trouble that loomed up in the long 
march towards a ‘chemical synthesis’ of reliable and reactive citizens and 
institutions out of the composite legacies of the British Empire. In September !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 Extract from Report from Deputy UKHC (Lahore) to UKHC – POL 6720/48, 1st February 
1948, DO 142/440, NAKG.  
139 Extract from Telegram No. 99 from UKHC (Pakistan) – POL 6467/48, 28th January 1948, DO 
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1953 both the federal government and the Pakistan Constituent Assembly 
revived the debate on the hoary and never-soothed problem of the distinction 
between refugees from agreed and non-agreed areas. “The Government is […] 
aware that the distinction, in whatever form it exists, is a source of dissatisfaction 
to the refugees coming from the non-agreed areas of India”, admitted the Federal 
Minister for the Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Refugees during a ‘Question 
and Answer’ session.142 As the chance to criticise the neighbouring state was to 
good to miss, he went on by attacking India from under this cover. “India” – he 
declared– “never implemented the Agreement of 1949 under which the 
distinction arose as far as Pakistan was concerned. The Government of Pakistan 
have adhered on this formula […] but the question of his [sic] abolition is under 
active consideration.”143 Acting with traditional - local - split-second timing, 
Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash – the Minister for Revenue in West Punjab’s 
Cabinet – made the views of its Government plain in early March 1954. “The 
House [West Punjab Assembly] has also passed a resolution and we had also 
written that this distinction should not be removed”, he replied to a question that 
Shameem Ahmad Khan from the refugee-reserved seat of Lyallpur VIII had 
posed him.144 The cut and thrust of the debate was marked by sheer political and 
parliamentary rhetoric for the very simple reason that the difference between 
migrants from agreed and non-agreed areas had de facto already been withdrawn. 
At grassroots level, the border between the two had always been quite porous. 
Those refugees from non-agreed areas who belonged to the upper classes or had 
important acquaintances within the ‘administrative circles’ had already freed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
142 Pakistan Constituent Assembly Debates, 23rd September 1953, PSCL.  
143 Ibidem.  
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their lives from the hurdles of allotment ordinances and practices.145 The 1951 
elections further clinched the controversy by not first discussing and then 
providing for a reservation of seats for them.146  
The introduction of the One-Unit system in 1955 would finally bring the 
drama to an end. As Nawa-i-Waqt (Lahore) damned in a long editorial published 
on 19th July 1954, the “clouds of provincialism […] had begun to obscure the 
Pakistani nation”.147 Strong feelings of attachment to local identities were 
worming their way into the body of a nation and a state in-the-making, and set 
back any constitutional attempt to get to the bottom of a balanced representation 
of the rich and composite Pakistani social tapestry within the federal assembly.148 
The idea of amalgamating the four parts of the western wing into a single unit 
entailed, in turn, careful re-consideration of all their constituencies. In July 1954 
the Government of Punjab appointed the Delimitation Committee to re-map the 
electoral geography of the region. As their power tottered, local politicians flew 
almost immediately into a panic. Party politics whipped itself into a state of 
frenzy. The Muslim League Refugees Consultative Committee strongly opposed 
the withdrawal of reserved seats, as the resettlement of refugees had not been 
completed as yet.149 A twelve-member delegation of refugee members of the 
Muslim League was formed, and asked to meet the Ministers of the Central 
Government in an attempt to present the list of their grievances.150  
The editorial offices of local and national newspapers were swamped with 
letters from distinguished as well as less famous readers. Oddly enough, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
145 Conversation with Rana Muhammad Iqbal Khan, Lahore, 1st December 2010. 
146 West Punjab Gazette – Extraordinary Issue, 5th August 1949, UPL and West Punjab Gazette – 
Extraordinary Issue, 23rd December 1950, UPL.  
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whole debate took place against a background of continuing institutional 
attempts to instil a sense of belonging to a wider community. As Radio Pakistan 
broadcast the national anthem for the first time and Pakistanis were welcomed to 
the screenings across the cinemas of the country, the bulk of the refugee 
community in West Punjab kept demanding official acknowledgment of their 
specific identity. Back in 1951, the creation of two-member constituencies had 
hewed to the plan of a quick rehabilitation of the migrant community. Yet, as 
Ahmad Mahsud Said – Muslim League Associate from Lyallpur – highlighted in 
his July 1954 letter to the Pakistan Times (Lahore), “if the position [is to] be 
examined today, it will be found that no more than 40% of the rural resettlement 
has not been completed so far and that the urban resettlement has not started”.151 
For his part, Jalil Ahmad Khan – President of the Refugee Association of 
Gujranwala District – revealed just how far the co-option of the refugees in 
municipal institutions had taken on the shape of an uphill struggle.  Run without 
any reservation of seats, the 1954 elections of the Gujranwala Board District had 
just represented a bitter pill for the members of the local migrant community to 
swallow. Indeed, refugees had secured only five out of the 38 available places by 
a very narrow majority.152 “Not until the refugees have been properly resettled 
and their peculiar problem satisfactorily solved should be the reserved seats be 
allowed to be abolished”, warned the chairman of the association.153   
 Mian Muhammad Shafi, however, struck a discordant note. A member of the 
Punjab Assembly representing the refugee-reserved seat of Montgomery VII, 
Shafi strongly opposed the initiative of his party fellows. “I wholeheartedly and 
emphatically oppose” – he argued – “the move for the simple reason that what !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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152 Pakistan Times (Lahore), 31st August 1954. 
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they seek to achieve is not the protection of the rights of the refugees but the 
perpetration of a privileged class amongst the Punjabis who would not be eligible 
to sit in the House”.154 The ‘mystery’ was finally unravelled. By polemically 
pointing his finger at the dualism between rights and privileges, Shafi revealed 
the mirroring tension between new and old biraderi links and patronage 
dynamics on one hand and a national community and big ideas on the other. As 
he went on saying, “the refugee problem under the present circumstances can not 
be solved to the doomsday [sic] and no amount of representation given to the so-
called leaders of the refugees in the Provincial Assembly can alleviate their 
distress”.155  
Metaphorically-speaking, the still-in-the-making nation of Pakistan was also 
mirrored in its hundred of thousands of women, whose infidelity was argued to 
have devastating effects on the happiness of conjugal life and the whole fabric of 
local society. Protecting their chastity came to be perceived to be an institutional 
duty.156 On 14th October 1955 Mian Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani was sworn in as 
the Governor of the new province of West Pakistan. Muhammad Munir – Chief 
Justice of the Federal Court – chaired the ceremony and sealed the beginning of a 
new institutional era.157 Following the report of the Demarcation Committee, the 
seat reservation for refugees who had been resettled in Punjab was abolished. 
Frequently compared to a women, Pakistan could be regarded as trying to 
preserve its ‘national chastity’ by levelling down identities and nationalisms, As 
the Prime Minister made clear while introducing the 1956 Constitution, “those of 
my friends who use phrases carelessly, who talk of "nationalities" […] I would !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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earnestly request them to desist. We are yet in a formative stage and even though 
the idea of Pakistan Nationalism, the idea of our common culture of one country 
and one people, shines bright, yet there are spots here and there, dark spots, 
where germs of disruption can thrive”. 158 !
***** 
 
This chapter has explored and highlighted the basic and ‘immaterial’ norms and 
rules that underpinned and inspired Pakistani early legal system and institutional 
life. Provincial and federal authorities alike could not ignore the challenge of 
rehabilitating millions of displaced persons. Their provisions, ordinances, mutual 
trips and bungled attempts to tackle the emergency supplanted, it has been 
argued here, the rather lazy debates of the Constituent Assemblies.   
 A morbid attachment to charismatic political leaders, the strained 
relationship with India, the curious proliferation of committees and boards, 
restrictive attitudes towards the freedom of speech have been treated as 
constituent – albeit dysfunctional – elements of both the institutional fabric and 
the ‘fundamental principles’ of Pakistan’s political history.  !
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Conclusion 
 
Lahore, late November 2010. I am surrounded by a deafening silence. I cannot 
hear a sound, not even the loud noise of the traffic. I look around: there is a tiny 
mosque on my right and, down there, low in the sky, the railway. A mild breeze 
stirs the leaves of a couple of trees. Shrubs replace the hundreds of graves that, 
back in 1947, drew a line between this refugee camp and the city. “Many years 
have gone by, years of war and what men call History”, I repeat to myself, 
quoting Carlo Levi’s novel.1  History has indeed stopped short of here, the 
former Walton Road reception camp. The yet-to-be-completed reinforced-
concrete structure of part of the well-known Bab-e-Pakistan makes of this barren 
land a peculiar free-trade zone. Here, the past does not square its accounts with 
the present, and vice versa. The chats that refugees carried out in these premises 
and the nearby suburbs still echo in the everyday communication of current 
Pakistanis. Twitter and Facebook turn into a virtual Walton Road Camp, wherein 
the clock of history has stopped and the betrayed dimension of achievement of 
independence fully surfaces.2 When, back in April this year, Asif Ali Zardari 
attacked the Sharif brothers by labelling them as ‘migrants’, he did not hit out 
blindly. As the reactions of my interlocutor suggest, he reopened an old wound 
that both institutionally and personally had never really healed. At various times 
in the last 30 years, Zia ul-Haq, Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif and Pervez 
Musharraf – all hailing from a refugee background – either supported or laid 
down their own foundation stone of this memorial to Partition refugees. The as 
yet unfinished monument mirrors the very same ‘broken narrative’ that has 
                                                
1 C. Levi, Christ Stopped at Eboli, London, 2000, p. 11.  
2 All the extracts quoted in this conclusion have been taken from either Twitter or Facebook 
public accounts that everyone can access freely at any time.  
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trapped the story on and around the post-1947 rehabilitation of the migrant 
community in West Punjab. This is precisely what this dissertation has attempted 
to address and re-evaluate. 
 
Exploring Lahore – This  [Facebook] Album [Chorn Aye Hum Wo 
Galyaan…!!] is dedicated to all those people who lived in Lahore, they left and 
they never came back. If your Parents/Fore-fathers migrated from Lahore to 
India, ask them the name of the area/street/bazaar mohalla they used to live. I 
shall try to capture pictures of those areas. I think it will be a great treat for 
them 
[…] 
Asim Iqbal – Well Said this Will be amazing if we share Pictures of our 
forefathers Home town and also The Pictures of home and street. I Live in 
Lahore My forefather Migrate [sic] from jalandhar to lahore Love to see the 
Streets of Jalandhar bazar Muhalla anything from Jalandhar.3 
 
The history of the resettlement of refugees in Pakistani Punjab is clearly part 
of the rich tapestry of the places in which they lived and which they regularly 
haunted. Asim and his relatives are a shining example of this whirl of emotions. 
His forefathers’ hearts certainly swelled with the pride of Pakistan nationalism 
but, as Asim inadvertently admits, their ‘home’ was in Jullundhur, India. The 
elaboration of a sense of belonging to the Pakistani state stemmed from their 
early experiences in camps, temporary-allotted houses and businesses. There the 
essential units of local society were challenged to such a degree that state 
institutions were perceived as a trauma and a scandal. Indeed, the dislocation of 
Partition brought about the ripping apart of entire biraderi, tabbar and gharana 
and of the local schemes of identification between occupation and position 
within the social ladder. Despite what government plans and widely-accepted 
narratives have argued thus far, refugees were hardly ever allotted properties on 
                                                
3https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.204513086271032.50546.110914475630894&type
=3 (accessed 18th July 2012). 
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the basis of their own place of origin, familiar ties and previous occupation. 
Instead, as oral accounts and official sources collected for this dissertation 
suggest, the current social stratification of Partition refugees and their families in 
Pakistani Punjab’s towns and villages is a by-product of history rather than an 
institutionally-targeted strategy. Those biraderi- and place of origin-friendly 
resettlement schemes that were first publicised by government authorities and 
then assimilated into the historiographical mainstream have been proven here to 
be mere wishful thinking.4  Nevertheless, at a moment when ideas of 
individuality, anonymity and social mobility crept into what was a highly-
personalised and hierarchical local society, modernity and tradition intertwined 
in an intricate plot.  The eviction of tenants from allotted evacuee lands and the 
rekindling of the cooperative society movement mirrored the subtleties of the 
process of social change taking place during those years. As argued in Chapter 2, 
the notion of biraderi embodied one of those  ‘multiple modernities’ wherein 
traditions were reframed within the phenomena of the early urbanisation of the 
Punjab and the paradoxical questioning of traditional hierarchies. 
 
Salman Masood (@SalamanMasood): 
It’s funny how there is talk of building institutions but practice of personal 
worship 
Mohsin Hijazee (@MohsinHijazee): 
@SalamanMasood –Our inherent paradigm is: individuals build institutions, 
I[mran]K[han]  mostly takes this line. People always looking for a Messiah. 
 
 
                                                
4 As suggested in the introduction, see Government of Pakistan, The Journey to Pakistan: a 
Documentation on Refugees of 1947, Islamabad, NDC. See also M. Waseem, “Partition and 
Assimilation: A Comparative Study of Pakistani Punjab”, in I. Talbot, G. Singh (eds.), Region 
and Partition. Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent, Karachi, 2000, pp. 203-27; 
M. Waseem, “Muslim Migration from East Punjab: Patterns of Settlement and Assimilation”, in 
I. Talbot, S. Thandi (eds.), People on the move. Punjabi Colonial and Post-Colonial Migration, 
Karachi, 2004, 63-77.and, more recently, I. Chattha, Partition and Locality. Violence, Migration, 
and Development in Gujranwala and Sialkot, 1947-1961, Karachi, 2011, pp. 183-208. 
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Salman Massood (@Salaman Masood): 
@MohsinHijazee – True. Its deep rooted and based on religoious [sic] 
connotations too.5 
 
To what extent – the Introduction to this dissertation asked - does challenging 
the current interpretation of the resettlement of Partition refugees in West Punjab 
affect our understanding of the early years of Pakistan’s history? As the Lahore 
experience that largely informs this exploration of 1947’s longer-term 
consequences suggests, the socially-disrupting fallout of Partition-related events 
and resettlement practices did not merely shape the private lives of members of 
the refugee community. Balances of powers and patterns of patronage and 
authority within administrative departments, and between the latter and society 
as a whole, all had to be re-negotiated. Indeed, the sensitive fabric of 
administrative and political biraderi, tabbar and gharana had  – almost 
completely – been torn apart. The need to re-assert local structures of authority 
reverberated through bungled attempts to grapple properly with the humanitarian 
crisis that had arisen from the migration of millions of persons.   
This dissertation has thus brought out the intrinsic and somehow lethal 
weaknesses of the newly-established Pakistan Civil Service. Legacy of the 
colonially-glorious Indian Civil Services, the Pakistani one appeared not to have 
sufficient stamina to meet the basic needs of its users, let alone the capacity to 
put forward what scholarly literature has labelled as the “bureaucratic polity”.  
As both the Punjab and the Pakistan state failed (or, to be more precise, never 
attempted) to enjoin a viable, impersonal administrative and legal framework, it 
was patronage that assuaged citizen fears of being trapped in an endless maze of 
                                                
5 http://twitter.com/SalmanMasood/ (accessed 18th July 2012). 
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excesses of powers, ultra vires decisions and impossible-to-meet bureaucratic 
criteria. Persons – especially relevant and influential ones – turned into 
institutions. They became, as Mohsin would argue, Pakistan’s ‘inherent 
paradigm’. Their good offices were a condicio sine qua non for accessing the 
state and its resources.  
In the wake of William Gould’s recent research on India in the 1930s-1960s, 
both the traditional idea of and on corruption practices are here challenged and 
re-addressed.6  What foreign commentators and diplomats hastily pigeonholed as 
‘corruption’ were actually totally-acceptable (and accepted) norms of social and 
institutional behaviour. They stood out as being anthropologically ‘sustainable’ 
as well as suiting the needs of a state in-the-making. Nevertheless, the 
progressive institutionalisation of practices of favouritism brought about the 
transposition of the very same mechanisms of marginalisation that burdened 
ordinary local men and women in their everyday interactions. Indeed, only a 
tight-knit minority of the migrant community could count on relevant networks 
of influential acquaintances that enabled them to negotiate properly their access 
to much-needed state resources. Far from stirring up a scandal, patronage and 
cronyism triggered off a curious process of emulation instead. Along the streets 
around the Civil Secretariat in Anarkali, Lahore, so-called touts, petition writers 
and accommodating civil servants performed the very same negotiation rituals to 
the benefit of all those whom society and the government authorities themselves 
had put in the back row:  bribes and empty promises fed refugees’ hopes that 
their needs would be eventually met, thereby amplifying the process of social 
polarisation and individuals’ feelings of being at the margins.  
                                                
10 W. Gould, Bureaucracy, Community and Influence in India: Society and the State, 1930s-
1960s, Abingdon (Oxon), 2011. 
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Raza Rumi (@RazaRumi): 
Amazes me that analysts insult the intelligence of Pakistanis. Families in 
South Asia are well-knit composite units with shared interests! 
[…] 
Real tragedy of #familygate: it is not about individuals, heroes 
(C[hief]J[ustice]) and villains (M[alik]R[iaz]) but about the democratic system 
& const [sic] governance.7 
 
Elections provided socially-excluded members of the migrant community 
with a further chance to right perceived administrative wrongs and redeem 
themselves in society’s eyes. In March 1951, the province of the Punjab held 
Pakistan’s first elections based on universal franchise.  The engineering of the 
electoral rules and the mapping of new constituencies culminated in a corpus of 
regulations that stemmed from well-rooted values and practices. For all its 
paradoxical nature, the disbanding of entire biraderi called for the partial 
enthronement of its political relevance.  Instead of levelling down patronage 
practices, the ad hoc electoral committee and provincial authorities raised these 
dynamics to the highest dignities of the state-building process. Playing both 
politics and institutions by the reassuring rules of society, political stability was 
an almost predictable outcome.  
 The ‘anthropological’ sustainability of the chosen electoral system is not the 
only element that needs to be credited with the political stability of the early 
years of Pakistani Punjab's history. Raza Rumi will not take it amiss or 
personally. Yet, examining the campaign that anticipated the March 1951 
elections suggests that, despite taking the lion’s share and being academically 
acclaimed as the quintessence of Pakistani politics, biraderi were not the only 
ace up candidates’ sleeves. A substantial share of the votes that the future 
                                                
7 http://twitter.com/Razarumi (accessed 18th July 2012).  
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members of the Punjab Assembly scraped together resulted from promises of 
material benefits to single individuals who were unrelated to the candidates 
themselves. The latter being in the position to milk the government in charge for 
every single of drop of the locally-limited (and thus much sought-after) 
resources, the vote was quite easily conceded. Unsurprisingly then, in 1950s 
Punjab, stability was tantamount to single-party rule. Judging from what we 
know about Lahore during this period, voters strategically picked only those 
candidates who, through their party connections, could mould government 
policies and eventually satisfy their demands. Within this framework of 
interpretation, the resettlement of refugees tells a different story of party history 
in post-independence Punjab and institution-building processes. Here, the Punjab 
Muslim League and, to some extent, Pakistan itself redeem themselves in the 
eyes of those scholarly interpretations that have plumbed the depths of their 
failure.8 Indeed, by the standards of its own electorate, the provincial branch of 
the Muslim League and the local party system were institutions that worked. 
Insofar as it held sway over the redistribution of state resources and the reins of 
the provincial exchequer, the sun over its political ‘empire’ was not doomed to 
set. 
Classifying Punjabi political parties of the late 1940s and 1950s along the 
binary distinction of ‘conservative vs. progressive’ is a herculean task, the only 
exceptions being, needless to say, the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Communist Party. 
Nevertheless, local parties’ attitudes towards Islam and its role within the public 
sphere may well be a barometer of either their liberalism or conservatism. West 
                                                
8 As suggested in the Introduction and in Chapter 4, see A. Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The 
Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 49-135, 295-328; S. 
Mahmood, “Decline of the Pakistan Muslim League and its Implications (1947-54)”, Pakistan 
Journal of History and Culture, 15, 2, 1994, pp. 68-89; Y. Samad, A Nation in Turmoil. 
Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937-1958, New Delhi, 1995. 
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Punjabi refugees were apparently not infected with the same leftist syndrome the 
affected their West Bengali counterparts.  “Pakistan is nation conscious of its 
nationhood. Visitors […] are immediately conscious of this awareness of 
nationality, which is rooted in religious and economic but in many other common 
interests. Islam has been described as an individual experience creative of social 
order with implicit legal concepts”, pointed out a correspondent from The Times 
(London) in early 1948.9 The great majority of the refugee candidates for a 
provincial parliamentary reserved seat tapped into this popular mood as a way of 
winning over their opponents and, incidentally, ousting Islamist parties. Whether 
or not this was a winning move, it certainly drifted the political debate towards 
the troubled waters of religious clashes. 
 
Saeed Elahi – Chief Minister, S[hahbaz] S[harif], has announced a special 
Ramazan Package of 4 billion to provide quality edible at subsidized rates to the 
people during Ramazan 
[…] 
Malik Mumtaz Ahmed – Ch Parvez Elahi has announced a similar Ramazan 
Package. C[hief]M[inister] should ensure not to waste additional amount 4 
billion and ads in print and electronic media to gain political leverage.10 
 
The legacy of the resettlement of West Punjabi Partition refugees for the 
broader political life of Pakistan, it could be argued, has inspired the elaboration 
of that (dis)order that has been underlying the Pakistani constitutional system 
since the country’s creation. The resilience and the stability of Pakistan as an 
autonomous patronage political system was by no means a byword for state 
strength. The problem that Dr. Saeed Elahi and Malik Mumtaz Ahmed are 
discussing is ‘old hat’. As parliamentary debates over the future constitution and 
                                                
9 The Times (London), 26th February 1948. 
10 http://www.facebook.com/saeedelahimpa (accessed 18th July 2012). 
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institutional architecture of Pakistan lazily dragged on in the decade after 1947, 
federal and provincial authorities found themselves without a legal framework 
that was able to regulate their mutual relationships successfully within a newly-
established independent state. The result was a total mess in relation to 
responsibilities, roles and power jurisdictions. Both the Pakistan and the Punjab 
administrations found themselves trapped in an endless and somehow curious 
competition in institutional retaliation. Their policies were not in harmony with 
each other, and clashes between political personalities marked the grim everyday 
reality of local institutional life.  For its part, the Pakistani press was of no help 
in the shaping of a public opinion that had the strength to sting authorities into 
action.  In the face of political quarrelsomeness and inconsistency, Punjabi 
citizens, and the refugee community in particular, developed a morbid 
attachment to all those institutional individuals who made ‘things’ happen for 
them. For theirs was a personal and immediate relationship. It did not envisage 
the kind of party mediation that literature usually ascribes to ‘patronage states’. 
Top institutional figures were further expected to be actively involved in policy-
making processes as, of course, these were interpreted by the local society. As 
power naturally coalesced around groups, different provincial authorities (for 
instance, the controversy between Punjab and Sindh over the transfer of overspill 
refugees) and categories, they were asked to mediate between them and on behalf 
of the marginal sectors of the local society.  
Lahore, late November 2010. I am surrounded by a deafening silence. I cannot 
hear a sound, not even the noise of the traffic. “Many years have gone by, years 
of war and what men called History”, I repeat to myself.11 “The greatest 
                                                
11 C. Levi, Christ Stopped, op. cit., p. 11. 
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travellers have not gone beyond the limits of their own words; they have trodden 
the path of their own souls, of good and evil, of morality and redemption”.12 
                                                
12 Ibidem, p. 12. 
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